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Abstract
The thesis empirically studies drivers and determinants of incomes at the regional level in
the United Kingdom. It draws on literatures in labour and macro economics, and examines
these through a regional lens. The thesis contains three self-contained chapters.
Chapter 2 studies the effect of labour mobility on local earnings in Great Britain in
the context of large regional earnings differences. Using a panel of employee records, I
estimate the effect of internal in- and out-migration on the earnings of employees who do
not move. Over the course of three years, the effect of in-migration on earnings growth
is positive, with no adverse effect from out-migration. These effects are larger in urban
areas, consistent with agglomeration effects as the underlying mechanism.
Chapter 3 considers the effect of growing industry concentration within the UK on
regional earnings. Using detailed firm-level data, I show that the share of output produced
by dominant firms has increased since 2002. While firms with market power pay higher
wages, the labour share, the share of total value added earned by workers is lower. This is
consistent with a rent-sharing model, whereby dominant firms charge mark-ups that are
only partially shared with workers.
In chapter 4, I study technological invention as a driver of employment growth for
different skill groups in NUTS1 and NUTS2 regions in Germany, France and the UK.
Invention, proxied by patenting, has a positive effect on graduate employment. Both
graduate employment and patenting have positive effects on mid-skilled and non-graduate
employment, but these effects tend to be temporary, with no persistent increase in employ-
ment. Looking at the three countries individually, the results are suggestive of significant
differences that can be rationalised with reference to differences in labour market institu-
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis is comprised of three empirical essays that investigate drivers of average regional
earnings and income inequality between regions. Essays one and two focus on the United
Kingdom, while essay three adds France and Germany in comparison to the UK. It draws
on and contributes to literatures primarily in regional science and labour economics. The
common theme across the essays is to understand drivers of earnings at the regional level,
and to understand why earnings in some regions, within the same country, are so much
higher than in others. To this end, I apply theories and methods from labour and macro
economics to the regional level, focussing on three different drivers of earnings growth.
The UK is chosen as the focus of the analysis, as a country with high and persistent
inequality between regions. The UK also represents a specific variety of capitalism, as a
European country that is more closely aligned with US liberalism.
While the focus of the thesis is on inequality in terms of wage incomes, inequality
runs deeper than the purely economic level. The 2016 vote to leave the European Union
is largely interpreted as a revolt by areas that have been excluded from the benefits
of globalisation and technological progress. Aside from the political impacts, income
inequality has further effects that are deeply unfair, if not damaging to the prospects
of the country as a whole. These include disparities in educational attainment, social
mobility, general health, and life expectancy.
For this thesis, I study causes of regional income differences from different angles. The
first essay studies the effect of internal migration on local earnings. The second essay
considers market power and dominant firms as drivers of regional earnings and labour
shares. The third essay explores the effect of technological invention on employment for
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different skill groups. In this chapter, section 1.1 elaborates on the motivation for the
thesis. Section 1.2 provides an overview of the three essays, concluding with a summary
of the overall contribution of the thesis in section 1.3.
1.1.Motivation
Regional inequality is a long-standing issue in the UK economy (Massey, 1979). While
London is among the richest regions in Europe, some regions in Wales and the North East
are among the poorest. The success of London as a driver of national growth has long
overshadowed the stagnation and decline of regions that did not benefit from globalisation
and the transformation of the service economy. Despite its specialisation in the financial
sector, London was relatively unscathed by the financial crisis (Overman, 2011). Moreover,
already struggling regions were hit hardest by the austerity polices that followed (Fetzer,
2019).
While one chapter of the thesis explores the effects of internal migration on regional
inequalities, most people in the UK in fact never move very far away from where they
were born (Bosquet & Overman, 2019). Place of birth also determines other life outcomes
(Chetty, Hendren, Kline, & Saez, 2014; Chetty, Hendren, Lin, & Majerovitz, 2016), and
many people have strong preferences to stay in a place they grew up in and where they
benefit from strong networks. It is therefore important to create opportunities across the
country, not just in a few, highly successful places.
Unfortunately, the negative effects or considerable adjustment costs of economic change
on some regions or individuals have often been dismissed or underestimated. For exam-
ple, while foreign direct investment and trade have overall positive effects on national
economies, certain regions may be particularly exposed due to their skill and industry mix
(Autor, Dorn, & Hanson, 2013; Gagliardi, Iammarino, & Rodŕıguez-Pose, 2021). The ad-
justments to these structural changes come at a high economic (Autor, Dorn, Hanson, &
Song, 2014), personal (Goldstein, 2017) and political cost (Becker, Fetzer, & Novy, 2017;
Rodŕıguez-Pose, 2018).
The goal of this thesis is to apply theories and concepts from labour and macro eco-
nomics to the regional scale, to understand how they not only affect outcomes, but also
inequalities between regions. The UK provides a good context for this. Firstly, because
inequalities are deep and persistent. Secondly, because the political system is highly cen-
tralised, with little variation in formal institutions and policies across regions and cities
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(Pike, Rodŕıguez-Pose, Tomaney, Torrisi, & Tselios, 2012). While some areas of pol-
icy making are the responsibility of the devolved administrations of Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland, most policy decisions are made centrally by the national government
in Westminster. Local governments and the increasing number of mayors can shape local
priorities, but have little ability to raise taxes and therefore to direct local spending. The
uniformity of institutions across the country allows to focus on the underlying economic
mechanisms with high external validity in other contexts. While there are many structural
economic differences across regions, the focus of the thesis is on more recent trends that
are defining recent regional growth trajectories.
Economics has long been grappling with explaining differences in economic develop-
ment across territories. Indeed, for a long time, it was assumed that incomes would con-
verge, conditional on differences in technology and human and physical capital (Mankiw,
Romer, & Weil, 1992; Romer, 1994). The New Economic Geography developed formal
models to demonstrate why differences in income may persist (Fujita, Krugman, & Ven-
ables, 1999). From recognising that not all regions are equal, a lot of attention has been
paid to the particular advantages of cities (Duranton & Puga, 2004; Glaeser, 2011; Stor-
per, 2013). This thesis adds to this literature by studying several mechanisms that drive
wages at the regional level.
1.2.Overview of the thesis
The thesis draws together three independent essays, each studying regional income in-
equalities from a different angle. Chapter 2 considers the effect of internal migration,
chapter 3 studies the effect of market power and industry concentration, and chapter 4
explores the impacts of technological invention. The following provides a brief overview
of each chapter. The main message of the thesis is that local labour markets are highly
complex and shaped by a variety of forces. The thesis provides insights into some of these
forces that have so far received relatively less attention.
1.2.1 First essay
Chapter 2 estimates the effect of internal migration in Great Britain on earnings of those
who do not move. The effect of graduate migration has been studied extensively in the
UK context (Faggian & McCann, 2009; Faggian, Rajbhandari, & Dotzel, 2017). Likewise,
there is abundant evidence of the (limited) effect of immigration on local labour markets
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(e.g. Dustmann, Frattini, & Preston, 2013). However, mobility of employees during
their working lives has received relatively little attention. Descriptive analysis confirms
wide differences in average earnings between local labour markets, even after controlling
for individual observable characteristics. These inequalities beg the question: why do
individuals not simply move to an area where they can expect to earn more? And as
people move, why do these inequalities not decline over time? While differences in nominal
earnings may compensate for differences in the cost of living or the availability of local
amenities (Glaeser & Gottlieb, 2009), there is evidence for real inequalities in welfare
across regions, even after controlling for these factors (Kemeny & Storper, 2012). While
skills mismatches may be a motivation to migrate (Iammarino & Marinelli, 2015), a lack
in skills may also prevent those from a region where wages are low to move to a region
where wages are higher (Giannone, 2018).
The chapter develops a simple model of earnings, which depend on labour supply as
well as productivity, whereby productivity is endogenously determined by the local labour
force. Therefore, internal migration can affect both labour supply, where it is expected that
an increase in labour supply will have a negative effect on wages, as well as productivity,
where it is expected that in-migration will increase productivity and wages.
The chapter draws on the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, a 1% sample of all
employees in the UK, to develop a measure of labour migration between travel-to-work
areas (TTWAs), representing self-contained local labour markets. Descriptive analysis
confirms that internal migrants experience an increase in earnings upon migration. How-
ever, this is mostly driven by the effect of starting a new job. After controlling for this,
many internal migrants seem to be motivated by factors other than earnings, implying
that internal in- and out-migration may be credibly described as exogenous shocks to lo-
cal labour supply. The results show an immediate negative effect of in-migration on the
earnings of those who do not move, consistent with the labour supply effect. However,
this turns positive over three years, consistent with the productivity effect. These effects
are larger in urban areas, suggesting that the density and buzz of cities may be conducive
to the productivity enhancing effect of internal migrants. Conversely, there is no effect of
out-migration, either in the short or medium term.
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1.2.2 Second essay
Chapter 3 studies the effect of industry concentration and market power on regional labour
markets. Increasing market power of dominant firms is of growing concern globally, both
from a consumer and worker perspective (Eeckhout, 2021; Philippon, 2019). In particular,
this has been linked to a decline in the labour share, the share of total value added
earned by workers (Autor, Dorn, Katz, Patterson, & Van Reenen, 2020; Barkai, 2020).
While falling labour shares have been documented globally (Dao, Das, Koczan, & Lian,
2017; Karabarbounis & Neiman, 2013), the issue has not been studied from a regional
perspective.
The chapter shows that industries that become more dominated by a small number of
large firms are also more regionally concentrated. This suggests an important role of these
businesses for local economies. Dominant firms are under increasing scrutiny, because
their market power allows them to charge a mark-up over marginal cost, creating a wedge
between labour productivity and wages. If sales and labour productivity increase due to
growing mark-ups, wages remain stagnant and the labour share falls if labour markets are
perfectly competitive. This would imply a growing concentration of wealth in the hands of
business owners, and less in the hands of workers. Yet, models of efficiency wages explain
why it may be in a firm’s interest to share some of the mark-up with workers. Rent sharing
would result in higher wages at the firm level, with ambiguous effects on the labour share.
I test these hypotheses on a sample of UK businesses drawn from the Annual Re-
spondents Database X (ARDX). Descriptive analysis documents three important stylised
facts. First, industry concentration in the UK has increased considerably between 2002
and 2014 on a wide range of indicators. Second, industries where market power is high are
also highly regionally clustered. And third, most dominant firms can be found in London
and the wider South East region. Regression analysis shows that firms with market power
pay higher wages, suggesting that rent sharing is taking place. However, these firms also
have lower labour shares, suggesting that only a fraction of rents is shared with workers.
Yet, the impacts at the regional level are limited. In London and the South East, the
strong presence of dominant firms is counteracted by a large number of very small busi-
nesses. This suggests that more research on the impact of dominant firms on inequality
within regions is warranted.
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1.2.3 Third essay
Chapter 4 considers the employment effects of technological invention, measured by patent
filings, in France, Germany and the UK. The interdependence between innovation and
local human capital is well documented. Recent research has highlighted the importance
of multiplier effects, whereby high-paid workers – such as those working in innovative
industries – create more local jobs through local consumption, mainly for those without a
university degree (Lee & Clarke, 2019; Kemeny & Osman, 2018; Moretti, 2012). This also
feeds into theories of labour market polarisation, whereby employment growth is strongest
at the high- and low-paid ends of the labour market, with jobs in the middle becoming more
and more scarce (Autor & Dorn, 2013; Goos, Manning, & Salomons, 2014). The question
this chapter seeks to answer is two-fold. First, can the generation of new technology create
jobs for those without a university degree? Second, are there any multiplier effects from
technological invention or graduate employment for those with intermediate skills, defined
as having an advanced vocational qualification?
I approach these questions using aggregate regional data at the NUTS1 and NUTS2
level. In contrast to previous studies, I take into account that the multiplier effects are
likely to be dynamic, with effects taking time to materialise and disappearing again after
some time. To allow for this, I estimate the effects using local projections (Jordà, 2005). I
confirm previous findings of positive effects of patenting on graduate employment, and of
graduate employment on non-graduate employment. Additionally, I also find evidence of
positive, albeit short-lived effects of patenting on non-graduate and mid-skilled employ-
ment.
Given the differences in educational and innovation systems across the three countries
studied, considerable heterogeneity in the effects can be expected among them. Germany
is most active in patenting among the three, and innovative activity is the most spread
out across subnational regions. Both France and Germany have a tradition of vocational
education that is absent in the UK. Unfortunately, owing to limited data availability, the
investigation into cross-country heterogeneity remains suggestive at this stage.
1.3.Contribution and limitations
Regional income differences are driven by a variety of factors, including, but not limited
to, industry and labour force composition, demographics, and formal and informal insti-
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tutions (Storper, Kemeny, Makarem, & Osman, 2015). Each chapter of the dissertation
contributes to a different strand of research, including migration studies, industrial organ-
isation, and technological innovation studies. Each chapter identifies gaps in the relevant
literatures that are addressed with reference to the case studied. However, there are some
common themes that advance the overall contribution of the thesis.
Regional inequality in the UK is often portrayed to be geographically uni-dimensional:
between the North and the South, between old manufacturing and technologically ad-
vanced regions, between the winners and losers of globalisation. The analysis presented in
this thesis shows that the drivers of regional inequality are manifold. The results support
a relatively new cleavage in the British context, between large urban areas and smaller
towns and rural areas. The large cities of the Midlands and the North have lagged behind
the success of London. However, they now seem to benefit from some of the same forces
as London. For example, chapter 2 shows that larger cities benefit more from internal
migration than non-urban areas.
Chapters 2 and 3 rely on individual- and firm-level data to answer regional-level ques-
tions. While trends in regional averages are important, the micro-level allows taking into
account heterogeneity within regions. Microeconomic research provides insights into the
drivers and outcomes of individual behaviour, as well as the effects of outside forces on
individual outcomes. The goal here is to explain the opposite effect, to provide evidence
of the microfoundations for aggregate, regional outcomes. This poses challenges for causal
inferences, as the actions of firms and individuals both contribute to aggregate outcomes,
but are also affected by the regional environment. The chapters in this thesis try to solve
these problems by developing theoretical frameworks grounded in the literature that can
guide the analysis. This is combined with careful descriptive analysis to provide evidence
for the underlying mechanisms.
The thesis has some limitations. It focuses on the relatively recent past, and the effects
of short-term changes. Many of the territorial inequalities in the United Kingdom have
their roots in the long-term structural decline of some industries. Some of the regions that
are now relatively deprived were once among the richest in the world and at the heart
of the industrial revolution which started in Britain (Allen, 2009). Other regions and
industries were shaped by the British Empire and colonial trade (Jones, 2002; Sunderland,
2013). While the legacies of industrial revolution and empire still influence the modern
UK in many ways, the focus here is on current economic change and factors that can
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be controlled, at least to some extent, by policy makers today. Unfortunately, Northern
Ireland, with an economic and political history of its own, could not be included in the
analyses in chapters 2 and 3 due to data limitations.
While the focus of the thesis is on inequality between regions, there are other dimen-
sions of inequality (Bourguignon, 2015, ch. 1). While London is referred to throughout
this thesis as the region in the UK with the highest average income, the city is also home to
some of the most deprived neighbourhoods of the country. Furthermore, there are aspects
of inequality without an explicit spatial scale, between workers in different occupations,
with different levels of education, between ethnic groups, men and women, and genera-
tions. While important issues in themselves, the thesis only makes limited contributions to
these problems. Furthermore, the empirical analysis only considers labour income, mostly
of employees, in the formal sector. This leaves out the incomes and welfare of those out of
the labour force, as well as the self-employed and those working in the informal economy.
In conclusion, the main contribution of this thesis is to identify recent drivers of income
growth at the regional level, and explains how these contribute to inequality between
regions in the UK. It takes recent contributions in labour and macro economics and applies
these to the regional scale. It provides insights into how these forces play out across
different regions, contributing to ongoing debates on the sources of and policy response
to persistent inequality between UK regions. It also provides a wide range of descriptive
insights that I hope will encourage and shape further research into these topics.
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Chapter 2
Labour mobility and regional
earnings in Great Britain
2.1.Introduction
Regional income inequality in the UK is high and persistent, reflecting both differences
in skill endowments as well as differences in returns to skills (Duranton & Monastiriotis,
2002). While some of these differences are compensated by differences in the cost of
living, disparities are mirrored in unemployment, GDP per capita (Martin, Pike, Tyler,
& Gardiner, 2016), child poverty (Hood & Waters, 2017), and social mobility (Social
Mobility Commission, 2017). Faced with stark inequality, movements from low-income to
high-income regions could both give individuals an instant boost to earnings as well as
eradicate regional earnings differences over time. However, despite relatively high levels
of labour mobility (Tatsiramos, 2009), earnings inequality in the UK remains high.
In this chapter, I study the impact of internal migration1 on regional earnings in the
UK. I find rates of labour mobility of around 7% among employees each year. These
moves are highly diverse: there is no single pattern of internal migrations. While many
people move to London and the wider South East, coastal areas also saw surprisingly high
inflows of employees. On average, internal migrants experience a boost to their earnings
upon migration, but this varies considerably by destination, occupation and age. Inflows
This work contains statistical data from ONS which is Crown Copyright. The use of the ONS sta-
tistical data in this work does not imply the endorsement of the ONS in relation to the interpretation or
analysis of the statistical data. This work uses research datasets which may not exactly reproduce National
Statistics aggregates.
1In the following migrants refers exclusively to those moving within the UK. I refer to those moving
to the UK from abroad or vice versa as immigrants or emigrants.
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of internal migrants to a local labour market exert downward pressure on wages at first,
consistent with a classic labour supply and demand framework. However, over the course
of three years, this turns into a positive effect on wage growth, which is stronger in urban
areas. In contrast, out-migration from a local labour market does not have a significant
effect on the earnings of those staying behind, neither in the short or longer term. Overall,
the findings imply positive effects of labour mobility, both on internal migrants and non-
migrants.
Regional inequality in the UK remains a pressing problem and the subject of many
policy debates – in particular in the aftermath of the 2016 vote to leave the European
Union and the regional divides it has revealed. It is widely understood that internal
migration has positive earnings effects, at least for full-time employees. Yet, there is little
evidence on how internal migrant flows affect local labour markets. The chapter is most
closely related to Mitze and Schmidt (2015), who study the effects of internal migration on
regional incomes in Denmark. Faggian and McCann (2009) and Iammarino and Marinelli
(2015) estimate the effects of graduate migration on regional economies in the UK and
Italy, respectively. Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2008), D’Costa and Overman (2014)
and Duranton and Monastiriotis (2002) rely on internal migrants to identify city wage
premia. In contrast, the goal of this chapter is to estimate the effects of internal migrants,
and specifically employees moving mid-career, on those who do not move.
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 provides a review of the literature, which
forms the basis for the theoretical framework. The dataset and empirical strategy are
presented in section 2.3. Section 2.4 presents the results, first extensively characterising
internal migration flows in the UK and then estimating their effect on local earnings.
Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2.Related literature and theoretical framework
There is an extensive literature on the effect of immigration from abroad on local earn-
ings. Internal migration has been studied relatively less, with a focus on the effects of
migration on the migrants themselves, rather than the wider impacts of labour mobility.
The following provides a brief overview of the evolution of regional inequalities in the UK,
and with respect to wages in particular. I provide a short introduction into the literature
on wage determination and explanations behind the persistence of regional differences,
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followed by the role internal migration might play in these. This is summarised in the
theoretical framework as the basis for the following analysis.
2.2.1 Local earnings and regional inequality
The large gaps between rich and poor regions in the UK are widely cited to be one of the
reasons behind the 2016 vote to leave the European Union (Becker et al., 2017), and are an
important matter for government policy (HM Government, 2017). Not only in the UK, but
in many developed countries has a combination of technological change and globalisation
forces led to growing regional economic polarisation that is yet difficult to explain in
its extent and wider implications (Storper, 2018). The UK is the OECD country with
the sharpest decline in manufacturing employment since 1970, which exacerbated existing
income inequalities between northern and southern regions. This is not a new phenomenon,
but rather a reversal of the decline in inequality that the country experienced during the
post-war period. This in turn resulted out of changing national and international divisions
of labour in conjunction with the regional concentration of declining industries in the UK
(Massey, 1979). Measured in GDP per capita, regional inequality is among the highest
in the UK compared to other west European countries and has been rising steadily since
the 1970s (Martin et al., 2016). Economic decline in the North was met with population
decline, which only stopped in the 2000s when immigration from abroad into those regions
picked up (Coutts, Glyn, & Rowthorn, 2007).
Regional inequality is on the rise in many countries, not just the UK. In recent years,
the most successful areas have been large urban agglomerations. However, it is not only
the agglomeration of well-educated people that makes these places successful. Cities them-
selves also add to the productivity of their workers. Wages are generally higher in cities
than in rural areas, but workers moving to urban areas also experience faster wage growth
than their peers in rural areas. These gains stick with workers even once they leave an
urban area, indicating that cities increase the skills of their workforces (Glaeser & Maré,
2001; Champion, 2013; D’Costa & Overman, 2014; De la Roca & Puga, 2017). Duranton
and Monastiriotis (2002) show that regional income gaps in the UK are increasingly ex-
plained by segregation by skill, whereby high-skilled workers sort into high-earning areas,
and those with less education into low-earning areas. In contrast, the returns to skill have
converged across regions.
Contributing to the divergence between regions is the widening gap between earnings of
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high- and low-skilled individuals. This wage polarisation occurs along two lines. The num-
ber of relatively well paid jobs in manufacturing and medium-skilled service occupations
is shrinking due to import competition (Autor et al., 2013) and skill-biased technological
change (Machin, 2001). The workers benefiting from this trend can be found both at the
top and the bottom of the pay distribution, as both complex cognitive tasks and many
manual tasks and personal services are difficult to automate, outsource or offshore (Goos
et al., 2014; Gagliardi, Iammarino, & Rodŕıguez-Pose, 2015).
In a basic framework, regional differences in wages are caused by mismatches of labour
supply and demand. If this is the case, well integrated labour markets, where workers
are able to swiftly react to wage differences across regions, may reduce regional inequality
(Bachmura, 1959; Bonin et al., 2008; Lehmer & Ludsteck, 2010). However, not all de-
mographic groups are equally able to adjust, and lower mobility has contributed to the
relatively greater deterioration in employment and earnings of the lower skilled (Bound
& Holzer, 2000). Mobility can also be lower during recessions, slowing down the adjust-
ment to negative shocks (Jackman & Savouri, 1992; Saks & Wozniak, 2011). Following
the financial crisis of 2008, cross-border mobility in the EU declined and remains on a low
level, despite disparities in regional unemployment rates and labour shortages (Eurofound,
2014). Within countries of the European Union, inter-regional mobility is actually higher
in countries with higher GDP per capita, although it is difficult to compare statistics
across countries (Eurofound, 2014). University graduates are among the most mobile de-
mographic groups (Faggian & McCann, 2009). Additionally, geographic mobility is an
important factor in raising employment rates among graduates and improving skill-job
match (Iammarino & Marinelli, 2015).
Over the longer term, regional earnings differences are more likely to be driven by
differences in productivity. There are large differences in productivity between the regions
of the UK. Some of this is explained by differences in industry specialisation, as some
industries tend to be more productive than others (Gardiner, Martin, Sunley, & Tyler,
2013). Regional specialisations are highly path dependent and evolved over decades, if not
centuries. Some parts of the North and the Midlands of England became very prosperous
during the first Industrial Revolution, but have had a long period of decline from the 1970s
with the onset of deindustrialisation. The manufacturing jobs that were lost during this
period were largely replaced by low-skilled service sector jobs (Rowthorn, 2010). However,
even within industries, there are regional differences. Even the most productive industries,
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such as high-skilled services, tend to have above average productivity in London and the
South East and below average productivity in other regions (Gal & Egeland, 2018). There
are many drivers of productivity at various levels, nationally, regionally, at the industry and
individual firm level. Even within narrowly defined industries, there is a lot of between-firm
heterogeneity in productivity that is reflected in between-firm heterogeneity in earnings
(Barth, Bryson, Davis, & Freeman, 2016; Card, Cardoso, Heining, & Kline, 2018; Card,
Heining, & Kline, 2013; Goux & Maurin, 1999; Van Reenen, 1996). Therefore, the place
of work – both the location and the firm – are important determinants of wages.
Of course, individual characteristics, including observable and unobservable skills, also
play an important role in determining earnings (Andersson et al., 2012; Abowd, Kramarz,
& Margolis, 1994). In particular, there is increasing evidence of sorting of high-earning
workers into high-paying firms, leading both to higher inequality between workers as well
as firms (Card et al., 2013; Eeckhout & Kircher, 2011). The causality between employee
skills, productivity and earnings runs in both directions. While workers benefit from
higher firm level productivity, driven, among others, by capital intensity and technology,
workers themselves are also important drivers of productivity (Barth, Davis, Freeman, &
Wang, 2017; Galindo-Rueda & Haskel, 2005; Syverson, 2011). Hence, through localised
productivity spillovers and agglomeration economies, internal migration may have effects
on productivity and earnings (Groot, de Groot, & Smit, 2014; Mitze & Schmidt, 2015).
2.2.2 Drivers and effects of internal migration
Internal migration decisions – both whether to migrate, and the destination decision –
are complex. Individuals maximise their utility on a range of different domains, balancing
sometimes conflicting factors, such as income, career prospects, costs of living, amenities
and individual preferences (Biagi, Faggian, & McCann, 2011; Greenwood, 1997; Kennan
& Walker, 2011). The decision becomes even more difficult where it involves not only
an individual person but a family, so that multiple incomes and preferences have to be
taken into account (Mincer, 1978). There is a large body of literature concerning the mo-
tivations and outcomes of labour mobility and internal migration. Internal migrants tend
to be younger, better educated, and experience a boost to their earnings upon migration
(Greenwood, 1997). However, both the determinants of the decision to migrate, and the
choice of destination are different for different skill groups, making it difficult to draw
conclusions for overall flows (Piras, 2021).
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A phenomenon that has been studied more recently, in particular in the context of high
housing costs in the most productive cities worldwide, is labour sorting whereby the most
productive individuals who can expect to earn high wages sort into the most productive
cities. Costs of living are high in these cities, but the high-skilled can expect to maximise
their earnings there. This influx of high-earners pushes out workers in less productive
occupations and industries, who cannot afford to live in expensive cities. However, the
presence of a large group of high-earners also creates a lot of low-skilled service jobs,
resulting in rising inequality (Dahl, 2002; Diamond, 2016; Moretti, 2012).
When studying the mobility of individuals, most papers do find a positive effect of
migration on migrants’ wages (Bonin et al., 2008; Kennan & Walker, 2011). Identifying
the causal effect of migration on wages is far from trivial as it requires controlling for
unobserved selection bias. Furthermore, even for non-migrants who stay in the same job,
wages are not static: workers’ wages tend to increase as they accumulate experience, and
location- and job-specific human capital. Therefore, a change of job and labour market
also entails the loss of these assets. Nonetheless, empirical studies find both evidence of
an instant pay premium upon migration, as well as higher pay growth over time (Böheim
& Taylor, 2007; Rodŕıguez-Pose & Tselios, 2010; Yankow, 2003).
There are also many non-labour market related reasons to move. For example, people
may decide to migrate for amenity reasons, such as good schools, a beautiful natural
environment, an interesting cultural scene, to be closer to friends and family, or to follow
their partner. Unsurprisingly, many authors studying family migration find no or even a
negative effect of internal migration on household income (Clark & Davies Withers, 2006,
2007; Cooke, 2003; LeClere & McLaughlin, 1997). In some of the studies cited above
only men are considered, and results might well be different if women were included (e.g.,
Böheim & Taylor, 2007; Yankow, 2003). For heterosexual couples, the negative effects on
wives’ wages are relatively short lived, but husbands’ earnings are also largely unaffected by
a move (Blackburn, 2010; Rabe, 2011; Lersch, 2012). Ultimately, the decision to migrate
may be one of individual preferences. As will be shown below, those who migrated once
are also more likely to migrate again. In the 2016 UK referendum on exiting the European
Union, those living in their county of birth were 7% more likely to vote Leave if that area
was also affected by relative economic decline (Lee, Morris, & Kemeny, 2018). This is just
one example demonstrating that migration is an important life event, whether it signals
or changes personal characteristics and opinions.
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Internal migration might have larger effects on local earnings. However, it is unclear
which direction these effects take: On the one hand, internal migration might serve to
balance labour supply and demand, with out-migration leading to earnings growth and
in-migration leading to a fall in wages. On the other hand, internal migrants might affect
productivity through agglomeration economies and knowledge and skill spillovers. This
chapter is closely related to Mitze and Schmidt (2015), who find evidence for a virtuous
circle of agglomeration economies, which attract in-migrants, reinforcing agglomeration
effects. The effects can be compared to those of immigration. While immigration is often
found to have no overall effect on wages, there is evidence of small negative effects on
the low-skilled (Dustmann et al., 2013; Manacorda, Manning, & Wadsworth, 2012). In
contrast, low-skilled immigrants are often complementary to high-skilled workers, either
in production or by providing cheaper or a larger variety of goods and services (Cortés,
2008; Cortés & Tessada, 2011). Patterns of internal migration and immigration are closely
intertwined. Depending on the skill complementarities of immigrants and natives, immi-
gration can attract (Mocetti & Porello, 2010; Peri, 2007) or displace natives (Borjas, 2006;
Hatton & Tani, 2005). The internal migration response to immigration is therefore likely
to be skill-dependent. Recent evidence for the UK shows that newly arriving immigrants
do not have a displacement effect on natives, but on earlier waves of immigrants, espe-
cially the low-skilled (Giulietti, 2009). However, for developed economies, the effect of
out-migration, sometimes characterised as a “brain drain” (Docquier & Rapoport, 2012)
is rarely studied.
To summarise, internal migration can affect average local earnings through the skill
composition and its effects on agglomeration economies. While earnings differentials are an
important driver of migration flows, there are many other factors that influence migration
decisions. The following translates this into a simple framework to guide the analysis.
2.2.3 Theoretical framework
In this section, I describe a simple theoretical framework to illustrate the effects of internal
migration on local earnings, based on similar models developed by Combes et al. (2008),
and Graham and Melo (2009). Suppose output Y in area a is produced according to a
Cobb-Douglas production function using capital Ka and labour La:
Ya = Aa(saLa)
µK1−µa (2.1)
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Where Aa is total factor productivity (TFP) and sa is the skill level of the labour force.
If firms in the region are profit maximising, the returns to labour – the wage rate wa –
and capital – rents r – will be equal to their marginal product. We assume that capital
is perfectly mobile, and therefore the cost of capital is the same across regions. However,
wages are determined locally. For simplicity, the output price index is set to unity, yielding
the profit function:
Πa = Aa(saLa)
µK1−µa − (waLa + rKa) (2.2)
The first order conditions provide the returns to capital and labour:















Equation 2.4 establishes the negative relation between labour supply and wage, all else
equal. In the short-term, where labour demand does not adjust, internal in-migration
increases labour supply La and wages are expected to fall. In contrast, out-migration
from the area reduces labour supply and wages are expected to increase.
Equation 2.4 can be rearranged and plugged into equation 2.3, to yield the labour
demand curve in equilibrium :






Note that in equilibrium, wages no longer depend on the level of labour or capital. Instead,
the equilibrium wage depends positively on the average skill level of the labour force sa,
positively on TFP Aa, and negatively on the cost of capital r. Internal migration may
affect sa, by affecting the skill mix in the area, for example if there is sorting and migrants
tend to be higher skilled (Duranton & Monastiriotis, 2002). Note that sa is the average
skill level in the local area. For example, it is assumed that the share of workers with
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a degree will have an effect on the productivity and wages of all workers. Through this
mechanism, internal migrants may affect average earnings in the areas they are joining or
leaving (Barth et al., 2017; Faggian & McCann, 2009; Moretti, 2004). A related channel
is through effects on TFP, Aa. Internal migrants may bring new knowledge and networks
to an area, which raises TFP (Eriksson, 2011; Groot et al., 2014; McCann & Simonen,
2005; Power & Lundmark, 2004). In the empirical implementation of the model, we will
not be able to distinguish the skills and TFP channels, however both serve to illustrate
that internal migrants can affect average equilibrium wages.
The model is very simple and is only meant to illustrate two mechanisms through
which internal migrants might affect local earnings. It assumes that internal migration is
the only source of change in labour supply, abstracting from labour force participation,
natural increase and decline, and immigration. There may be a negative feedback effect
whereby previous residents are pushed out over time as house prices increase. The model
also assumes perfect competition in labour markets. Firms may have wage setting power,
and wages may be rigid due to other constraints such as long-term contracts and trade
unions. If internal migrants contribute to productivity growth, firms do not necessarily
share those gains with workers.
2.3.Data and empirical methods
Measuring migrant flows in the UK is difficult, as there is no population register. Official
estimates rely on registrations with family doctors and movements of students in higher
education (Office for National Statistics, 2016). Here, I identify migrants from a long-
running employer survey that also provides information on internal migrants’ earnings
and place of work. This section describes how the dataset is constructed and how it will
be used in the estimation.
2.3.1 Data
The Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) has been used frequently to address
questions concerning local labour market conditions in the UK (e.g. Graham & Melo, 2009;
Gibbons, Overman, & Pelkonen, 2014; D’Costa & Overman, 2014). As it identifies indi-
viduals through their working lives even as they change their place of work, it is uniquely
suited to answer questions around internal migration and earnings. The individual-level
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datasets used in this study were accessed through the Office for National Statistics Secure
Research Service.
ASHE is a 1% panel of pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) tax registered employees, who are
identified by the last two digits of their national insurance number (NiNo). Questionnaires
are completed by employers from information available on payslips, and the quality of the
data is considered to be high. Because of the NiNo identifier, employees stay in the survey
even if they change jobs. However, it is a known shortcoming that ASHE is less reliable
for those on low incomes, as well as those who move jobs frequently, as there is a time
lag between drawing the sample and sending out questionnaires. Only jobs that pay more
than the personal tax allowance are reported to HM Revenues and Customs (HMRC), so
jobs falling below this threshold are not picked up on ASHE. The personal allowance has
gradually increased from £4,745 of annual earnings in 2004/05, where the main dataset
for this study starts, to £11,850 in 2018/19. Also, self-employed workers are not included,
therefore workers in the so-called gig-economy, but also independent contractors and self-
employed professionals are not captured in the survey.
Since the dataset is a panel with an annual observation for each employee, it is possible
to trace people as they move and change jobs. Each year, employees appearing on ASHE
are identified as internal migrants if their travel-to-work area (TTWA) of employment is
different to that of the previous year. Employees that were missing for one year only are
also identified as migrants if the TTWA differs before and after the break. Employees
with longer absences from the survey are not considered in identifying migrants. As only
those in continuous employment are considered, graduates moving for their first job after
finishing university cannot be included.
I use the postcode of the place of work to assign TTWAs, following D’Costa and
Overman (2014). ASHE also provides the postcode of the home address, but this variable
is less complete and potentially more noisy. TTWAs are designed so that 75% of workers
in an area also live there, and 75% of residents in an area also work there. Hence, for most
employees, the work and home TTWAs are the same (Office for National Statistics, 2015).
Commuting patterns across TTWAs may be non-random, with high earners tending to
commute further (Brown, Champion, Coombes, & Wymer, 2015). To avoid any biases
that could stem from commuting patterns, I focus only on the place of work.
From an initial definition in 2001, TTWAs were updated in 2011 to reflect new census
results (Coombes & Office for National Statistics, 2015). For consistency, the 2011 TTWAs
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are used throughout. The downside is that the further the analysis is moving away from
2011, the less reflective TTWAs are of actual commuting patterns at the time. Given that
the density and capacity of road and public transport connections varies widely across
the country, the size and shape of TTWAs is uneven. Within the 75% rule, boundaries
were set to “maximise the number of self-contained areas” (Coombes & Office for National
Statistics, 2015, p. 9), resulting in a number of relatively small TTWAs. To increase sample
sizes in rural areas, some TTWAs were consolidated, bringing the total number down from
218 to 150 TTWAs of more even size (following Gibbons et al., 20142). Furthermore,
setting the boundaries of large cities is a difficult task. For example, in the east, the
London TTWA contains much of the areas along the Thames Estuary, which are part of
Essex and Kent. In the west, some London boroughs have been combined with Slough to
form the Slough and Heathrow TTWA. However, TTWAs have not been modified further
to facilitate comparability.
ASHE provides information on the hourly rate, usual hours worked, overtime and
incentive pay, and the occupation and managerial duties of the employee, continuously for
1975 to 2018. Crucially, for 2004 to 2018, it also provides the postcode of employment.
Throughout the chapter, earnings or wages refer to total gross weekly earnings, usually
in logs, in an employee’s main job. Some employees have more than one job. I retain
only the main job, defined as the one with the highest hourly wage or most weekly hours
worked, if hourly wages are the same. In the few cases where both earnings and hours are
the same, the main job is chosen at random. As ASHE questionnaires are completed by
employers, employer information such as industry and total employment are also included
in the dataset. While data before 2004 cannot be linked to location, I use the historical
data to compute total years of employment experience. As two time lags are required to
identify the internal migrants, the analysis covers the years 2006 to 2018.
Occupations are coded to the main National Statistics Socio-Economic Classifications
(NSSEC), which facilitates comparisons across time and classification regimes. There are
seven main groups: higher managerial, lower managerial, administrative and professional;
intermediate occupations; small employers and own account workers; lower supervisory
and technical employees; semi-routine and routine occupations. As shown in table 2.1,
these are summarised into three classes for the analysis – higher, middle and routine/
semi-routine occupations.
2Definitions and shapefiles for consolidated TTWAs based on 2001 boundaries were kindly provided
by Steve Gibbons. These were updated by the author to reflect 2011 boundaries.
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Table 2.1: Summary of NSSEC classes
NSSEC class Classes for analysis
1 Higher managerial, administrative and professional Higher occupation
2 Lower managerial, administrative and professional Higher occupation
3 Intermediate occupations Middle occupation
4 Small employers and own account workers Middle occupation
5 Lower supervisory and technical occupations Middle occupation
6 Semi-routine occupations Routine/ semi-routine
7 Routine occupations Routine/ semi-routine
Note: Based on SOC 2000 and SOC 2010.
All monetary values are deflated using the consumer price index. Employees reported
to work more than 100 hours per week, earned less than £50, more than £100,000 per
week or tripled their earnings from one year to another were removed as outliers. Those
switching from working full-time to part-time or vice versa were also not considered, as
this might distort earnings growth. As observations are aggregated below the regional
level, observations have not been weighted (following Gibbons et al., 2014).
Figure 2.1 provides the share of internal migrants in the sample each year. Each year,
around 7.5% of employees move to a different TTWA. As is commonly observed in the
literature, internal migrations declined during the recession in 2009 and 2010, but picked
up again thereafter.
Table 2.2 compares internal migrants identified on ASHE against the full sample.
Migrants earn slightly more, but also work longer hours than non-migrants. They are
more likely to be male and to be working full-time. Interestingly, among non-migrants,
the share of women is 50%, although the share of men in total employment is higher
(Office for National Statistics, 2018). Men may have a lower propensity to appear on
ASHE as they are more likely to be self-employed and therefore not being included on
ASHE (Obschonka, Schmitt-Rodermund, & Terracciano, 2014). Self-employment has risen
steadily in the UK (Costa & Machin, 2017), which might explain why this was not observed
in an earlier study using ASHE (Gibbons, Overman, & Resende, 2011). Internal migrants
work disproportionately in higher occupations (managerial or professional), according to
the NSSEC classification. Migrants tend to move repeatedly: the migrants identified in
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Figure 2.1: Share of migrants in the sample
Note: Internal migrants as a share of all ASHE employees.
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the data were more likely to have already moved before, confirming similar findings on
Italian data (Impicciatore & Strozza, 2016). Internal migrants have fewer years of total
labour market experience, calculated as the total number of years appearing on ASHE,
consistent with the lower average age.
Table 2.2: Summary statistics for internal migrants and non-migrants
Internal migrants All
Mean SD Mean SD
Age 38.51 12.06 40.85 12.72
Female 45% 0.5 50% 0.5
Full-time 79% 0.4 73% 0.44
With second-job 2% 0.15 2% 0.13
Gross pay 546 417 515 445
Basic weekly hours 34.25 9.68 32.83 10.06
Total weekly hours 35.37 10.38 33.98 10.79
Number of employees at place of work 18672 41453 18765 44967
Higher occupation 39% 0.49 33% 0.47
Intermediate occupation 36% 0.48 39% 0.49
Routine/ semi-routine occupation 25% 0.43 28% 0.45
Previous number of migrations 0.28 0.59 0.12 0.39
Years of labour market experience 10.7 6.79 11.6 7.3
Number of observations 146956 2165653
Note: Averaged over 2004-2018. Number of observations refers to the total observa-
tions (individuals x years).
At the firm level, we can distinguish between migrants who move between different
local units of the same enterprise, e.g. to a different office, branch or plant elsewhere in
the country, and those that start working for a different firm. About a third of all internal
migrants continue working for the same enterprise at a different local unit after a move.
As these moves could be a potential source of bias, table 2.3 compares these internal
migrants, dubbed corporate migrants to migrants who also change employer when moving
(independent migrants). Unsurprisingly, employees moving within a business are more
likely to work at larger firms, who are also more likely to operate from multiple locations.
Corporate internal migrants also have higher average earnings, but earnings growth upon
migrating is lower. Otherwise, the differences between the groups are small.
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Table 2.3: Summary statistics for corporate and independent internal migrants
Corporate migrants Independent migrants
Mean SD Mean SD
Gross pay 585.66 456.02 515.81 382.42
Gross pay (logs) 6.15 0.69 6.03 0.69
Earnings growth 3% 0.25 6% 0.4
Basic weekly hours 34.44 9.29 34.1 9.96
Total weekly hours 35.68 10.05 35.13 10.62
Urban area destination 0.73 0.44 0.74 0.44
Urban area origin 0.73 0.44 0.73 0.45
Age 40.8 12.02 36.78 11.79
Female 43% 0.5 46% 0.5
Full-time 80% 0.4 79% 0.41
With second-job 1% 0.1 3% 0.18
Previous number of migrations 0.23 0.52 0.32 0.64
Years of labour market experience 12.34 6.93 9.5 6.41
Higher occupation 38% 0.49 39% 0.49
Intermediate occupation 38% 0.48 34% 0.47
Routine/ semi-routine occupation 24% 0.43 26% 0.44
Large firm (>employees) 0.9 0.31 0.73 0.44
Number of employees at place of work 28263.7 50919.12 11040.66 29851.99
Number of observations 63387 83569
Note: Averaged over 2004-2018. Corporate migrants stay with the same enterprise when
moving to another TTWA, while independent migrants start working for another en-
terprise when moving. Number of observations refers to the total observations (indi-
viduals x years).
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2.3.2 Estimation strategy
From the theoretical framework described in section 2.2.3, we can derive an estimation
strategy that relates earnings to in- and out-migration in the local area. The estimating
equation is provided by equation 2.6, where wit are log gross weekly earnings of individual
i in year t. imat and omat are internal in- and out-migrants arriving in or leaving area a,
where individual i works in year t, da is an area dummy and dt is a year dummy to control
for macroeconomic shocks. Migrants are measured as a share of total employment in area
a.
wit = βXit + γ1imat + γ2omat + da + dt + uiat (2.6)
There are obvious endogeneity concerns with this equation. Both internal in- and out-
migration and local earnings growth might be driven by other underlying factors, for
example, the opening of new businesses or plants in the area, or conversely the closure
of businesses and loss of jobs. Furthermore, internal migration may be correlated with
other shocks to the labour force, e.g. change in participation or immigration from abroad.
The following descriptive analysis of the data in section 2.4.1 will attempt to dispel these
concerns to some extent. It is very hard to predict internal migrations, both the event
and the destination (Piras, 2021). Most employees do not move in any given year. Most
internal migrants do experience income growth upon migration, but others do not. As
the discussion of the literature on family migration has shown, there are many reasons
why people move, and some of these moves may be out of career considerations for some
household members, but this is not always the case. Moves, especially across larger dis-
tances, are important life decisions, where income plays an important, but not the only




As discussed earlier, there are large earnings disparities across the regions of the UK.
Before going into the internal migration flows, I briefly describe these disparities with
the data at hand. Figure 2.2 provides snapshots of average TTWA earnings in 2005 and
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2018. Two findings stand out from the maps. First, there is the broad North-South divide
described above. Second is the relative lack of movement between 2005 and 2018. While
the highest concentration of high-earning areas can be found in the south of England, the
divide can also be interpreted as urban-rural rather than North-South. The high earning
areas in dark red stretch from London to Bristol in the West and up to Birmingham.
However, the coastal areas of the South East, East and South West are much poorer than
the urban core. By 2018, areas with relatively high earnings also include the larger cities
of the North East and North West, as well as Edinburgh and Aberdeen in Scotland.
The large disparities in regional earnings are partly driven by differences in the in-
dustry and skill distribution across regions. However, as figure 2.3 shows, there is a large
unexplained share that cannot be accounted for by observable differences. The map is
based on residuals derived from a regression of individual log earnings on industry (broad
letter-code categories), occupation, working hours, age, gender and labour market expe-
rience. Full regression results can be found in table 2.A.1 in the appendix. The map in
figure 2.3 shows that regional differences persist even after controlling for these factors,
and if anything become more marked. In Scotland, Aberdeen stands out as the centre of
the North Sea oil industry.
Figure 2.4 depicts the patterns of net migration and total employment growth in Great
Britain between 2006 and 2018. Migration flows are broadly consistent with employment
growth, although smaller in magnitude, confirming that internal migration is an important
contributor to employment growth, next to labour force participation, natural change,
graduate mobility, and international migration. Note that ASHE is a random 1% sample,
so numbers in figure 2.4 can be read as approximately one-hundredth of the total change
in the employee population. Hence, internal migrants may have a significant impact to
local earnings through the labour supply channel, as assumed by equation 2.4.
There is no clear pattern of net internal migration, but some comparisons with the
earnings distribution can be made: London and its immediate surroundings, as well as
larger cities in the North such as Manchester and Leeds are more prosperous and also
received more internal migrants. However, lots of areas outside the high earning hotspots
also received lots of internal migrants, and some of the high-earning areas around London
lost workers due to internal migration. This suggests that earnings are only one among
many factors determining migration decisions.
Strong employment growth in the London TTWA observed is contrary to findings
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Figure 2.2: Average gross weekly earnings by TTWA
a) 2005 b) 2018
Note: Based on average log earnings, deflated using GDP deflator. Includes part-time
and full-time employees. Brackets determined using k-means partition cluster analy-
sis.
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Figure 2.3: Residual earnings by TTWA
Note: Residual earnings based on regression of log gross weekly earnings on personal
characteristics, year and industry dummies. Underlying regression results can be found
in table 2.A.1. Brackets determined using k-means partition cluster analysis.
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Figure 2.4: Employment growth and net internal migration of employees between 2006
and 2018
a) Net migration of employees b) Employment growth
Note: Employment growth is calculated as the difference in the number of employees
on ASHE between 2005 and 2018. Net migration is calculated as the difference be-
tween internal migrants into and out of the TTWA between 2004 and 2018. Brackets
determined using k-means partition cluster analysis.
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that show net outflows from London and other large cities (e.g. Champion and Coombes
(2007), or ONS, Population Estimates 2018 for more recent figures). There are a number
of potential explanations for this discrepancy. The most likely one is that ASHE only
includes employees, and the people moving out of London are less likely to be employed,
such as families with children and retirees. The definition of London provides another
explanation. While TTWAs are designed so that at least 75% of workers also live there,
that leaves considerable scope for people to commute in from further away. If people move
out of London but continue working there, this would not be picked up in the definition
of internal migrants used here. Conversely, if they take up a job in London and continue
living in Cambridge, say, this would show up as a move to London.
While the aim of the chapter is to estimate the effect of internal migrants on the
earnings of those who do not move, in the following I briefly consider the effect of migration
on the migrants themselves. This is to get an understanding of their likely motivations and
characteristics. Overall, the data show a positive correlation between internal migration
and earnings growth. A move may be necessary to take up a job offer, so that career and
mobility choices are linked. It might be more attractive to move for younger workers, who
face a steeper career ladder and are set to gain more from being mobile (Amior, 2019).
This is reflected in the younger average age of migrants. Table 2.4 confirms the positive
effect of internal migration on individual earnings. It shows results of the regression of
earnings growth on two dummy variables, indicating whether the individual moved in the
current year, or in the last one to three years, or whether they changed jobs but stayed
in the same TTWA. The job change dummy is equal to one also for non-migrants, who
change jobs within the same TTWA. Individual characteristics are also included in the
regressions. In the first four specifications, only the internal migration, but not the job-
change dummy is included. The effect of internal migration on earnings is estimated to
be positive and significant in the year of migration, and after two and three years. When
the job change dummy is included, the internal migration coefficient drops, and is only
statistically significant in the first year of migration. In contrast, the job change has a
significant effect on earnings for all three years after it occurred. These findings suggest
that the earnings effects of internal migration are mostly related to a job change, but
not necessarily to the move. This adds further evidence that internal migrants are not
necessarily only driven by earnings considerations.
The extend of earnings growth associated with internal migration also depends on
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Table 2.4: Effect of internal migration on earnings
Dependent variable: Annual growth rate of log gross weekly earnings
Lag 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
Migration 0.011*** -0.0011 0.0022* 0.0022* 0.0076*** -0.0024** 0.0013 0.0012
(0.00088) (0.00083) (0.00097) (0.0010) (0.00093) (0.00086) (0.0010) (0.0011)
Job change 0.0098*** 0.0056*** 0.0036** 0.0045***
(0.00091) (0.00099) (0.0012) (0.0013)
Age -0.0016*** -0.0012*** -0.0011*** -0.00090*** -0.0016*** -0.0012*** -0.0011*** -0.00090***
(0.000023) (0.000022) (0.000026) (0.000029) (0.000023) (0.000022) (0.000026) (0.000029)
Female 0.0081*** 0.0059*** 0.0081*** 0.0084*** 0.0081*** 0.0058*** 0.0081*** 0.0083***
(0.00048) (0.00045) (0.00053) (0.00057) (0.00048) (0.00045) (0.00053) (0.00057)
Full-time -0.16*** -0.18*** -0.16*** -0.15*** -0.16*** -0.18*** -0.16*** -0.15***
(0.00086) (0.00084) (0.00098) (0.0011) (0.00086) (0.00084) (0.00098) (0.0011)
2nd job 0.070*** 0.047*** 0.056*** 0.055*** 0.068*** 0.047*** 0.056*** 0.055***
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0019)
Hours (logs) 0.20*** 0.24*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.24*** 0.21*** 0.20***
(0.00091) (0.00089) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.00091) (0.00089) (0.0011) (0.0012)
Higher occ. 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.013***
(0.00052) (0.00049) (0.00056) (0.00060) (0.00052) (0.00049) (0.00056) (0.00060)
Routine -0.0027*** -0.010*** -0.0056*** -0.0051*** -0.0027*** -0.010*** -0.0056*** -0.0051***
(0.00057) (0.00054) (0.00063) (0.00069) (0.00057) (0.00054) (0.00063) (0.00069)
Experience -0.0020*** -0.0017*** -0.0014*** -0.0012*** -0.0020*** -0.0017*** -0.0014*** -0.0012***
(0.000043) (0.000040) (0.000046) (0.000050) (0.000043) (0.000040) (0.000046) (0.000050)
Employer size 0.00074*** 0.00065*** 0.00036*** 0.00030** 0.00079*** 0.00067*** 0.00037*** 0.00031**
(0.000078) (0.000073) (0.000086) (0.000094) (0.000078) (0.000073) (0.000086) (0.000094)
Constant -0.48*** -0.59*** -0.55*** -0.54*** -0.48*** -0.59*** -0.55*** -0.54***
(0.0044) (0.0042) (0.0050) (0.0055) (0.0044) (0.0042) (0.0050) (0.0055)
N 1359369 1175981 850880 700416 1359369 1175981 850880 700416
R2 0.054 0.072 0.057 0.053 0.054 0.072 0.057 0.053
Adjusted R2 0.054 0.072 0.057 0.053 0.054 0.072 0.057 0.053
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Note: The lag refers to the time lag of migration and job change, so the effect of inter-
nal migration and job change is estimated in the year of the event, and 1 to 3 years
thereafter. Second job is a dummy equal to one for workers who have a second job.
Hours defined as average total hours worked per week, in logs. Experience is mea-
sured as the number of years appearing on ASHE. Employer size measured as number
of employees at place of work in logs. Routine is a dummy variable for routine or
semi-routine occupations. Year and sector dummies included.
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origin and destination, as figure 2.5 shows. The map on the left shows residual earnings
growth for internal migrants by their origin, after controlling for personal characteristics.
There is no clear pattern emerging. Internal migrants who are leaving London and the
South East tend to have lower earnings growth, but the same is true of internal migrants
leaving the North East. The picture is clearer in the map on the right-hand side, depicting
earnings growth of internal migrants by their destination. Earnings growth is strong for
those moving to London and the areas to the west. However, it is lower or even negative
for internal migrants moving to the coastal areas in the south and east of London, despite
high levels of migration into those areas. There is also strongly positive earnings growth
for internal migrants to Yorkshire and the Humber, as well as the North West, but overall
migration into those areas is relatively low.
Figure 2.5 sums up the complex picture emerging of the determinants and motiva-
tions for internal migration. Some migration and destination decisions may be driven by
earnings considerations, but others are clearly not. While most internal migrants earn
a return on their move, others do not. Moreover, some internal migrants increase their
earnings despite moving to an area with overall quite low and stagnating earnings. In
the next section, I present estimates of the effects of internal migrants on the earnings
of non-migrants in the areas they leave behind and join. The evidence presented in this
section gives some support to the assumption that internal migrations are exogenous to
other shocks to local earnings.
2.4.2 The effect of internal migration on local earnings
I now turn to estimating equation 2.6 on the effect of internal in- and out-migrants on the
earnings of non-migrants. The estimation sample includes only individuals who are not
moving. I estimate equation 2.6 on three different dependent variables: log gross weekly
earnings in year t, earnings growth between t and t+1 and earnings growth between t and
t+ 3. Earnings growth rates are computed as the log differences in gross weekly earnings
between those time periods. For the estimations on growth rates, only employees are
included who work in the same TTWA between t− 1 and t+ 1 or t+ 3, respectively. The
internal migration variables are internal in-migrants, who move to the TTWA between
t−1 and t and internal out-migrants, who leave the TTWA between t−1 and t, measured
as shares of total employment on ASHE in t. Summary statistics for the estimation sample
are provided in table 2.5.
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Figure 2.5: Conditional earnings growth of internal migrants by origin and destination
a) Origin b) Destination
Note: Earnings growth of internal migrants by TTWA of origin and destination. Aver-
aged over 2006-2018. Based on regression results in table 2.4, specification with zero
lag. Brackets determined using k-means partition cluster analysis.
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Table 2.5: Regression summary statistics
All
Mean SD
Log gross weekly earnings 5.99 0.73
Earnings growth (t to t+1) 2% 0.22
Earnings growth (t to t+3) 5% 0.25
Share of in-migrants 0.07 0.03
Share of out-migrants 0.07 0.03
Share of in-migrants over last 3 years 0.27 0.08
Share of in-migrants over last 5 years 0.4 0.12
Share of out-migrants over last 3 years 0.28 0.09




With second-job 2% 0.14
Total hours (logs) 3.47 0.41
Higher occupation 29% 0.45
Routine/ semi-routine occupation 24% 0.43
Previously migrated 18% 0.54
Years of labour market experience 11.04 6.88
Employer size 7.07 3.03
TTWA employment (logs) 8.39 2.11
Number of observations 706966
Note: The sample includes only employees who do not move in a given year. In- and
out-migrant shares measured at the TTWA level. Second job is a dummy equal to
one for workers who have a second job. Hours defined as average total hours worked
per week, in logs.
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Baseline estimation results are presented in table 2.6. The regressions include individ-
ual characteristics including age, gender, and job characteristics. The model is saturated
with TTWA and year fixed effects. TTWA fixed effects control for structural differences
between regions that do not change over the estimation period. In the absence of local
price indices and measures of amenities, they also control for these factors. For example, it
is well known that costs of living in the South, particularly London, are higher than in the
North due to higher housing costs. TTWA fixed effects strip out these differences in levels,
but they cannot control for differences in trajectories. The fixed effects can also control
for amenities, particularly natural amenities that might attract people to those areas, but
do not change much over time. Year fixed effects can control for common macroeconomic
shocks that affect the whole country.
For each of the dependent variables, table 2.6 presents estimation results without
individual fixed effects in the first three columns and estimations including individual fixed
effects in the last three columns. In addition to TTWA and year fixed effects, individual
fixed effects can control for unobserved personal characteristics that do not change over
time, such as ability and education. The effect of the internal in-migrant share shows an
interesting time pattern. Focussing on the results without individual fixed effects first, the
in-migrant share has a statistically significant negative contemporaneous effect. However,
the effect is economically quite small: an increase in the internal in-migrant share by one
percentage point is estimated to result in 0.12% lower earnings for non-migrants. The sign
of the in-migrant share coefficient turns when estimating the effect on earnings growth,
although it is statistically insignificant for the 1-year and 3-year earnings growth variables.
The picture is similar when individual fixed effects are included in the last three spec-
ifications. The negative contemporaneous effect is slightly smaller. The positive effect on
earnings growth over three years becomes statistically significant and larger in magnitude.
These estimates are preferable to the ones without individual fixed effects, as any unob-
servable personal characteristics, that may be related to self-selection into an area, and
therefore correlated with internal migrant flows, are controlled for.
Both the negative contemporaneous effect of internal in-migrants and the positive
effect on three-year earnings growth are consistent with the model presented in section
2.2.3. In the short-run, an increase in labour supply puts downward pressure on wages,
as predicted by equation 2.4. However, over the longer run, internal migrants contribute
to productivity growth, and earnings increase again. In equilibrium, the wage depends no
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longer on labour supply but on TFP, as shown in equation 2.5. In-migrants may affect
productivity, which explains the positive coefficient on the three-year earnings growth
rate. The underlying mechanism explaining the link between migration and productivity
is agglomeration economies (Duranton & Puga, 2004).
Note that the coefficient on the out-migrant share is never significant and flips sign
frequently. This suggests that the productivity channel works through knowledge exchange
and networks, rather than the skills embodied in employees. Incoming internal migrants
bring new knowledge and experience from their previous place of work that they can share
with their new colleagues, supporting productivity growth. This new knowledge then stays
in the area. There is no evidence that out-migration has any effects on earnings, so it does
not look like departing internal migrants deplete the knowledge base in the area they are
leaving.
The contemporaneous negative effect of in-migration alleviates some concerns that
internal migration is endogenous. If higher earnings growth in an area was a pull-factor
for internal migrants, we would expect a positive correlation between in-migration and
earnings, and a negative correlation between out-migration and earnings. There is no
evidence for this in the regressions. It is harder to think of underlying negative shocks to
earnings driving an increase in in-migration.
If knowledge sharing and networks are an important mechanism through which internal
migrants affect earnings growth, it is expected that the effects are stronger in cities, as
denser labour markets are more conducive to these sorts of knowledge flows (De la Roca
& Puga, 2017; Glaeser & Maré, 2001; Storper & Venables, 2004). Table 2.7 tests for
differences of effects in urban and non-urban areas.
TTWAs are classified as urban if they consisted mainly of urban or suburban local areas
at the 2011 census. Table 2.7 shows the contemporaneous and three year growth effects
in urban and non-urban areas. Individual fixed effects are included in all specifications.
The pattern observed before only holds for the urban samples. In the year of the internal
in-migration shock, the coefficient is statistically significant and negative, and for the three-
year earnings growth rate, it is statistically significant and positive. The contemporaneous
negative effect is slightly smaller in the urban sample. However, the positive effect on the
three-year growth rate is 1.5-times larger. A one percentage point increase in the migrant
share increases earnings by 0.075% over three years. In the non-urban sample, both
coefficients are statistically insignificant and smaller in magnitude, although they retain
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Table 2.6: Baseline results: effect of internal in- and out-migration on local earnings
Dependent variable Log-level 1-y.growth 3-y.growth Log-level 1-y.growth 3-y.growth
In-migrant share -0.12*** 0.011 0.034 -0.078*** 0.0049 0.049*
(0.030) (0.018) (0.029) (0.013) (0.016) (0.022)
Out-migrant share 0.031 0.0021 -0.0053 -0.020 0.0027 -0.0018
(0.023) (0.014) (0.021) (0.011) (0.014) (0.019)
Age 0.0011*** -0.0015*** -0.0035*** -0.0045*** -0.00026 0.00015
(0.000078) (0.000026) (0.000098) (0.00045) (0.00053) (0.00088)
Female -0.14*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.021* -0.021* 0.0012
(0.0020) (0.00047) (0.00078) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.014)
Full-time 0.27*** 0.15*** 0.21*** 0.15*** 0.30*** 0.40***
(0.018) (0.0020) (0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0028) (0.0074)
With second-job -0.034*** -0.022*** -0.016*** 0.0049* -0.015*** -0.011*
(0.0066) (0.0017) (0.0046) (0.0022) (0.0031) (0.0053)
Total hours (logs) 0.82*** -0.22*** -0.30*** 0.86*** -0.52*** -0.75***
(0.010) (0.0024) (0.0039) (0.0031) (0.0037) (0.0066)
Higher occ. 0.47*** -0.011*** -0.0081** 0.11*** -0.0074*** -0.017***
(0.0098) (0.00080) (0.0025) (0.0012) (0.00092) (0.0017)
Routine occ. -0.20*** 0.0043*** 0.0063*** -0.064*** 0.0050*** 0.014***
(0.010) (0.00057) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0019)
Previous migrations 0.023*** 0.000046 0.00063 0.024*** 0.0060*** 0.0054
(0.0034) (0.00032) (0.00074) (0.00091) (0.00086) (0.0028)
Experience 0.016*** -0.00042*** -0.0018*** 0.0014*** -0.0065*** -0.020***
(0.00035) (0.000088) (0.00019) (0.00038) (0.00046) (0.0020)
Employer size 0.0069*** -0.00014* -0.0012*** 0.0078*** -0.0017*** -0.0047***
(0.00049) (0.000065) (0.00014) (0.00026) (0.00029) (0.00073)
Constant 2.68*** 0.76*** 1.18*** 2.90*** 1.75*** 2.77***




√ √ √ √ √ √
Year FE
√ √ √ √ √ √
N 1724431 1141904 580281 1724431 1141904 580281
R2 0.73 0.065 0.13 0.60 0.13 0.20
Adjusted R2 0.73 0.065 0.13 0.60 0.13 0.20
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Note: Sample: non-internal migrants. Dependent variable: log gross weekly earnings.
Earnings growth measured between t and t+n. Internal migrants moved between t
and t-1 and are measured as the share of total employees in t. Experience is measured
as the number of years appearing on ASHE. Employer size measured as number of
employees at place of work in logs. Routine is a dummy variable for routine or semi-
routine occupations.
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the same signs.
Table 2.7: Regression results for urban and non-urban areas
Dependent variable Log-level earnings 3-year earnings growth
Urban/ rural Urban Non-urban Urban Non-urban
In-migrant share -0.11*** -0.023 0.075** 0.0044
(0.017) (0.021) (0.028) (0.038)
Out-migrant share -0.024 0.021 0.020 -0.049
(0.013) (0.019) (0.023) (0.034)
Individual characteristics
√ √ √ √
Individual FE
√ √ √ √
TTWA FE
√ √ √ √
Year FE
√ √ √ √
Number of observation 1298366 426065 434577 145704
R2 0.59 0.60 0.19 0.22
Adjusted R2 0.59 0.60 0.19 0.22
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Note: Sample: non-internal migrants, separately by whether they work in predomi-
nantly urban or rural areas. Dependent variable: log gross weekly earnings. Internal
migrants moved between t and t-1 and are measured as the share of total employees
in t. Other independent variables included as in table 2.6, as well as year and TTWA
dummies. Full regression results including all control variables can be found in table
2.A.2 in the appendix.
2.4.3 Evaluating the local impact
The regression coefficients together with the actual internal in- and out-migrant shares
can be used to estimate the effect on earnings by TTWA. This is done in figure 2.6,
by multiplying the average share of in- and out-migrants by the coefficients estimated in
table 2.7, for the urban and non-urban samples separately. Note that these are the average
annual effects, not the cumulative effect over the period, so the magnitudes are relatively
small. The maps include the total effect from internal in- and out-migration, although the
coefficients on out-migrants are statistically insignificant.
The map on the left-hand side shows the effects on log-level earnings in the year of the
internal migration shock. In most areas of the country, the effect is very small, indicated
by the dark red colour. Effects can be seen in London and Slough, but not the rest of the
South East and East areas. Other larger areas are also affected, including Birmingham,
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the cities of the North West, and Newcastle. Note that these effects are not driven by the
absolute size of these areas, as migration is measured in shares of total employment.
The map on the right-hand side depicts the longer-term effects on three-year earnings
growth. Here, the picture reverses. The areas in the East Midlands and South West
that did not receive many internal migrants had lower earnings growth. Here, the scale
should be read in percentage points of the three-year growth rate. Blue shades indicate
a reduction in the three-year earnings growth rate of up to 0.14 percentage points, while
dark red indicates an increase in the growth rate of up to 0.9 percentage points. Among
the areas benefiting the most from internal in-migration are London and Slough, as well
as Birmingham, and the cities of the North West and west Yorkshire. In most peripheral
areas, the effects are close to zero. The areas that are most negatively affected can be
found in the areas between large urban centres in the South West, Midlands and Yorkshire.
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Figure 2.6: Evaluating estimated effects at TTWA level
a) Contemporaneous effect b) Effect on 3-year earnings
on average earnings growth rate
Note: Both figures show the average in- and out-migrant share multiplied by the regres-
sion coefficient in table 2.7, using the specifications including individual fixed effects.
The scale on the left-hand side is in percent, while the scale on the right-hand side is
in percentage points.
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2.5.Discussion and conclusion
The chapter has considered the effects of internal migration on regional income inequality
in Great Britain. While employees are relatively mobile, it is not the case that workers
move exclusively to areas with high earnings prospects. To the contrary, in many areas,
in particular the more rural and peripheral, employees earn on average less than before
they moved. Unfortunately, those areas also benefit less from internal migration, as the
positive earnings growth effect on in-migration is concentrated in urban areas.
From a policy perspective, internal migration can be a double-edged sword. Local
economic development policies often create jobs that are filled by internal migrants that
did not previously live in the area (Bartik, 1993). This may create the impression that
these policies do not actually benefit the target population. However, the results presented
here show that areas receiving in-migrants can benefit from earnings growth.
The results also show that there are adjustment costs to an internal migration shock in
the form of a negative short-term effect on earnings. There may be other adjustment costs,
such as increasing house prices and pressure on local services. This may pose a barrier to
mobility, as local residents oppose development of housing to accommodate in-migration.
Given that migrants tend to earn above-average wages, gentrification may be of concern.
While housing-led development in itself may not lead to growth or more opportunities for
the most disadvantaged (Rodŕıguez-Pose & Storper, 2020), the results in this chapter show
that long-term earnings growth may be dampened in urban areas in particular that have
high barriers to in-migration. Future research should consider differences in the effects of
internal migration on different income groups. Evidence on the decline of the urban wage
premium for those without university education suggests that those benefiting most from
inflows of migrants may be higher skilled (Autor, 2019; Giannone, 2018).
The lack of an effect in rural and intermediate areas is concerning, as many of these
areas are among the most deprived. The findings suggest that encouraging in-migration
does not provide growth opportunities for these areas. Future research should consider
why this is the case. It is possible that selection plays a role, whereby the least productive
workers choose to move to non-urban areas. On the other hand, opportunities to interact
and learn from new arrivals may be limited in less dense areas. A better understanding
of the mechanisms behind the positive effect in urban areas is therefore also warranted.
Duranton and Puga (2004) distinguish between the sharing, matching and learning mecha-
nism as the sources of agglomeration economies. In-migrants may contribute to economies
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of scale, have skills that allow all employees in an area to find a job better suited to their
skills, or bring new knowledge to a region that they can share with others. Groot et
al. (2014) provide evidence for the Netherlands that these effects materialise particularly
within specialised industries, or through Marshall-Arrow-Romer externalities, rather than
between a diverse set of industries. Less dense areas may lack the scale to have a high
degree of specialisation in any particular industry (Kemeny & Storper, 2015).
Nonetheless, for the overall trajectory of regional inequality, the results are encourag-
ing. The North East, North West, and Yorkshire have many large and mid-sized cities
and towns that stand to benefit from increased in-migration. While the results presented
here suggest that there are considerable migration flows in some of these areas, in par-
ticular highly qualified graduates tend to move to the South East (Faggian & McCann,
2009). Based on the results presented in this chapter, this may not be a bad thing, if
some graduates eventually return to northern cities, bringing with them experience and
networks. Indeed, there is some evidence of return migration (Champion, 2013). Future
research could consider the effect of returning migrants in particular, who may already
have networks within their destination region and may therefore be particularly effective
in sharing knowledge.
This suggests that a unified framework of the drivers and effects of internal migration
is required. However, in a large, regionally highly unequal country like the UK, this is
likely to be more complex than in a small country like Denmark, which is considered by
Mitze and Schmidt (2015) for this purpose. Over the longer term, in-migration into an
area may push out previous residents, fundamentally altering the demographic make-up
of an area. Internal migration also interacts with immigration, where immigrants can act
both as a push and pull factor for internal migrants. To fully understand these interactions
requires a dataset with a longer timer series that could be used to study these dynamics.
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Appendix
2.A.Additional tables
Table 2.A.1: Determinants of earnings





With second-job -0.025*** 0.0022
Total hours 0.81*** 0.0011
Higher occupation 0.47*** 0.00071
Routine/ semi-routine occupation -0.18*** 0.00076
Years not in employment 0.0018*** 0.000069
Years of labour market experience 0.014*** 0.00006
Number of employees at place of work (logs) 0.0085*** 0.0001
Constant 2.62*** 0.0056
Number of observation 1831424
R2 0.72
Adjusted R2 0.72
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Note: Year and industry letter code dummies included. Residuals presented in figure
2.3 are derived from this regression.
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Table 2.A.2: Full regression results for urban and non-urban areas
Dependent variable Log-level earnings 3-year earnings growth
Urban/ rural Urban Non-urban Urban Non-urban
In-migrant share -0.11*** -0.023 0.075** 0.0044
(0.017) (0.021) (0.028) (0.038)
Out-migrant share -0.024 0.021 0.020 -0.049
(0.013) (0.019) (0.023) (0.034)
Age -0.0043*** -0.0044*** 0.00020 -0.0024
(0.00054) (0.00100) (0.00096) (0.0024)
Female -0.029** -0.0014 0.0038 -0.00091
(0.011) (0.020) (0.017) (0.027)
Full-time 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.40*** 0.41***
(0.0025) (0.0047) (0.0086) (0.015)
With second job 0.0059* 0.0057 -0.013* -0.0060
(0.0025) (0.0040) (0.0063) (0.010)
Total hours (logs) 0.85*** 0.84*** -0.75*** -0.78***
(0.0035) (0.0071) (0.0078) (0.013)
Higher occupation 0.11*** 0.084*** -0.016*** -0.023***
(0.0014) (0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0035)
Routine occupation -0.064*** -0.048*** 0.018*** 0.0041
(0.0012) (0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0036)
Previous migrations 0.025*** 0.016*** 0.0042 -0.0018
(0.0011) (0.0022) (0.0035) (0.0061)
Experience 0.0012** 0.0026** -0.020*** -0.016***
(0.00046) (0.00081) (0.0023) (0.0045)
Employer size 0.0074*** 0.0087*** -0.0044*** -0.0054***
(0.00031) (0.00054) (0.00086) (0.0015)
Constant 2.91*** 2.92*** 2.51*** 2.98***
(0.026) (0.061) (0.070) (0.12)
TTWA FE
√ √ √ √
Individual FE
√ √ √ √
Number of observation 1298366 426065 434577 145704
R2 0.59 0.60 0.19 0.22
Adjusted R2 0.59 0.60 0.19 0.22
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Note: Sample: non-internal migrants, separately by whether they work in predomi-
nantly urban or rural areas. Dependent variable: log gross weekly earnings. Internal
migrants moved between t and t-1 and are measured as the share of total employees
in t. Employer size is measured as number of employees at place of work in logs. Rou-
tine occupation is a dummy for routine and semi-routine occupations. Experience is
measured as the number of years appearing on ASHE.
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Chapter 3
Labour market effects of industry
concentration: A regional analysis
of Great Britain
3.1.Introduction
Industry concentration, the degree to which industries are dominated by a small number
of firms, is rising in many countries (Philippon, 2019; Ennis, Gonzaga, & Pike, 2019).
This can be damaging to consumers, if prices are high and choice is restricted, but labour
markets can also be negatively affected (Eeckhout, 2021). In this chapter, I estimate the
effect of market power and industry concentration on average wages and labour shares in
Great Britain. Industry concentration is also associated with growing regional concentra-
tion of businesses. In this context, most dominant businesses can be found in London and
the wider South East, the two regions with the highest average earnings. I estimate the
contribution of market power to regional income inequality. While the overall effects are
small, the results are suggestive of the growing importance of dominant firms in regional
economies and labour markets. The findings provide further evidence for the importance
of considering the wider impact of market power, other than on consumer welfare.
Market power allows firms to charge a mark-up over cost, allowing them to earn rents,
This work contains statistical data from ONS which is Crown Copyright. The use of the ONS sta-
tistical data in this work does not imply the endorsement of the ONS in relation to the interpretation or
analysis of the statistical data. This work uses research datasets which may not exactly reproduce National
Statistics aggregates.
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or pure profits. If wages stay constant, this means that the labour share, the share of value
added earned by workers, falls. A falling labour share and a negative correlation with in-
dustry concentration have been documented extensively (Autor et al., 2020; Barkai, 2020;
Berkowitz, Ma, & Nishioka, 2017; Berlingieri, Blanchenay, & Criscuolo, 2017). A falling
labour share might signal increasing inequality and falling bargaining power of workers
(Atkinson, 2009; Elsby, Hobijn, & Sahin, 2013; Piketty, 2014; Stansbury & Summers,
2020). However, as I will show, firms with market power pay in fact higher wages, despite
a lower labour share. This is consistent with rent sharing models of the labour market
(Akerlof & Yellen, 1990; Blanchflower, Oswald, & Sanfey, 1996; Van Reenen, 1996).
Some regions stand to benefit more from growing concentration than others. In par-
ticular, superstar regions that are already very productive and host many successful firms
may benefit if these firms gain market power. Smaller businesses in lagging regions are
more likely to be driven out of business by a dominant competitor. Growing concentra-
tion can also consolidate growth opportunities in successful cities through other channels,
for example by acquisitions of firms from lagging regions (Feldman, Guy, Iammarino, &
Ioramashvili, 2021) or through access to financial capital that allows young firms to jump
growing barriers to entry (Martin, Berndt, Klagge, & Sunley, 2005).
To my knowledge, this is the first study to estimate the effects of market power and
industry concentration for Great Britain, and to adopt an explicitly regional lens. I use
a firm-level survey, the Annual Respondents Database X, spanning the years from 2002
to 2014. I find that firms with market power pay substantially higher wages, while the
labour share at these firms is lower, pointing to a rent-sharing model. However, while
dominant businesses are concentrated in London and the South East, the effects on regional
earnings are limited in these regions, as a high number of dominant firms is offset by many
small firms with little market power. Nonetheless, the results provide important insights
for the interaction between competition and local development policy. As fast growing
industries are highly concentrated, barriers to entry make it even harder for regions outside
established clusters to foster successful businesses. In order to grow, regions need to
attract investment from a small number of dominant firms, likely a zero-sum game. Local
growth strategies therefore also need to take into account the competitive environment
and industrial structures to establish where local firms may have a competitive advantage.
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 discusses related literature and provides
a theoretical framework for the analysis. Section 3.3 describes the data and empirical
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methods used. Section 3.4 provides the results. Section 3.5 discusses the results and
concludes.
3.2.Related literature and theoretical framework
Declining competition is of growing concern for policy makers and researchers alike. Some
prominent antitrust cases in the European Union and United States, in particular around
technology platforms, have attracted public attention, but research shows that the phe-
nomenon affects a diverse range of industries and many countries (De Loecker & Eeckhout,
2018; Philippon, 2019). Declining competition is manifested in increasing industry con-
centration or higher price mark-ups over cost (Autor et al., 2020; De Loecker, Eeckhout,
& Unger, 2020; Grullon, Larkin, & Michaely, 2019). In the following, I will briefly dis-
cuss some of the causes of growing industry concentration. Next, I discuss the growing
literature on the effect of growing concentration on wages and income inequality. In this
context, recent research has considered the impact on labour shares, the share of output
earned by workers. Lastly, I review related literature on the spatial dimension of industry
concentration, an aspect that has received much less attention.
3.2.1 Increasing industry concentration
Industry concentration and market power
While closely aligned, market dominance is not necessarily the same as market power
(Philippon, 2019). Some industries are highly concentrated and dominated by a small
number of companies, but remain intensely competitive (Syverson, 2019). In the US and
the UK, supermarkets are an example of this. Mark-ups are a more precise measure of
market power, showing the ability of firms to set prices above marginal cost. In practice,
there is a strong correlation between growing industry concentration and growing mark-ups
and profits (De Loecker & Eeckhout, 2018; De Loecker et al., 2020; Eggertson, Robbins,
& Getz Wold, 2018; Furman & Orszag, 2015).
The relationship between concentration and competition differs across industries. For
tradable goods, markets are global, where complex relations of market power play out
through global value chains (Selwyn & Leyden, 2021). For some firms and industries, the
appropriate market to assess their dominance and concentration is global (Gutiérrez &
Philippon, 2020). In these cases, global competition can limit market power of dominant
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firms. On the other hand, the market size for some retail and service businesses can have a
very limited radius. In practice, competition may be more limited than national measures
would imply. Business structures also play a role. The expansion of national chains may
result in an increase in local competition even if the number of independent businesses
falls (Hsieh & Rossi-Hansberg, 2019).
Drivers of increasing concentration
Drivers of increasing concentration can broadly be linked to technological and institu-
tional change. In terms of technology, the growing importance of intangible assets may
pose a barrier to entry. Intangible assets are an overhead cost with infinite economies of
scale, imposing high entry costs for new entrants to match the productivity of incumbents
(De Ridder, 2019). The declining marginal costs of such industries create natural monop-
olies. A special case are network industries, where the product becomes more useful as the
number of users or customers increases (Crouzet & Eberly, 2019; Rochet & Tirole, 2006).
Lower search and transport costs may also result in a winner-takes-most market, where
consumers swiftly gravitate towards superior products, produced by the most productive
firm (Autor et al., 2020; Syverson, 2019).
Institutions, and in particular competition policy or anti-trust enforcement also affect
industry concentration (Covarrubias, Gutiérrez, & Philippon, 2019). In the global context,
competition policy in the EU is considered to be strong, with associated lower consumer
prices in many sectors (Gutiérrez & Philippon, 2019). However, the UK follows the US
trajectory, with an economic model overall more aligned to American liberalism (Schneider
& Paunescu, 2012). An increase in anti-competitive practices, weaker competition policy,
or more barriers to entry as a result of incumbents’ lobbying efforts all drive the economy-
wide increase in concentration (Khan & Vaheesan, 2017; Philippon, 2019).
In many instances, the cause of increasing concentration is a combination of chang-
ing technology and institutions catching up on the changing environment. Especially in
digital industries that exhibit characteristics of natural monopolies, competition policy is
struggling to adapt (Argentesi et al., 2020; Bourreau & de Streel, 2019).
3.2.2 Impacts of market concentration on earnings
Competition policy is mostly concerned with consumer welfare, as firms with market power
have power to raise prices above marginal costs, while a competitive market is associated
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with lower prices and a wider variety of choice (Khan & Vaheesan, 2017). However,
market power also impacts earnings more widely. While workers may be beneficiaries of
their employers’ market power, concentration may also manifest itself through monopsony
power, or the power of employers to set wages below the competitive level.
Efficiency wages and profit sharing
Firms with market power may be able to charge prices above marginal cost and therefore
earn pure economic profits. These rents are passed on to the owners or workers of the
firm. Models of rent sharing show how firms maximise profits by passing a share of rents
on to workers, to attract and retain talent, discourage shirking and increase productivity
(Akerlof & Yellen, 1990; Blanchflower et al., 1996; Hildreth & Oswald, 1997; Krueger &
Summers, 1988). The extent of rent sharing depends on the relative power of workers and
owners of capital. Empirical evidence shows that trade unions increase worker power to
capture rents, resulting in a higher union wage premium for businesses with market power
(Abowd & Lemieux, 1993; Stewart, 1990).
A special case that has been extensively studied is the returns to market power con-
ferred by patent protection. As the development of new inventions may require substantial
upfront investments, patents provide some protection from competition, so that inventors
are able to recoup these costs. Estimates suggest that around 30% of patent rents are
passed on to workers (Kline, Petkova, Williams, & Zidar, 2019; Van Reenen, 1996). How-
ever, rival innovation, resulting in increased competition in the product market, reduces
this wage premium (Van Reenen, 1996).
Monopsony power
In industries where workers have little power, industry concentration exacerbates this
asymmetry (Stansbury & Summers, 2020). The extend to which firms pass rents on to
workers, and the overall level of wages depends on the level of competition in the labour
market, or the firm’s monopsony power (Kroft, Luo, Mogstad, & Setzler, 2020; Manning,
2011). Under perfect competition, wages grow at the same rate as productivity. In labour
markets where firms have wage-setting power, the link between productivity and wage
growth breaks. As productivity grows faster than wages, the labour share falls (Abel,
Tenreyro, & Thwaites, 2018; Azar, Marinescu, Steinbaum, & Taska, 2019; Benmelech,
Bergman, & Kim, 2018). Abel et al. (2018) find overall stable levels of monopsony power
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in the UK over the last two decades, but with substantial variation across industries.
Other evidence on the increase of involuntary part-time and temporary employment over
the period suggests a decline in worker bargaining power in the UK, in particular in the
aftermath of the financial crisis (Green & Livanos, 2015).
In many cases, labour markets are more geographically confined than product markets,
and workers’ bargaining power varies regionally. Firms have less monopsony power in
denser labour markets, one of the drivers of the urban wage premium (Hirsch, Jahn,
Manning, & Oberfichter, 2019; Manning, 2010). Firms are able to exercise monopsony
power where workers face barriers to finding or taking up a better paid job, for reasons
such as preferences or barriers to mobility (Manning & Petrongolo, 2017; Benmelech
et al., 2018). The effect of dominant firms can also go in the other direction. In the
USA, some retailers, which employ large numbers of relatively low-skilled workers, recently
implemented an internal wage floor above the statutory minimum wage. In labour markets
where these employers play an important role, average wages increased also at other firms
(Derenoncourt, Noelke, & Weil, 2021).
3.2.3 Labour shares and inequality
As industry concentration affects labour markets, a particular concern about growing
concentration is around increasing income inequality. Growing industry concentration has
been linked to a decline in the labour share (Autor et al., 2020). Additionally, in so far
as firms pass on rents to workers, wages diverge between firms with more and firms with
less market power.
Divergence in returns to capital and labour
Labour shares have been declining for several years in many countries around the world
(Dao et al., 2017; Elsby et al., 2013; Karabarbounis & Neiman, 2013). A declining labour
share is concerning because it implies a falling share of income going to workers and a
rising share going to a smaller group of capital owners (Atkinson, 2009; Dao et al., 2017).
Another interpretation of the declining labour share is that wages grow more slowly than
labour productivity (Pessoa & Van Reenen, 2013; Schwellnus, Pak, Pionnier, & Crivellaro,
2018).
The decline of the labour share can be directly connected to growing industry con-
centration. Barkai (2020) constructs measures of capital costs in addition to labour costs
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at the industry level in the US, and finds that both have been declining as a share of
total value added, with a rise in the share of pure profits. This is linked to industry
concentration: as firms are able to charge a higher mark-up over production costs, profits
rise. Autor et al. (2020) similarly find a link between growing industry concentration and
falling labour shares using US firm-level data. They explain these findings with a model
of superstar firms, in which larger firms are more productive and require less workers in
administrative overhead occupations, which explains the declining labour share.
Others have stressed alternative factors in the global decline of the labour share, such
as technological change (Dao et al., 2017; Karabarbounis & Neiman, 2013; Schwellnus
et al., 2018), globalisation (Reshef & Santoni, 2019), and industrialisation in developing
economies (Lewis, 1954; Maarek & Orgiazzi, 2020). Among institutional factors, declining
trade union power is associated with declining labour shares (Stansbury & Summers,
2020). The labour share declined significantly in the UK following the Thatcher era and
the associated decline in union power. It then grew again from the end of the 1990s (Judzik
& Sala, 2013), to some extend attributable to the introduction of the national minimum
wage in 1999 (Metcalf, 2008). Similarly, worker protection laws and the extend of the
welfare state affect labour’s bargaining power and therefore the labour share (Deakin,
Malmberg, & Sarkar, 2014; Stockhammer, 2017). Yet, these national policies cannot
explain local variation in the labour share, as well as a continuing decline in industries
with already low union representation.
Divergence of wages between firms and industries
To reiterate, firms with market power are able to charge mark-ups over cost, earning pure
profits or rents. These rents are likely to be (partially) shared with workers. This is
consistent with evidence of a growing intra-industry dispersion of wages between firms
(Card et al., 2013, 2018; Berlingieri et al., 2017; Song, Price, Guvenen, Bloom, & von
Wachter, 2019). Dominant businesses are able to pay higher wages, while firms with less
market power are not able to pay workers above their marginal product.
There is no contradiction between a firm paying relatively high wages but having a
low labour share. This has further implication on inequality between workers. Rents are
not passed through a firm’s supply chain. In the context of growing outsourcing of labour
intensive tasks, this implies that the circle of workers benefiting from rent sharing is be-
coming smaller and more homogenous (Goldschmidt & Schmieder, 2017). Moreover, Kline
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et al. (2019) find that rents from patenting benefit male workers more, as well as workers
in the upper half of the firm-specific wage distribution. Comparing the monopolists of the
digital era to the giants of the mechanical age, Philippon (2019, ch. 13) finds that digital
firms employ on average less workers, and have less diverse workforces. This implies that
a smaller and more select group of workers benefits from their market power.
3.2.4 Location of dominant firms
As discussed, businesses with market power also affect the labour market. Therefore,
their presence in the local economy may play an important role for local employment and
wages. Besides wide regional divides in average earnings (Martin et al., 2016), there is
also evidence of considerable regional variation in labour shares (Izushi, 2008). While
not the main focus of the chapter, the following briefly discusses how industries that are
dominated by a small number of large firms tend to be also geographically concentrated
in a few regions.
There are several mechanisms that would make an industry become more spatially
concentrated. Some locations may be more likely to produce dominant firms. Urban
density contributes to businesses’ productivity and may allow them to grow faster and
dominate an industry (Duranton & Puga, 2004; Gaubert, 2018). Access to finance and
political power may be just as important and work as direct drivers of firms’ ability to
establish monopoly power (Feldman, Guy, & Iammarino, 2019; Philippon, 2019). The UK
has a centralised financial system that impedes growth opportunities for SMEs, partic-
ularly further away from London (Klagge & Martin, 2005; Lee & Brown, 2017). Firms
located further away from financial centres are also less likely to access venture capital
finance (Chen, Gompers, Aovner, & Lerner, 2010; Cumming & Dai, 2010; Martin et al.,
2005) and to be listed on a stock exchange (Wójcik, 2009). Venture capital is an impor-
tant source of funding for high growth, innovative start-ups that might disrupt industries
and challenge dominant incumbents (Gompers & Lerner, 2001). While venture capital
investments have traditionally favoured London and the South East (Martin, 1989), the
growing internationalisation of the industry reaffirms this regional bias, with London as
a global financial centre receiving over 80% of recent foreign venture capital investments
(Harrison, Yohanna, & Pierrakis, 2020).
Mergers and acquisitions may also lead to spatial concentration. Feldman et al. (2021)
show how Big Tech firms concentrated in Silicon Valley acquire tech start-ups across the
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United States and indeed the world, which often means that the start-up also relocates
to California. Some M&A deals are structured deliberately to avoid anti-trust scrutiny,
resulting in lower competition in affected markets (Kepler, Naiker, & Stewart, 2021).
Mergers and acquisitions are also associated with growing concentration of businesses in
centres of political power, such as state capitals (Rodŕıguez-Pose & Zademach, 2003).
Across countries, centralisation of political power is associated with increased urban con-
centration (Ades & Glaeser, 1995; Kim & Law, 2012).
3.2.5 Theoretical framework
To summarise, a large literature documents the rise of market power across many countries.
This allows businesses to charge mark-ups and earn rents, or pure profits. On the one
hand, businesses may exercise monopsony power to pay less than market wages. On the
other hand, these profits may be shared with workers. Recent empirical evidence points in
the latter direction, of rent sharing as a driver of earnings inequality between firms. This
affects earnings inequality both within industries – between firms with different degrees
of market power – as well as between industries with different degrees of concentration.
The following translates this into a simple theoretical framework relating market power
to earnings and labour shares.
The analysis in this chapter does not provide a causal mechanism, but rather an
accounting framework for the effects of industry concentration at the firm and regional
level. Consider a firm i that produces output Yi according to a Cobb-Douglas production






Then, as appendix 3.A shows, the labour share wiLiYi = α, where wi is the wage rate. The
capital share is riKiYi = 1− α.
If the firm has market power, it is able to charge mark-up mi over prices, so that total
output is (1 + mi)Yi (see, e.g. De Loecker, Eeckhout, and Mongey (2021) for a model of
industry concentration and mark-ups). We assume the capital and labour markets remain
competitive, but workers and shareholders can bargain over the mark-up. In particular,
workers share si of the mark-up, while shareholders receive 1 − si. The worker share is
determined through negotiation. For example, Van Reenen (1996) describes a bargaining
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model for innovation rents, where firms bargain over wages with a union. The presence of
a union is not crucial to arrive at the results. It is equally plausible that firms negotiate
wages with “insider” employees that have some firm-specific skills and knowledge and
therefore have some bargaining power, as worker turnover is costly for the firm. With this










For any positive share of the mark-up gained by workers, the average wage will increase.
However, the labour share will only increase if si > α. For si < α, the labour share will
fall despite growing wages.
This has several implications. On the one hand, growing heterogeneity in wages among
firms would be expected, as wages at firms with market power will be higher (Song et al.,
2019; Card et al., 2013). This also corresponds to the notion of superstar firms (Autor
et al., 2020). The focus of this chapter is on the impacts of industry concentration on
regional wage inequality. In particular, if there is a regional concentration of firms with
market power, this will also increase regional inequality. To my knowledge, the labour
market effects of dominant firms have not yet been studied in a regional context. At the
regional level, the effects of dominant firms may be felt more strongly, if dominant firms
are clustered. This heterogeneity across regions may not be evident when looking at the
problem at an aggregate level.
3.3.Data and empirical methods
3.3.1 Data
The Office for National Statistics (ONS) collects data on GVA and employment costs
through the Annual Business Survey (ABS) and its predecessor before 2008, the Annual
Business Inquiry (ABI). For this study, I accessed the confidential panel of firm-level
records that is made accessible as the Annual Respondents Database X (ARDX) through
the Secure Research Service at the ONS. It is available from 2002 to 2014. The ABS/ ABI
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surveys all businesses with more than 250 employees and uses a sampling frame for smaller
businesses that is stratified by size and industry. It is restricted to Great Britain and there-
fore does not include businesses in Northern Ireland. The survey covers approximately
two-thirds of GB GDP. Important sectors that are excluded are financial intermediation
and insurance (the latter is excluded only in 2013 and 2014), most parts of the agricultural
sector, public administration and defence, and public provision of education and health
services.
The survey is conducted at the reporting unit level, which is the smallest collection of
establishments for which a company can provide financial information. Most businesses
consist of a single establishment that constitutes the reporting unit. However, larger, more
complex businesses have many establishments that are grouped into reporting units, for
example by function or location. Businesses are sampled to take part in the survey from
the universe of reporting units. Large businesses with more than 250 employees are always
surveyed. Small and medium sized businesses are surveyed for two consecutive years once
selected. Micro-businesses are also included in the survey but are surveyed only for one
time if included in the sample. This means that there is a limited panel element to the
survey: most businesses that are sampled are surveyed for at least two years. However,
not all businesses respond, and businesses may cease trading after their first survey, so in
practice the panel aspect is selective.
Market power is measured by a firm’s share in total industry turnover. Industries
are defined by SIC codes, with the 4-digit, most detailed definition used in the preferred
specifications. SIC codes change over time, and some steps were undertaken to harmonise
codes over time, which are detailed in appendix 3.B. My preferred measure of industry
concentration is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index defined as the sum of squared market
shares of the industry 1. The higher the index, the more concentrated, or dominated by
a smaller number of firms, the industry is. This indicator is used in the UK context, for
example, by Abel et al. (2018) to measure market power of employers in industries defined
by 2-digit SIC codes. As an alternative measure of concentration, I use concentration
ratios, defined as the share of the largest four or largest twenty businesses in total industry
turnover.
While businesses provide data on total wages and salaries paid during a year, they
are not asked for employment figures which are required to calculate average salaries.




i , where si is the market share by
turnover of business i in a certain industry
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Instead, employment numbers are merged from the Business Registers and Employment
Survey (BRES) and the Inter-departmental Business Register (IDBR). This results in
several issues. Even if a business is included both on the ABS and BRES, the timing of
the two surveys is different, so that the reporting periods are not the same. Employment
figures from the IDBR may be interpolated for several years if no update from the business
is available.
The variables used to calculate the labour share are GVA at market prices and to-
tal employment costs. These are derived in turn from several survey questions, but are
provided as standard measures on the dataset. GVA at market prices is calculated as
total turnover minus total purchases of goods, materials and services, adjusted for taxes
paid and changes in stocks and work in progress. Total employment costs include total
wages, salaries and redundancy payments, but exclude employer social security contribu-
tions. Responding businesses are requested to include compensation in cash and in kind,
including any bonus payments or premiums (Office for National Statistics, n.d.). This is
important, as growing popularity of equity-based compensation means that measures of
the labour share are biased downward if only compensation in cash is included (Eisfeldt,
Falato, & Xiaolan, 2021).
For regional analysis, matching a business to a location is straight-forward in most
cases: businesses that consist of a single local unit can be matched to their postcode, and
from there to any other geographical unit. However, for reporting units that consist of
establishments in different locations, some mapping needs to be done. Fortunately, only
few reporting units span several NUTS3 areas, the smallest geographical unit of analysis
used here. Where they do, reporting units are allocated proportionally by the employment
shares in the different locations. This is possible, because employment estimates are
available at the local unit level from the IDBR.
The data have several shortcomings. The self-employed are not included in the survey.
This is a problem, since the use of self-employed sub-contractors varies over time and
across industries. Self-employment is on the rise across the UK, and there is evidence that
it is most prevalent at the lower and higher ends of the pay distribution (Costa & Machin,
2017). The growing substitution of sub-contractors for employees may distort labour
shares, as labour costs are shifted from employment costs into other input costs. This
would bias the labour share downward and may also distort average wages, for example
if lower paid work is more likely to be contracted. Furthermore, payments to directors,
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partners and proprietors are also not included except for regular salaries. While this should
not bias the results much for larger businesses, in smaller businesses, where the boundaries
between personal and business finances may be more blurred, and directors may forego a
higher salary in favour of capital income for tax reasons, this may bias both wages and the
labour share downward. Another shortcoming of the data is that the financial sector is not
included. This sector plays an important role particularly in London and is an important
driver of high average earnings there.
The survey collects a range of other variables, such as an indicator whether the busi-
ness has conducted any research and development during the last year, the country of
ultimate ownership, which has been converted into an indicator for non-UK ownership,
and payments to employment agencies, which has been converted into the share of agency
employment in total employment costs. Summary statistics for the variables used in the
analysis can be found in table 3.1. The dataset contains some extreme outliers. Therefore,
the sample has been trimmed by dropping the 0.1% of businesses with the highest and
lowest labour shares and average wages.
3.3.2 Estimation strategy
I now turn to estimating the effect of market power and industry concentration on labour
shares at the firm level. I estimate the following equation:
Yjit = β1Sjit + β2HH it + β3Sjit ∗HH it + β4Xjit + γi + τt + εjit (3.4)
Where Yjit is the outcome variable of interest – average wages and labour shares – of firm
j in industry i and year t, HHit is the log Herfindahl-Hirschman in industry i in year t,
Sjit is the market share of firm j in industry i and year t, Xjit are control variables at the
firm level, γi are industry and τt are year fixed effects, and εjit is the error term.
Industry concentration can be measured at different levels of industry aggregation. In
the preferred specifications, industry concentration and market shares are measured at
the 4-digit industry level, with fixed effects entered at the same level. Robustness checks
show that the effects remain similar for 2- and 3-digit industries.
The control variables included are log employment and log turnover, which may capture
scale effects. A dummy indicates whether the firm plans to undertake any R&D in the
next two years. More innovative firms may be able to achieve a dominant position by
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Variable Definition Mean SD
Labour share Compensation of employees + employer
taxes and social security contributions di-
vided by GVA
0.553 0.258
Average wage (th£) Wages and salaries divided by total em-
ployment
33.64 357.3
Average wages (logs) 2.687 0.948
HH-index SIC 2 Herfindahl-Hirschman index of industry
turnover at 2-digit SIC code level
0.0509 0.0586
HH-index SIC 3 Herfindahl-Hirschman index of industry
turnover at 3-digit SIC code level
0.0873 0.0938
HH-index SIC 4 Herfindahl-Hirschman index of industry
turnover at 4-digit SIC code level
0.135 0.141
Market share SIC 2 Businesses’ share in total industry
turnover at 2-digit SIC code level
0.00264 0.0191
Market share SIC 3 Businesses’ share in total industry
turnover at 3-digit SIC code level
0.00806 0.0422
Market share SIC 4 Businesses’ share in total industry
turnover at 4-digit SIC code level
0.0177 0.0721
Employment Employment matched from IDBR 217.3 1883.9
Log employment 3.099 2.089
Turnover 43485.4 632262
Turnover (logs) 7.471 2.479
GVA Gross value added 14024.5 123541.1
GVA (logs) 6.684 2.331
R&D dummy Conduct research and development work
on a regular basis during the year
0.194 0.395
Foreign owned Owned by a non-UK based organisation 0.0924 0.29




Note: Sample corresponding to regression sample in table 3.4. Source: ARDX (ONS).
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offering superior and unique products. On the other hand, innovation rents may be shared
with employees (Van Reenen, 1996; Kline et al., 2019). A variable indicating the share
of agency employment in total employment costs is a rough indicator for outsourcing of
labour intensive tasks. Lastly, a dummy for foreign ownership is included.
3.4.Results
3.4.1 Descriptive analysis
Figure 3.1 shows different measures of industry concentration for Great Britain between
2002 and 2014 for different industry aggregations. Panel a) uses the Herfindahl-Hirschman
index (HH-index). As industries defined by 4-digit SIC codes are the most narrowly
defined, levels of concentration are overall higher than for 3-digit and 2-digit industries.
At each level of aggregation, concentration has increased over the observation period. At
the four-digit industry level, the HH-index increased from 0.14 in 2002 to 0.18 in 2014,
with a peak of 0.2 in 2009, an increase of 30%. At the 3- and 2-digit industry levels, the
index grew by 32% and 48%, respectively, over the period.
Panel b) of figure 3.1 considers concentration ratios as an alternative measure of in-
dustry concentration. While the HH-index takes into account the whole distribution of
businesses within industries, the index number itself does not have a straightforward in-
terpretation. Concentration ratios represent the share of the largest four (CR4) or largest
twenty (CR20) businesses in total industry turnover. Panel b) in figure 3.1 shows that the
largest four businesses in 4-digit industries accounted for 53% of industry turnover in 2002.
This share increased to 62% in 2014, or by 17%. At the 3- and 2-digit industry levels, the
turnover share by the largest four businesses grew by 21% and 36%, respectively, over the
period.
Figure 3.1 considers industry concentration at the national level. This does not neces-
sarily imply that industries are also spatially concentrated. In particular, Rossi-Hansberg,
Sarte, and Trachter (2018) find that increasing concentration at the national level is as-
sociated with falling concentration at the local level, if dominant businesses open more
local establishments. On the other hand, an industry that is not very concentrated can
be spatially concentrated if all firms are located in a single cluster.
While it is not clear a priori whether concentrated industries are also geographically
clustered, this is the case in the UK over the time period studied. Table 3.1 shows
the correlation between national and regional concentration of an industry. As above,
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Figure 3.1: Measures of industry concentration
a) Average Herfindahl-Hirschman index
b) Average concentration ratio
Note: Herfindahl-Hirschman index is measured as the sum of squared market shares at
the industry level. CR4 and CR20 are the concentration ratios, or market shares of
the largest 4 and largest 20 businesses by turnover. Industries are defined by 2-, 3-, or
4-digit SIC codes. All indices are first calculated at the industry level, and the average
is weighted by total industry turnover. Source: ARDX (ONS), author’s calculations.
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national concentration is measured by firms’ share of total industry turnover as the HH-
index, CR4 and CR20. Regional concentration is measured as the HH-index of industry
employment and value added across regions. For robustness, three different aggregations
across NUTS1, 2 and 3 regions are presented. The top panel presents the correlation in
levels, where observations are industry-years, while the bottom panel presents correlations
in changes across the time period. Both in levels and differences, the correlations are
positive and highly statistically significant. This shows that as industry concentration
increases, industries tend to also become more regionally concentrated.
Table 3.1: Correlation between industry concentration and regional concentration
Regional concentration
Regions NUTS1 NUTS2 NUTS3
Metric GVA Emp GVA Emp GVA Emp
HH-index 0.716*** 0.686*** 0.762*** 0.722*** 0.782*** 0.736***
CR4 0.578*** 0.552*** 0.606*** 0.566*** 0.613*** 0.569***
CR20 0.330*** 0.316*** 0.345*** 0.320*** 0.346*** 0.317***
N 7159 7159 7159 7159 7159 7159
Change in regional concentration
Regions NUTS1 NUTS2 NUTS3
Metric GVA Emp GVA Emp GVA Emp
∆ HH-index 0.580*** 0.533*** 0.620*** 0.571*** 0.633*** 0.598***
∆ CR4 0.346*** 0.315*** 0.365*** 0.328*** 0.382*** 0.349***
∆ CR20 0.166*** 0.151*** 0.171*** 0.150*** 0.183*** 0.161***
N 525 525 525 525 525 525
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Note: Correlation between regional concentration of GVA and employment with differ-
ent measures of national industry concentration across firms by GVA. Regional units
for the regional measure of concentration are indicated in the top line of the table.
Unit of observation are industry-year averages defined by 4-digit SIC codes.
Given that industries are becoming more concentrated, and that concentrated indus-
tries tend to be more clustered, it is important to understand where dominant businesses
are located. Table 3.2 provides a rough overview by counting the number of top-4 and
top-20 businesses – measured by turnover, like the concentration ratios – for each NUTS1
region for different industry aggregations. This is only a rough measure as even the largest
businesses in an industry with overall low levels of concentration do not have a lot of mar-
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ket power. Nonetheless, this concept aligns closely with the concentration ratios presented
above, which are highly correlated with the Herfindahl-Hirschman indices. Table 3.2 shows
that most dominant businesses can be found in London and the South East, the two rich-
est regions by average incomes. The smallest numbers, by a large margin, can be found
in Wales and the North East, two relatively poor regions. Regardless of the industry
definition and whether the largest four or largest twenty businesses are considered to be
dominant, the ranking of regions remains relatively stable. Naturally, some of these differ-
ences are driven by the total number of businesses in the regions, which are provided on
the right-hand side of the table. However, it should be noted that these are unweighted
counts, meaning that large businesses are overrepresented in the overall count, due to the
sampling structure.
Table 3.2: Number of dominant businesses by NUTS1 region
Industry def. 4-digit SIC 3-digit SIC 2-digit SIC Number of
Dominance def. Top 4 Top 20 Top 4 Top 20 Top 4 Top 20 businesses
London 347 1321 175 744 71 330 4845
South East 271 1158 128 592 44 231 4688
North West 230 903 99 432 36 162 3184
Yorks & Humber 211 750 88 390 23 116 2509
West Midlands 209 812 87 435 24 131 2726
East of England 196 815 92 403 26 136 3194
Scotland 188 814 94 401 33 171 3894
East Midlands 163 668 69 321 22 107 2287
South West 156 664 70 345 <20 110 2714
Wales 77 310 36 172 <20 54 1155
North East 70 252 34 130 <20 48 902
Note: Number of businesses that are among the largest 4 or largest 20 by turnover in
their industry, defined by 4-, 3- or 2-digit industries, in 2014. Reporting units with
local units in multiple regions are allocated proportionally to local employment. All
numbers are unweighted and are therefore not necessarily representative.
Table 3.3 relates industry concentration to industry average earnings, productivity
and labour shares. Results are presented at the 2, 3 and 4 digit industry level as well as
using the Hirschman-Herfindahl index and concentration ratios, to ensure results are not
driven by the choice of indicator or industry aggregation. The underlying observations
are industry-year averages. Throughout, there is a significant positive correlation between
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average earnings and labour productivity, measured as GVA per worker. As expected, the
correlation with the labour share is negative. The next section will test these correlations
in more detail.
Table 3.3: Correlation between industry concentration and earnings, productivity and
labour shares
HH-index CR4 CR20
Average earnings 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.070***
GVA per worker 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.075***
Labour share -0.062*** -0.13*** -0.12***
Number of underlying businesses 396708 396708 396708
Number of industries x years 7162 7162 7162
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Note: Correlation between industry concentration measured by the Herfindahl index
and concentration ratios (top-4 and top-20 share in turnover at the 4-digit industry
level). Observations are industry-year averages. Industry definitions as indicated in
the top row. Firms in top and bottom 0.1% of earnings, productivity and labour
shares omitted.
3.4.2 Firm-level effects
This section presents estimation results of the effect of market power and industry concen-
tration at the firm level. Table 3.4 presents estimates of the effect of industry concentration
and market power on average wages and labour shares. All models define industries at
the 4-digit SIC code level. Alternative specifications are explored in the appendix.
In the first, most simple model, only the Herfindahl-Hirschman index and the firm’s
share in total industry output, as well as industry and year fixed effects are included.
The coefficient on the HH-index is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that
firms in more concentrated industries have monopsony power and are able to set lower
wages. However, the coefficient on a firm’s individual market share is positive. This
has two possible explanations. More productive firms may be able to capture a larger
market share, with higher labour productivity reflected in higher wages. Alternatively,
rents captured due to market power may be passed on to workers in the form of higher
wages.
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In the second specification, further firm-level controls are added, including log em-
ployment, dummies indicating whether the firm conducts R&D or is foreign-owned, and
the share of agency employment in total employment costs. The coefficient on the HH-
index becomes statistically insignificant, while the coefficient on the market share falls in
magnitude but remains statistically significant.
In the third specification, the interaction of the two variables of interest is included, as
the market power a firm can exercise also depends on the overall level of concentration of
the industry. The coefficient of the HH-index remains statistically insignificant, while that
of the market share doubles in magnitude. The coefficient of the interaction is statistically
significant and negative. Overall, the marginal effect of the market share remains positive,
while that of the HH-index remains statistically insignificant, as shown at the bottom
of the table. If a firms market share increased by one percentage point, average annual
wages would be expected to increase by about £1,012. At the average annual wage of
£33,640, this is a quite substantial increase of 3%. Figure 3.2 plots the marginal effect of
the market share against different levels of the HH-index. The figure shows a larger effect
of market share for lower levels of industry concentration. This points to the importance of
the overall competitive environment, not just the individual market share. For example,
in an industry that is otherwise characterised by a large number of small firms, a firm
that is larger than most others by some margin may have some market power despite
not possessing a large overall market share. On the other side of the spectrum, highly
concentrated markets may be highly competitive, so that even firms with large market
shares have relatively little market power. An example of this are supermarkets in the
UK. However, there is no guarantee that a concentrated market turns into a competitive
oligopoly, as Philippon (2019) demonstrates with the example of the telecoms and airlines
markets.
The control variables included have the expected effects. Average wages are higher at
larger firms as measured by log employment. Firms that undertake R&D or are foreign
owned also pay higher wages. In contrast, wages are lower at firms that use more agency
workers, a practice that is more common in low-paid industries.
The next set of results shows estimations for the labour share as the dependent variable.
When only the HH-index and market share are included as explanatory variables, neither
has a statistically significant effect. When more control variables are included, the effect of
the HH-index becomes positive and statistically significant, while that of the market share
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Table 3.4: Regression of wages and labour shares on market power and concentration
Dep. Var.: Average wage (logs) Labour share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Market share 2.16*** 0.55*** 1.15*** 0.0099 -0.49*** -1.07***
(0.076) (0.10) (0.22) (0.016) (0.025) (0.047)
HH-index -0.22*** -0.045 0.023 -0.014 0.042*** -0.023**
(0.038) (0.029) (0.028) (0.012) (0.0095) (0.010)
HH-index x mkt sh -1.12*** 1.08***
(0.24) (0.058)
Log employment 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.055*** 0.058***
(0.0096) (0.010) (0.0018) (0.0018)
R&D dummy 0.033*** 0.032*** -0.0014 -0.00069
(0.010) (0.010) (0.0022) (0.0021)
Foreign owned 0.27*** 0.27*** -0.052*** -0.046***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.0043) (0.0042)
Agency emp. share -0.020** -0.020** -0.0062** -0.0061**
(0.0091) (0.0092) (0.0026) (0.0026)
Constant 2.68*** 2.22*** 2.21*** 0.56*** 0.39*** 0.39***
(0.0052) (0.030) (0.029) (0.0015) (0.0057) (0.0056)
R2 0.15 0.23 0.24 0.12 0.25 0.26
adj. R2 0.15 0.23 0.23 0.12 0.25 0.26
N 429057 429057 429057 429057 429057 429057
dydx HH-index 0.023 -0.023
dydx market share 1.15 -1.07
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Note: Market share and Herfindahl-Hirschman (HH-) index defined at the 4-digit SIC
code level. All specifications including year and 4-digit SIC code industry fixed effects.
dydx indicates the marginal effect of changes in the variable, taking into account the
interaction effect. Robust standard errors clustered at the industry level provided in
parentheses.
Labour market effects of industry concentration 64
becomes negative. As expected, these effects are the opposite of the effects for average
wages. This suggests that firms with market power are able to capture rents that are not
fully shared with workers, so that the share of wages in GVA declines.
When the interaction is included, the negative coefficient on the market share increases
in magnitude and the coefficient on the HH-index flips to negative. The coefficient on the
interaction is positive, but the marginal effects on both variables remain negative, as
indicated at the bottom of the table. Figure 3.2 shows the marginal effect of the market
share on the labour share for different levels of industry concentration. As with the effect
on wages, the graph shows the largest, in this case negative, effect for lower levels of
industry concentration.
In terms of the control variables, the labour share is higher at larger firms. There is no
effect from R&D, which demonstrates again that, while innovation rents may be shared
with workers (Van Reenen, 1996), this does not necessarily affect the labour share. The
labour share is lower in foreign owned firms, which may be a result of lower bargaining
power of employees at multinational enterprises. Unsurprisingly, the labour share is larger
in firms that use agency employment, as some of the labour is outsourced.
Figure 3.2: Marginal effect of market power on average earnings and labour shares
Average wages Labour shares
Note: The figures show the marginal effects of market share on average wages and
labour shares, respectively, for different levels of industry concentration. The figure is
derived from specifications 3 and 6 in table 3.4.
The appendix presents some robustness checks for these results. Table 3.D.2 repeats
specification three and six with market share and industry concentration measured at
the 2-digit and 3-digit SIC code level. While the coefficients change in magnitude, their
sign remains unchanged. Table 3.D.4 utilises the panel aspect of the survey and only
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includes businesses with at least two survey responses available. Summary statistics for
the restricted sample are provided in table 3.D.3, showing that these businesses are on
average larger and pay higher wages than the full sample. Because the sample is less
representative of the British economy as a whole, it is not used for the main results.
The regression controls for business fixed effects, therefore controlling for any unobserved
characteristics of the business. For average wages, the results are slightly different, with a
significant negative coefficient of the HH-index instead of a positive insignificant one, and a
negative effect of log employment. The marginal effect of the the HH-index flips negative,
but remains small in magnitude compared to the effect of market power. The coefficients
in the labour share regressions have the same sign as in the full sample regressions.
3.4.3 Regional impacts
Businesses with market power may have big impacts on local labour markets. As industries
are dominated by fewer, larger firms, employment is more concentrated, and, as table
3.1 shows, industries that are more concentrated are also more spatially concentrated.
Concentration increases if existing businesses cease trading and are not replaced by new
entrants. Given the constant churn in the economy, it is impossible to say where businesses
would have been located had they entered the market or not left the market in the first
place. However, based on the regression analysis above, it is possible to calculate the
contribution of concentration on average wages and labour shares at the regional level.
Table 3.5 provides a calculation of the regional distribution of the effect of market power
and industry concentration on average wages. The effect is calculated from the regression
coefficients in table 3.4, multiplied by market power and industry concentration at the
firm level and averaged at the regional level. The averages are weighted by survey design
weights2 as well as log employment, to give more weight to larger businesses. Reporting
units, which are collections of local units such as plants, offices and branches for which
financial information is available, are allocated to regions based on local employment. The
weights required to create aggregates from the survey sample are only available from 2003,
so the 2003-2014 horizon is used for the calculation.
2The weights consist of sampling weights that are based on the sampling frame and reflect the
lower probability of smaller businesses to be sampled, as well as the differences in sampling across in-
dustries. Additionally, calibration weights are used to adjust for unusual values in the sample using
additional data. These adjustments are used to account for sampling variation and to achieve greater
stability in the data. The calibration weights used here are based on turnover. For details on the
weight design see https://www.ons.gov.uk/businessindustryandtrade/business/businessservices/
methodologies/annualbusinesssurveytechnicalreportaugust2018
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The first two columns in table 3.5 show log wages (in thousands) and the effect of
market power and concentration on wages in 2003 by region. The contribution of mar-
ket power and industry concentration to wage growth is calculated as the change in the
effect divided by the change in wages. However, the effects are overall quite small. The
contributions are negative for London and the South East, the two regions with the high-
est earnings, but for opposing reasons: in London, wages were stagnant, but the average
market share of businesses actually declined, with this negative impact counteracted by
other forces. In the South East, on the other hand, wages fell, but by less than otherwise
expected, because of an increase in market power of local firms. At the bottom of the
table, decline in market power of local firms contributed to falling average wages in the
North East.
Table 3.5: Effect of market power and industry concentration on average wages by NUTS1
region, 2003-2014
2003 Effect 2014 Effect Wage growth
2003 of market power 2014 of market power attributable to
wages & concentration wages & concentration market power
NUTS1 region (log) on wages (log) on wages & concentration
[1] [2] [3] [4] ([4]-[2])/([3]-[1])
London 2.60 0.0076 2.60 0.0067 -96.10%
South East 2.44 0.0067 2.43 0.0070 -4.02%
West Midlands 2.40 0.0074 2.41 0.0071 -2.48%
East Midlands 2.40 0.0066 2.33 0.0070 -0.54%
North West 2.34 0.0069 2.30 0.0070 -0.20%
Wales 2.36 0.0063 2.23 0.0064 -0.08%
Yorks. & Humber 2.40 0.0072 2.28 0.0073 -0.08%
Scotland 2.53 0.0079 2.39 0.0073 0.43%
South West 2.31 0.0066 2.29 0.0062 1.77%
East of England 2.38 0.0061 2.40 0.0067 2.15%
North East 2.36 0.0077 2.35 0.0070 13.01%
Note: Effect of market power and industry concentration on average wages based on
specification 3 in table 3.4. Observations are weighted by survey designed weights (a-
weight and g-weight) and log employment.
As a result of the global financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, wage growth over the period
was overall very low. Figure 3.C.1 in the appendix shows the trends in average wages
over the whole period, with the negative effect of the financial crisis clearly visible in 2008
and 2009. After 2009, wages remained largely stable, albeit, in many regions at a lower
level. It should be noted that these are average wages per employee: the reduction in
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average wages may be the result of reduced hourly rates, reduced hours, or a shift in the
composition of employment to lower-paid roles. Table 3.D.5 in the appendix replicates
the analysis for two sub-periods, 2003 to 2007 and 2010 to 2014, that were less affected by
the recession. In the first period, growing concentration uniformly contributed to growing
wages. In the second period, concentration offset some of the decline in average wages,
such as in Scotland, the South East, Wales and Yorkshire and the Humber.
Table 3.6 repeats the analysis for the effect on labour shares. In all regions, labour
shares fell between 2003 and 2014. By 2014, labour shares were lowest in London and
the South East, the two highest paying regions, albeit with a small margin. Similar to
the effect on wages, the overall contribution of market power and concentration is small,
up to 2% of total change in labour shares. Again, the analysis is repeated for the two
periods before and after the financial crisis in table 3.D.6 in the appendix. This shows that
the labour share increased in some regions in the first half of the observation period, but
uniformly fell in the second. Between 2010 and 2014, increasing industry concentration
contributed to the decline in the labour share in most regions. In the South East, it
contributed almost 6% of the decline in the labour share. While London experienced a
steep decline in the labour share between 2010 and 2014, growing concentration did not
contribute to this trend.
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Table 3.6: Effect of market power and industry concentration on labour shares by NUTS1
region, 2003-2014
2003 Effect of 2014 Effect of LS change
2003 market power & 2014 market power & attributable to
labour concentration labour concentration market power
share on LS share on LS & concentration
NUTS1 region [1] [2] [3] [4] ([4]-[2])/([3]-[1])
North East 55.9% -0.0073 53.1% -0.0067 -2.04%
London 56.0% -0.0072 49.9% -0.0064 -1.33%
Scotland 57.9% -0.0075 52.1% -0.0070 -0.81%
South West 56.5% -0.0063 50.9% -0.0060 -0.53%
West Midlands 56.3% -0.0070 50.7% -0.0068 -0.32%
Wales 60.3% -0.0059 51.7% -0.0062 0.30%
North West 55.8% -0.0066 51.4% -0.0067 0.34%
Yorks & Humber 55.8% -0.0068 51.3% -0.0070 0.40%
East Midlands 56.6% -0.0063 51.6% -0.0067 0.81%
South East 54.7% -0.0063 50.4% -0.0067 0.88%
East of England 53.1% -0.0058 50.2% -0.0064 2.09%
Note: Effect of market power and industry concentration on average wages based on specifica-
tion 6 in table 3.4. LS indicates labour share. Observations are weighted by survey designed
weights (a-weight and g-weight) and log employment.
3.5.Discussion and conclusion
The analysis shows strong impacts of market power on wages and labour shares at the
firm level in the UK. Market concentration has grown significantly in recent years. The
evidence suggests that this gives firms market power and the ability to charge mark-ups
over marginal cost. While these rents are partially shared with workers, labour shares fall,
with possibly negative effects on overall interpersonal inequality. Concentrated industries
also become more regionally clustered, however, the overall effects at the regional level are
small. While these results add to the international evidence on the growing importance
of dominant firms, future research needs to consider the underlying mechanisms driving
these effects.
At the firm level, market power is associated with higher wages. This may be a signal
of higher productivity: more productive firms may be able to capture a higher market
share and also pay higher wages. However, this does not square with the negative effect
of market power on labour shares. If gains in productivity were shared with workers,
productivity increases would translate into higher wages and a constant labour share. In
the model proposed by Autor et al. (2020), higher productivity is manifested in a smaller
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share of overhead labour, which also results in a lower labour share. But it is not clear
what their model predicts for average wages. In contrast, efficiency wage models (Akerlof
& Yellen, 1990; Blanchflower et al., 1996) can explain both the effect on wages as well as
on labour shares, if profits are only partially shared with workers.
One aspect that could not be explored with the available data is the effect on regional
earnings through business dynamics, as only wages and labour shares at surviving busi-
nesses are observed. Businesses with high market shares may be able to achieve their
dominance by forcing competitors out of business. Feldman et al. (2021) show how large
businesses may negatively affect growth in left-behind regions in the United States through
acquisitions of promising start-ups, thereby depriving those regions of growth prospects.
The effects of industry concentration may therefore be wider, if business growth in regions
outside of established clusters is stifled. The co-location of dominant firms and very small
firms could be directly related, as highly productive firms tend to outsource more and
more functions to smaller firms or self-employed sub-contractors (Card et al., 2013; Weil,
2014). In the UK context, this is facilitated by liberal labour market institutions that have
fuelled the growth of self-employment and other forms of non-standard working such as
through employment agencies and umbrella companies in recent years (Green & Livanos,
2015).
This makes it important to understand the wider compositional changes. Concentra-
tion can increase if the overall number of businesses declines, or if market shares become
more unequally distributed between smaller and larger businesses. A widening gap be-
tween a small number of market leaders and a long tail of possible challengers that find
it difficult to gain scale may also contribute to widening inequalities within regions, an
aspect not considered in this chapter.
This links to the factors that allow firms to achieve dominance in the first place.
Research shows that regional characteristics can contribute to a firm’s growth to industry
dominance through external economies of scale, such as supplier networks, deep labour
pools and knowledge exchange (Duranton & Puga, 2004). If industries are becoming
more and more concentrated, the only chance for a start-up to “make it” may then be
by locating in a highly productive city (Gaubert, 2018), further deepening inequalities.
The interaction between agglomeration effects and market power may then make it very
difficult for lagging regions to attract new firms and industries (Feldman et al., 2019).
To better understand the mechanisms at play, future research needs to unpack the
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mechanisms by which industries become more concentrated. Some firms gain market
power through strategic acquisitions (Argentesi et al., 2020; Cunningham, Ederer, & Ma,
2021). Others may grow organically to dominate a market, or disrupt an industry through
innovation. The dynamics are highly specific to individual industries. Some industries, in
particular traditional manufacturing and service industries have low barriers to entry, but
incumbents may fend of competition through acquisitions or predatory pricing, whereby
the incumbent takes temporary losses to undercut a challengers prices and drive them out
of business. In contrast, many digital industries, but also those requiring high upfront
tangible or intangible investments and technologies exhibiting network effects, may be
natural monopolies.
The present study cannot establish causality between market power, industry concen-
tration, wages and labour shares. Although the combination of positive effects on wages
and negative effects on labour shares presents some compelling evidence in favour of a
rent sharing model, future research will uncover the specific components of this model.
Estimating rents is difficult as firms’ marginal costs are unobserved, but it is possible to
do so (De Loecker & Eeckhout, 2018). This could provide more evidence on the relation
between market power, rents and wages, and labour shares. Combined with more evidence
on the structure of the market, as outlined above, this could also uncover the source of
rents. Some market power is legitimate, for example, market power conferred by patent
protection, which allows inventors to earn rents to recover the costs of the invention (Kline
et al., 2019). In other cases, this may come at the detriment of consumers, through higher
prices. Here, price comparisons across countries can provide insights (Gutiérrez & Philip-
pon, 2019). This measure is not useful in many digital markets, where the products are
free to consumers, or platforms, that help consumers to find lower prices. Instead, in these
markets high rents are achieved by exercising monopsony power over suppliers of inputs.
If the rent-sharing model hypothesised here is accurate, the question remains over how
the share of the rents earned by workers is determined. Stansbury and Summers (2020)
argue that worker power has declined in particular as a result of falling unionisation. Many
workers have strong preferences for low inequality within a work place, resulting in higher
wages for those with otherwise low bargaining power (Akerlof & Yellen, 1990). However,
recent increases in outsourcing and the use of non-standard employment contracts have
weakened bargaining power (Weil, 2014), or what Stansbury and Summers (2020) call
“ruthless” management practices, as opposed to the fair wage model by Akerlof and Yellen
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(1990). On the other hand, there is evidence that public pressure, in particular on large
employers can result in higher pay, even outside the targeted firms (Derenoncourt et al.,
2021).
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Appendix
3.A.Mark-up model
Consider the following Cobb-Douglas production function:
Y = ALαK1−α














If firms are able to charge a mark-up m over cost, total nominal output is Y + mY =
(1 + m)Y . If workers are able to capture share s of the mark-up, the new labour share



















Therefore, if m > 0, the labour share will remain constant only if s = α, increase if
s > alpha, and decrease if s < alpha.
3.B.Harmonising 2003 and 2007 SIC codes
Industrial classifications change to reflect changes in the structure of the economy. UK SIC
codes changed in 2003 and 2007. As the ARDX is designed as a panel dataset, researchers
have imputed 2007 SIC codes for the 1998 to 2007 period. However, an unusually large
number of businesses changed SIC code in 2003, 2008 and 2009, implying that measures of
industry concentration may be distorted. Moreover, the number of industries in the dataset
increases over time. This may result in a measured increase in industry concentration
because the same number of businesses are spread over a rising number of industries. To
mitigate these factors, I adjusted SIC codes to reduce volatility in SIC codes and to hold
the number of industries in the dataset roughly stable over time. One simple solution might
be to use the last available SIC code for every business throughout its history. However,
businesses may reasonably change their main activity over time. I therefore adjusted SIC
codes with a view to eliminate the spike in reassignments in 2003 and 2008/2009 according
to the following rules:
1. For years after 2009, make no adjustments and use the available SIC code.
2. If a firm never changes SIC code, use the assigned SIC code.
3. If a firm changed SIC code once, use the assigned SIC code, unless the change
occurred in 2003, 2008 or 2009.
4. In all other cases, use the last available SIC code.
As most firms are not captured by the ARDX each year, the SIC code assignment is
done using universe files, where all firms in the ARDX sampling frame are included each
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year, with SIC codes drawn from the Figure 3.B.1 shows the number of industries per
year. Figure 3.B.2 replicates figure 3.1 but showing Hirschman-Herfindahl indices at the
4-digit SIC code level using original SIC codes, assigning the last available SIC code, and
the modified SIC codes as explained above, which are used throughout the main analysis.
Figure 3.B.1: Number of industries in the dataset using alternative modifications
Note: All SIC codes are according to the 2007 classification, but the number of indus-
tries varies depending on the method to update older SIC codes for the years before
2008. Original SIC codes as in ARDX, modified SIC codes as described in the text,
and last available assigning the last available code for each business.
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Figure 3.B.2: Average Herfindahl-Hirschman index for alternative industry definitions
Note: Average Herfindahl-Hirschman index for 4-digit industries with different modifi-
cations to update older SIC codes for the years before 2008. Original SIC codes as in
ARDX, modified SIC codes as described in the text, and last available assigning the
last available code for each business.
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3.C.Additional figures
Figure 3.C.1: Average wages by NUTS1 region
Note: Average wages calculated as weighted average from reporting unit level wages,
weighted by a-weight x g-weight x log employment. Reporting units with local units in
multiple regions are allocated based on local unit employment shares. Source: ARDX
(ONS), author’s calculations.
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Figure 3.C.2: Labour share by NUTS1 region
Note: Regional labour share calculated as weighted average from reporting unit level
labour shares, weighted by a-weight x g-weight x log employment. Reporting units
with local units in multiple regions are allocated based on local unit employment
shares. Source: ARDX (ONS), author’s calculations.
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3.D.Additional tables
Table 3.D.1: Correlation between industry concentration and earnings, productivity and
labour shares – alternative industry aggregations
2-digit SIC 3-digit SIC
HH-index CR4 CR20 HH-index CR4 CR20
Average earnings 0.096*** 0.21*** 0.27*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.13***
GVA per worker 0.20*** 0.25*** 0.27*** 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.11***
Labour share -0.16*** -0.33*** -0.37*** -0.11*** -0.18*** -0.16***
N businesses 396708 396708 396708 396708 396708 396708
N industries x years 1082 1082 1082 3271 3271 3271
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Note: Correlation between industry concentration measured by the Herfindahl index
and concentration ratios (top-4 and top-20 share in turnover at the 4-digit industry
level). Observations are industry-year averages. Industry definitions as indicated in
the top row. Firms in top and bottom 0.1% of earnings, productivity and labour
shares omitted.
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Table 3.D.2: Regression results for alternative industry aggregations
Dep. Var.: Average wage (logs) Labour share
Industry aggregation: SIC 2 SIC 3 SIC 2 SIC 3
Market share 1.60** 1.22*** -2.85*** -1.54***
(0.72) (0.35) (0.23) (0.087)
HH-index 0.094 0.022 0.014 -0.023
(0.098) (0.047) (0.025) (0.014)
HH-index x mkt sh -1.88** -1.32*** 3.44*** 1.68***
(0.92) (0.41) (0.40) (0.12)
Log employment 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.055*** 0.056***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.0028) (0.0021)
R&D dummy 0.041*** 0.038*** -0.0030 -0.0014
(0.015) (0.013) (0.0032) (0.0026)
Foreign owned 0.31*** 0.29*** -0.061*** -0.053***
(0.043) (0.027) (0.0058) (0.0051)
Agency emp. share -0.019** -0.019** -0.0063** -0.0061**
(0.0088) (0.0090) (0.0027) (0.0026)
Constant 2.21*** 2.21*** 0.39*** 0.40***
(0.036) (0.033) (0.0087) (0.0067)
R2 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.25
adj. R2 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.25
N 429057 429057 429057 429057
dydx HH-index 0.094 0.022 0.014 -0.023
dydx market share 1.60 1.22 -2.85 -1.54
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Note: Market share and Herfindahl-Hirschman (HH-) index defined at the SIC code
level as indicated at the top of the table. All specifications including year and industry
fixed effects at the same level of aggregation as concentration variables. dydx indicates
the marginal effect of changes in the variable, taking into account the interaction ef-
fect. Robust standard errors clustered at the industry level provided in parentheses.
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Table 3.D.3: Summary statistics for panel sample
Mean SD
Labour share 0.628 0.223
Average wage (th£) 40.92 394.2
Average wages/salaries (logs) 2.996 0.758
HH-index SIC 2 0.05 0.0587
HH-index SIC 3 0.0884 0.0952
HH-index SIC 4 0.137 0.142
Market share SIC 2 0.00467 0.025
Market share SIC 3 0.014 0.0544
Market share SIC 4 0.0303 0.0923
Employment 388 2545.4
Log employment 4.464 1.577
Turnover 78746.9 861658.7
Turnover (logs) 9.027 1.941
GVA 25253.5 165278.5
GVA (logs) 8.16 1.818
R&D dummy 0.219 0.414
Foreign owned 0.155 0.362
Agency emp. share 0.0294 0.746
Observations 227389
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Table 3.D.4: Regression results for panel sample
Dep. var.: Average wage (logs) Labour share
Industry aggregation: SIC 2 SIC 3 SIC 4 SIC 2 SIC 3 SIC 4
Market share 2.87*** 1.60*** 1.16*** -0.58*** -0.35*** -0.23***
(0.23) (0.090) (0.054) (0.083) (0.036) (0.021)
HH-index -0.078** -0.050** -0.028* -0.0015 -0.0091 -0.0082
(0.033) (0.020) (0.015) (0.014) (0.0089) (0.0064)
HH-index x mkt sh -3.12*** -1.63*** -1.03*** 0.63*** 0.36*** 0.22***
(0.29) (0.13) (0.061) (0.12) (0.049) (0.026)
Log employment -0.42*** -0.42*** -0.43*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.029***
(0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015)
R&D dummy 0.00025 0.0010 0.0010 0.0027** 0.0026** 0.0025**
(0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Foreign owned -0.0039 -0.0037 -0.0032 -0.0014 -0.0012 -0.0015
(0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025)
Agency emp. share -0.017** -0.017** -0.017** -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0010
(0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.00098) (0.00098) (0.00098)
Constant 4.87*** 4.87*** 4.88*** 0.50*** 0.51*** 0.51***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067)
R2 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.69 0.70 0.70
adj. R2 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.57 0.57 0.57
N 227389 227389 227389 227389 227389 227389
dydx HH-index -0.078 -0.050 -0.028 -0.0015 -0.0091 -0.0082
dydx market share 2.87 1.60 1.16 -0.58 -0.35 -0.23
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Note: Only includes reporting units (firms) occurring at least twice on ARDX. Market
share and Herfindahl-Hirschman (HH-) index defined at the SIC code level as indicated
at the top of the table. All specifications including reporting unit, year and industry
fixed effects at the same level of aggregation as concentration variables. dydx indicates
the marginal effect of changes in the variable, taking into account the interaction ef-
fect. Robust standard errors clustered at the industry level provided in parentheses.
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Table 3.D.5: Effect of market power and industry concentration on regional wages for
alternative time periods
2003-2007 2010-2014 2003-2014
Wage growth Wage growth Wage growth
due to market due to market due to market
Wage power & Wage power & Wage power &
NUTS1 region growth concentration growth concentration growth concentration
East Midlands 19.04% 1.15% 3.54% 0.30% -6.99% -0.54%
East of England 23.27% 1.19% 4.11% 0.78% 2.65% 2.15%
London 32.97% 0.56% -2.12% 0.86% 0.10% -96.10%
North East 19.97% 2.11% 5.17% -0.04% -0.50% 13.01%
North West 31.08% 0.79% 1.20% 1.95% -4.31% -0.20%
Scotland 34.03% 1.04% -3.28% -1.01% -13.57% 0.43%
South East 22.28% 0.35% -0.43% -20.31% -0.72% -4.02%
South West 9.87% 1.38% 1.86% 1.95% -2.64% 1.77%
Wales 15.06% 2.57% -5.26% -0.10% -12.85% -0.08%
West Midlands 20.72% 0.90% 6.50% -0.21% 1.09% -2.48%
Yorks & Humber 14.70% 1.18% -2.99% -0.11% -12.23% -0.08%
Note: The table shows the share of wage growth that is attributable to changing mar-
ket power and industry concentration. This is calculated as the effect of the change
in market power and industry concentration, derived from specification 3 in table 3.4,
divided by overall wage growth in the region. Observations are weighted by survey
designed weights (a-weight and g-weight) and log employment.
Table 3.D.6: Effect of marker power and industry on regional labour shares for alternative
time periods
2003-2007 2010-2014 2003-2014
LS change LS change LS change
Labour due to market Labour due to market Labour due to market
share power & share power & share power &
NUTS1 region change concentration change concentration change concentration
East Midlands -0.14 136.39% -1.11 0.78% -5.01 0.81%
East of England 0.57 -45.07% -1.88 1.67% -2.89 2.09%
London 0.37 -46.41% -2.47 -0.64% -6.01 -1.33%
North East 1.49 -26.36% 0.27 0.94% -2.84 -2.04%
North West 1.38 -16.19% -1.66 1.43% -4.33 0.34%
Scotland 4.37 -7.39% -2.07 1.43% -5.85 -0.81%
South East -0.30 25.03% -1.44 5.87% -4.24 0.88%
South West -2.86 4.38% -0.87 4.15% -5.68 -0.53%
Wales -4.78 7.68% -2.75 0.30% -8.64 0.30%
West Midlands 0.92 -18.37% -2.41 -0.49% -5.65 -0.32
Yorks. & Humber -1.56 10.21% -2.23 0.20% -4.55 0.40%
Note: The table shows the share of the change in the labour share that is attributable to chang-
ing market power and industry concentration. This is calculated as the effect of the change in
market power and industry concentration, derived from specification 6 in table 3.4, divided by
the overall change in market power in the region. Labour share change in percentage points.
Observations are weighted by survey designed weights (a-weight and g-weight) and log em-
ployment. LS indicates the labour share.
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Chapter 4
Technological invention and local
labour markets: Evidence from
France, Germany and the UK
4.1.Introduction
With a returning interest in industrial strategy, many governments seek to foster tech-
nological invention as a local economic development strategy. The rationale behind this
policy approach is two-fold: On the one hand, it is a well-established fact in economic
theory that technological progress drives economic growth in the long run (Aghion &
Howitt, 1988). On the other hand, innovative and high-tech sectors have multiplier effects
(Moretti, 2012). Through their spending on local services, highly paid workers at inno-
vative firms generate further jobs in the local economy, in particular for non-graduates.
Therefore, when assessing the local labour market effects of innovation, many scholars
focus on the impact of the number of high-skilled workers on other employment (e.g. Ke-
meny & Osman, 2018; Lee & Clarke, 2019; Lee & Rodŕıguez-Pose, 2016). However, there
is less evidence on the direct impacts of invention and innovation activity on local labour
markets, other than mediated through employment multipliers.
Classical models have focused on a dichotomy between ”high” and ”low” skilled work-
ers. However, recent evidence of routine-biased technical change suggests that jobs in the
middle of the income distribution are declining, as they often comprise of routine activities
that are easily automated (Autor, 2019; Goos et al., 2014; Harrigan, Reshef, & Toubal,
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2021). Yet, technological invention may also provide a source of job growth for mid-skilled
workers in occupations that require creativity and soft skills (Aghion, Bergeaud, Blundell,
& Griffith, 2019). There is little evidence of the local labour market effects of innovation
on employment by level of education, a gap that this study seeks to fill.
This chapter studies the effects of technological invention, measured by patent filings,
on regional employment in France, Germany and the UK. I distinguish between three skill
groups, graduates, all non-graduates, as well as those with advanced vocational qualifi-
cations below degree level (henceforth also called ”mid-skilled”). I estimate these effects
with the help of panel data analysis for the period between 2000 and 2019 at the level of
NUTS1 and NUTS2 regions. I use local projections estimation (Jordà, 2005) to trace out
the effects of changes in patenting and graduate employment on non-graduate and mid-
skilled employment over a period of one to six years and calculate multiplier effects of the
additional jobs created. I also investigate heterogeneity across the three countries in the
sample. While these three large, developed economies are the most innovative in Europe
in terms of patent filings, they are very different in terms of their innovation systems and
labour market institutions.
The study contributes to the large literature on innovation-employment multipliers
(Brenner, Capassi, Duschl, Frenken, & Treibich, 2018; Eberle, Brenner, & Mitze, 2020;
Frocrain & Gitraud, 2018; Kemeny & Osman, 2018; Lee & Clarke, 2019; Moretti, 2010;
Moretti & Thulin, 2013; Van Dijk, 2018; Van Roy, Vértesy, & Vivarelli, 2018). In contrast
to the previous literature, the chapter considers and compares the effects across three
countries. The results show considerable heterogeneity across countries that can be ex-
plained by differences in labour market institutions. The estimation strategy provides the
adjustment in employment in response to shocks over several years, rather than a single
point in time. While growth in graduate employment is relatively persistent, gains in non-
graduate and mid-skilled employment tend to be short-lived, with employment reverting
to the baseline within two to three years.
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 4.2 reviews the relevant literature and intro-
duces the theoretical framework underlying the analysis. Section 4.3 describes the dataset
and introduces the estimation strategy. Section 4.4 provides the results. The chapter is
exploratory in nature and there are several limitations that warrant further investigation.
These are discussed in section 4.5.
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4.2.Related literature and theoretical framework
In the following, I briefly review the literature on the labour market impacts of innovation,
situating this in the contexts of the three countries studied. While the empirical analysis
focuses on technological invention proxied by patenting, I will use the term “innovation”
loosely below, as definitions differ. The shortcomings of relying solely on patents as a
measure of invention are discussed in section 4.3. I conclude the discussion of the literature
with a simple theoretical framework that guides the following analysis.
4.2.1 Innovation multiplier effects
The idea that employment creation in some sectors increases employment in others has
been well established for a long time (North, 1955). Theory predicts that tradable in-
dustries create employment in non-tradable industries, either through direct links such as
local distribution and business services, or indirectly, through the consumption of local
services by those employed in the tradable industry (Moretti, 2012). Recent evidence
confirms the significance of the multiplier effect for regional growth (Frocrain & Gitraud,
2018; Moretti, 2010; Moretti & Thulin, 2013), although its magnitude remains somewhat
disputed (Van Dijk, 2018).
In this context, innovation plays an important role because of the rents that creators
of new ideas are able to capture. Innovation relies on highly skilled workers who share
part of these rents (Kline et al., 2019; Van Reenen, 1996). The comparative advantage
that innovative firms enjoy allows these firms to grow, leading to higher employment at
the individual firm level (Balasubramanian & Sivadasan, 2011; Van Roy et al., 2018).
Wider regional effects of innovation are generally conceptualised in terms of consump-
tion multipliers. In this respect, innovative industries are not very different from other
industries relying heavily on high-skilled, highly paid workers, such as knowledge-intensive
business services (Brenner et al., 2018). Indeed, there is evidence that these industries
contribute to the polarisation of labour markets by creating a lot of employment in local
service industries (Kemeny & Osman, 2018), jobs that are often low paid (Lee & Clarke,
2019).
However, the effects of innovation can go beyond the consumption channel, as suc-
cessfully innovating firms fuel further research and development activity at the regional
level, and create further employment in innovative industries (Buerger, Broekel, & Coad,
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2012). Innovative regions attract graduates that contribute to a virtuous cycle of inno-
vativeness, employment growth, and human capital accumulation (Faggian & McCann,
2009). Yet, innovation may contribute to growing polarisation between innovative, fast-
growing regions that attract skilled workers, and those that are left behind (Autor, 2019;
Rodŕıguez-Pose, 2018).
Nonetheless, innovation may also benefit those with qualifications below degree level
(Filippetti & Guy, 2016). After all, not all workers involved in innovation and innova-
tive industries are high-skilled. Aghion et al. (2019) find that low-skilled workers benefit
from innovation at the firm level in terms of higher wages, in particular in jobs reliant
on soft skills. Polarisation of labour markets with growth concentrated in both high-
and low-paid non-routine occupations has been driven by skill-biased technical change
and offshoring which has eliminated many mid-skilled routine occupations in high-income
economies (Autor & Dorn, 2013; Caselli & Manning, 2017; Goos et al., 2014). In contrast
to low-skilled occupations, mid-skilled occupations that were lost in manufacturing sectors
have not been replaced in the service economy.
By virtue of their newness, tasks in innovative industries are less likely to be automat-
able, at least in the medium term. Following a successful innovation, the composition of
new hires tends to reflect a firm’s previous skill profile, indicating no evidence of a skill
bias of technological change at the firm level (Kline et al., 2019). This is also supported
by theories of industry life cycles, whereby industries are most agglomerated during the
most innovative stages before offshoring and outsourcing take over in more mature phases
(Audretsch & Feldman, 1996a). However, the degree to which benefits of innovation
are shared across skill groups depends on the institutional and wider policy environment
(Bramwell, 2021; Ciarli, Marzucchi, Salgado, & Savona, 2018).
While innovation may be a source of employment growth, skilled workers are also an
important input in the innovation process (Faggian et al., 2017; Gagliardi, 2014), and col-
laborations between universities and industry are a driver of local innovation (Crescenzi,
Filippetti, & Iammarino, 2017; D’Este, Guy, & Iammarino, 2013). Regions with abun-
dant human capital therefore attract innovative activities, which may reinforce inequalities
between regions. Furthermore, innovative industries tend to cluster more than other in-
dustries (Audretsch & Feldman, 1996b). This is because of the strong path dependency
in knowledge creation and the small radius in which knowledge spillovers tend to occur
(Sonn & Storper, 2008). Where exactly innovative activities locate and thrive remains
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a topic of intense scholarly debate, with factors including local and national institutions,
skills and serendipity all playing a role (Chatterji, Glaeser, & Kerr, 2014; Storper et al.,
2015). While lagging regions need to invest in innovation to catch up with leaders, they
often lack the absorptive capacity to do so, further widening the divide (Muscio, Reid, &
Rivera Leon, 2015).
4.2.2 National innovation and education systems
The three countries included in the empirical analysis are deliberately chosen to repre-
sent different industrial structures and national and regional institutions. Theories of
regional systems of innovation emphasise the importance of local actors, institutions and
path dependency (Iammarino, 2005). These systems interact directly with labour market
institutions, in terms of the skill profile of the workforce and the incentives for businesses
to be innovative. Among the three countries, France has the most stringent employment
protection laws, while the UK has the most liberal. German labour market institutions
resembled the French, but have been somewhat liberalised in recent years (Griffith &
Macartney, 2014).
There are also significant differences in terms of education systems. Germany has
a strong tradition of vocational post-secondary education of the “dual apprenticeship”
model, whereby apprentices spend some time acquiring firm-specific skills while training
on the job, and the rest of their time acquiring transferable skills at a further education
college. In contrast, while the French education model also provides a range of post-
secondary qualifications below degree level, skills tend to be acquired on the job with
company-based training. In the UK, further education is weak, with mostly college based
training (Esteves-Abe, Iversen, & Soskice, 2001). Instead, access to higher education has
been promoted, so that the share of university graduates in the workforce is highest in the
UK, as I will show below.
These differences have important implications for the level and type of innovation.
Generous unemployment insurance gives workers confidence to acquire specialised skills,
as is the case with the German and French further education systems. The wider diversity
of skills that these economies possess is conducive to innovation (Filippetti & Guy, 2020).
On the other hand employment protection legislation that makes it harder to hire and
fire workers may provide an incentive for firms to innovate to improve productivity in an
otherwise inflexible setting. However, rigid institutions also make workforce adjustment
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harder if skill requirements change due to technological progress. The evidence suggests
that there is more innovation overall in countries with stronger employment protection,
but this tends to be incremental, whereas countries with liberal labour market institutions
tend to be drivers of radical innovation (Griffith & Macartney, 2014).
Institutions also affect the degree and speed of adjustment following a technological
shock. The multiplier effect identified above may be less pronounced if hiring is costly
or workers lack the right skills to fill roles. Highly specialised skills make it harder to
adjust in the face of technological and organisational change (Lamo, Messina, & Wasmer,
2011). Internal migration provides an important adjustment mechanism to fill jobs in
regions with high labour demand due to innovation (Bartik, 1993; Faggian & McCann,
2009). However, the mobility of the labour force is again dependent on the flexibility of
labour market institutions, whereby inflexible institutions provide an obstacle to mobility
(Monastiriotis & Sakkas, 2021). As shown in chapter 2, internal migration in itself can
also affect local labour markets.
4.2.3 Theoretical framework
To summarise, technological invention is an important driver of local employment growth.
However, there are several sources of growth. Inventions may contribute to income growth,
and in turn increase consumption of local services. Additionally, innovating firms may
expand their workforce, hiring more mid- and high-skilled workers to expand production
and innovate further. All this is mediated by labour market institutions which dictate the
costs of hiring and firing, as well as the local skill mix available to businesses.
Figure 4.1 translates this into a simple framework underpinning the following analysis.
The interdependence of invention and graduate employment (1) is already well documented
in the literature. Equally, there is evidence of the multiplier effect of graduate on non-
graduate employment (2). However, there is less evidence of the effect of technological
invention on employment for people without a university degree or with vocational quali-
fications. These effects are especially important given a general trend towards the decline
of mid-skilled jobs (Autor, 2019; Goos et al., 2014; Harrigan et al., 2021). The question
is whether technological invention can halt some of this decline. At the macroeconomic
level, theories of skill-biased technological change predict a negative effect of innovation on
low-skilled employment (Machin, 2001). At the local level, these effects may be different.
Innovative activity may be less prone to automation, as it is non-routine by nature. At
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the beginning of the product or industry life cycle, production is less likely to be offshored
and more likely to be kept close to the development site (Audretsch & Feldman, 1996a).
The effect of graduate employment on non-graduate employment is generally con-
ceptualised as a consumption channel. Highly skilled and highly paid workers consume
local services, which creates jobs for non-graduates. If technological invention has a pos-
itive effect on graduate employment, this also creates an indirect effect from invention
to non-graduate employment. However, there may be direct complementarities between
non-graduates and both graduate employment and invention. Non-graduates are not a ho-
mogenous group, with many possessing advanced qualifications below degree level. Those
with vocational and technical qualifications may be employed in occupations adjacent to
innovative firms and industries, such as within research labs or prototyping and manufac-
turing.
The next section introduces the data used in the analysis, which provides estimates
of the number of graduates, all non-graduates and a mid-skilled group with advanced
vocational qualifications at the regional level for France, Germany and the UK. The aim of
the estimation strategy is to estimate effects (1), (2) and (3) in figure 4.1, between graduate
employment and technological invention and of those two variables on non-graduate and
mid-skilled employment.
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Figure 4.1: Theoretical framework
4.3.Data and empirical methods
The goal of the chapter is to estimate the relation between patenting as a proxy for
technological invention and employment for different skill levels at the regional level in
France, Germany and the UK. The following sets out the development of a dataset that
is consistent across countries and over time.
4.3.1 Measuring technological invention
The OECD REGPAT database provides patents matched to NUTS regions, which can
be used as a measure of local inventions (OECD, 2021). The database covers all patents
filed with the European Patent Office (EPO) as well as those filed under the Patent Co-
operation Treaty (PCT) after 1977. Following Sonn and Storper (2008), I use the inventor
location to assign patents to a region, as this is most likely where the innovative activity
has taken place. If there are multiple inventors in different regions, the patent is counted
fractionally. The number of patents applied for during a given year by local inventors is
then the measure of regional innovativeness. While the application date is used as the
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date of the invention, only applications that are ultimately successful are included in the
dataset.
Patents are a noisy measure of invention. On the one hand, many patents are not
very valuable commercially (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2001; Pakes, 1984). On the other
hand, many valuable ideas are not or cannot be patented for various reasons. Patents
apply mainly to product innovation, and therefore do not measure process innovation.
They only represent the first stage in the innovation process, with many inventions never
making it to the next stage of commercialisation (Carlino & Kerr, 2015). The further
innovation process after the registration of a patent may also take place in a different
location from the invention itself (Feldman, 1994). Patents are less applicable to service
industries, although patents can be granted for software code. Nonetheless, in cross-
country comparisons, patents capture variation in research productivity (de Rassenfosse &
van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2009), and have direct impact on firm-level employment,
productivity and wages (Kline et al., 2019; Van Reenen, 1996).
4.3.2 Employment by education levels
The challenge with measuring employment by educational attainment lies in the diversity
of educational systems and qualifications used across the three countries, in particular
above the secondary level. There is a trade-off between availability of finer grained regional
data and more detailed educational information. Therefore, the analysis relies on two
different datasets.
The first dataset, provided by Eurostat, provides employment by broad educational
attainment at the NUTS2 regional level. The classifications available are tertiary, upper
secondary, and primary or lower secondary. I summarise the latter two as non-graduates,
while those with tertiary education are deemed graduates. The graduate category is
somewhat vaguely defined and considers different levels of post-secondary education for
different countries, including apprenticeships and college courses, other than university
degrees. Consistent estimates for the three countries are available from 1999 to 2019. The
classification is a very rough approximation of skill levels. It is noticeable that the share of
graduates in Germany is overall lower than that in Great Britain or France as vocational
degrees are more prevalent.
The second dataset uses the European Social Survey (ESS) to construct an interme-
diate group with advanced vocational education, to distinguish these workers from those
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Table 4.1: Definition of the intermediate education category
France Germany UK
First university degree (pre-
mier cycle)
Master craftsman, technician
or equivalent college diploma
Nursing certificate
Elementary diplomas in law
and pedagogy
Apprenticeship in commerce,
industry, crafts or agriculture
Teacher training
Professional and technical vo-
cational degrees (brevet)
College degrees in pedagogy,
nursing and other medical as-
sistant professions
Technical diplomas
Elementary civil service exams
(Laufbahnprüfung)
Note: National qualifications included in the ISCED IV – advanced vocational, sub-
degree category. Includes most relevant categories only.
with a university degree. The ESS is a household survey that has been conducted every
two years since 2002, providing nine survey waves to date. The survey asks respondents
about their educational attainment as well as – if applicable – that of their partner. Re-
sponses are coded to the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED), but
the original responses according to national standards are also provided. The level of
detail and classifications available varies over time, also in response to changes in national
education systems. As a baseline, I use ISCED IV – advanced vocational, sub-degree – as
the definition for the intermediate education category. For more recent surveys, all educa-
tion levels are coded to harmonised ISCED levels. However, in the four surveys between
2002 and 2008, this is not always the case and gaps have to be filled manually. Table 4.1
gives an overview of the qualifications making up the intermediate category.
While the ESS is a household survey and responses are available at the individual
level, these can be aggregated into regional totals. Geographical information is available
at the NUTS1 level, i.e. larger regions than the NUTS2 regions available on the Eurostat
dataset. To make full use of the available data, I consider both respondents as well as
information available on their partners so that the total working population is made up
of working respondents and working partners of respondents. Partners are assigned the
same weight as respondents. In some regions, there is a lot of fluctuation in sample
sizes between waves of surveys, resulting in even larger variations in the number of those
with vocational qualifications. To reduce the survey variation, I normalise the number
Technological invention and local labour markets 93
of employees by total Eurostat employment according to equation 4.1, multiplying the
raw number of mid-skilled workers, empmid−raw as a share of total employment in the
ESS, empESS by total employment from Eurostat. This normalisation is not required for
the non-graduate and graduate variables, as these are available as aggregated population
totals. As NUTS2 regions are nested in NUTS1 regions, it is easy to aggregate variables
available from Eurostat into the NUTS1 regions available on the ESS, so that all variables





The ESS provides a more detailed categorisation of education and qualification levels
than the Eurostat dataset. However, the limited number of survey waves available makes
it difficult to conduct time series analysis using the dataset. Therefore, I only use the ESS
dataset to estimate the intermediate skill category, which is not available from Eurostat.
4.3.3 Estimation strategy
Estimating the effects of innovation on regional employment is challenging because of the
endogeneity of all variables involved. Innovation may create jobs, but also depends on the
availability of local skills. Furthermore, high-skilled workers may be directly responsible
for the creation of lower-skilled jobs through the consumption channel. I rely on the panel
aspect of the data to deal with these issues. As outlined above, I expect that graduate
employment depends on innovation and that non-graduate and mid-skilled employment
depend on both innovation and graduate employment.
For all variables, I estimate the effect over increasing time horizons to trace the cumu-
lative effect of the explanatory variables over time, following the local projections approach
by Jordà (2005). The method can be used to estimate impulse response functions for mul-
tivariate dynamic systems, similar to vector autoregression (VAR). Indeed, many studies
use VAR estimation in similar contexts (e.g. Brenner et al., 2018; Buerger et al., 2012;
Eberle et al., 2020). However, among other advantages, the estimates are more robust to
misspecification and can be estimated by OLS (Jordà, 2005). While a VAR relies on ex-
trapolation of impulse responses from lagged effects, the local projection method explicitly
estimates effects at different forecast horizons. Other studies estimate multiplier effects
for single points in time (e.g. Kemeny & Osman, 2018; Lee & Clarke, 2019). However,
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that approach cannot reveal information about the dynamics of the multiplier effect. As
I will show below, the effect can take some time to materialise, and also disappear again
after a few years.
Equation 4.2 specifies the estimating equation for the effect of patenting on graduate
employment growth. empgr,t+h − emp
g
r,t−1 is the log difference in graduate employment
in region r between t − 1 and t + h. patt−1 is the number of patents filed in t-1 in logs,
empgt−1,t−2 are lags of the dependent variable, and Xr,t are additional control variables.
In particular, I control for population density and a dummy variable equal to 1 in 2009
and 2010 during the recession following the financial crisis. Region fixed effects αr control
for unobservable differences in regions that are invariant over time. Of particular concern
are differences in economic structures with some regions specialising in industries that
are innovative, but less prone to patenting, such as software development and service
industries. These structural characteristics of regions change relatively slowly, so that
fixed effects control for this.
empgr,t+h − emp
g
r,t−1 = β0 + βhpatr,t−1 + emp
g
r,t−1,t−2 + γXr,t + αr + εr,t (4.2)
I estimate this model for h running from -4 to 5 to trace out the effect of patenting on
employment over time. The negative lags test for a placebo effect: If there was already an
effect detectable before the patenting shock occurs, it would suggest that an underlying
unobserved variable is causing both the patenting and the graduate employment shock.
To visualise the impulse response, I plot the βh against the time horizon effectively tracing
the cumulative effect of the patenting shock over time.
Effects on the other variables are estimated analogously. Equation 4.3 specifies the
effect of graduate employment and patenting on non-graduate employment. Here, non-
graduate employment growth, empngr,t+h − emp
ng
r,t−1 is estimated as a function of graduate
employment growth, where ∆empgt−1 is the log difference in graduate employment between












The estimating equation for higher vocational or mid-skilled employment, equation 4.4,
accounts for the fact that employment estimates in this category are only available in
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two-year intervals as explained above. Graduate employment is included as the two-year
growth rate and patenting as the total over two years. I estimate this equation for h
running from -3 to 3.
empmidr,t+2h − emp
ng







+ ∆empmidr,t−2 + γXr,t + αr + εr,t (4.4)
As noted before, causal identification of these effects is challenging, because of the inter-
dependence of the variables. The placebo test checks for reverse causality, as changes in
the dependent variable cannot feasibly be caused by future changes in the explanatory
variable. However, missing variable bias is undetected if both the changes in the depen-
dent and explanatory variable are caused by a different, unobserved variable or shock.
Instrumental variables (IV) can be used to overcome this problem, but it is difficult to
find instruments that are applicable in the different country contexts. For example, Lee
and Clarke (2019) use the historical location of art and design schools to predict the
current share of high-tech employment in the population. Given the different histories,
such historical instruments would not be appropriate for the three countries studied here.
The inclusion of lagged dependent variables can alleviate some of these concerns, as this
controls for a general trend in the dependent variable that might at the same time affect




Table 4.1 provides summary statistics for the estimation sample by country. The observa-
tions in this table are at the regional level. As explained above, Eurostat-based variables
and patents are at the NUTS2 level, while ESS-derived variables are at the NUTS1 level
and only available every second year. Overall, there are 96 NUTS2 regions, 21 in France,
38 in Germany and 37 in the UK. A small modification was made to the standard NUTS2
regions, by combining the five NUTS2 regions that make up Greater London into one.
This is appropriate, as Greater London can be viewed as a single labour market area.
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Correspondingly, the Île de France region around Paris is a single NUTS2 region. There
are 41 NUTS1 regions, 13 in France, 16 Germany and 12 in the UK.
The most significant differences across countries are in terms of patenting activity.
There are on average 728 patent applications per NUTS2 region and year in Germany,
but only 202 in the UK. French regions are in the middle, with 471 applications. However,
the standard deviation is largest in France, suggesting a more unequal distribution. These
differences are repeated at the NUTS1 level at a larger scale, given the higher aggregation
of the data.
Regions differ slightly in average size across countries, so employment figures by educa-
tional attainment are not directly comparable. As a share of total employment, graduate
employment is highest in the UK at 36% on average across NUTS2 regions (NUTS1: 37%),
followed by France at 33% (NUTS1: 35%). The graduate employment share is markedly
lower in Germany, at only 27% (NUTS1: 27%). In contrast, the share of employees with
advanced vocational qualifications is higher in Germany, at 19% on average across NUTS1
regions, compared to 16% in France and 15% in the UK.
Table 4.2 shows some characteristics of employees by educational attainment, derived
from the ESS micro data. The table confirms that the higher vocational category accu-
rately captures an intermediate income and skill group. It shows average earnings, years
of education, and other job attributes for the intermediate skill group with a higher voca-
tional qualification as explained above, as well as other groups with no degree, a university
degree, and advanced degree, such as an MSc or a professional diploma. Not all questions
are asked in every wave of the survey, which is why the sample size varies substantially
between questions. These variables are not used in the analysis, but rather to characterise
the different skill groups. As these groups are defined by completed level of education
rather than occupation, there is a risk of mismeasurement if many work in jobs that they
are over or under-qualified for. Reassuringly, the income and other characteristics reported
in the following confirm significant differences across educational groups.
Gross pay is only measured in 2004. As expected, average earnings for workers with
intermediate educational attainment sits in between workers with and without a university
degree. A household’s net income decile is reported every year. Note that this also takes
income of other household members into account and is therefore less closely related to the
respondent’s educational attainment. Nonetheless, the pattern is similar to gross income,
in that workers with intermediate education are on average in higher income deciles than
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics
Full sample France Germany UK
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
NUTS2 level
Patents 472 667 471 817 728 748 202 214
Graduate employment 309 321 395 471 277 172 290 322
Non-graduate employment 666 424 805 584 740 361 502 302
Total employment 986 721 1201 1036 1028 524 811 618
Population density 447 787 148 196 452 725 624 993
N 1749 399 694 656
NUTS1 level
Patents 1091 1709 912 1131 1583 2326 566 486
Graduate employment 777 581 834 592 651 588 903 533
Advanced vocational emp. 410 366 378 205 462 504 363 194
Total employment 2411 1687 2362 1189 2399 2243 2462 1017
Population density 569 1061 207 281 676 1041 694 1359
N 332 80 144 108
Note: Observations are year x region. Variables at the NUTS2 level are for 2000-2019.
Variables at the NUTS1 level for even numbered years between 2002 and 2018. All em-
ployment numbers are in thousands. Advanced vocational employment at the NUTS1
level is derived from ESS and normalised to total regional employment. Population
density is measured in persons per square kilometre.
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Table 4.2: Descriptives for educational categories in ESS
Higher vocational No degree Degree Advanced degree
Mean/SD N Mean/SD N Mean/SD N Mean/SD N
Gross pay 10681.5 859 7097.4 3405 18312.1 1196 17931.5 466
(23575.1) (18936.4) (30266.3) (34124.4)
Househ income decile 6.79 4915 6.07 18114 7.62 7796 7.69 3557
(2.38) (2.50) (2.29) (2.33)
Years of education 14.9 5683 12.8 21276 17.4 9141 18.4 3936
(2.61) (2.69) (3.14) (3.07)
Working hours 40.8 5632 38.6 21055 41.3 9040 42.3 3890
(12.4) (13.1) (12.4) (12.3)
Job requires >basic edu 0.79 1023 0.59 4136 0.90 1447 0.92 557
(0.41) (0.49) (0.30) (0.27)
Job requires learning 2.99 1030 2.65 4200 3.16 1453 3.11 557
(0.95) (1.04) (0.88) (0.87)
Has partner 0.68 5704 0.66 21385 0.67 9181 0.69 3957
(0.47) (0.48) (0.47) (0.46)
N 5704 21385 9181 3957
Note: ESS rounds 1-9 (2002-2018) for France, Germany and the UK. Includes information on
respondents only. Gross pay only available for round 2 (2004). Household income decile only
available for rounds 4-9 (2008-2018). Dummy variable asking whether current job requires
more than basic education only available for rounds 2 and 5 (2004 and 2010). Variable asking
whether job requires learning new things (coded 1 = Not at all true to 4 = Very true) only
available for rounds 2 and 5 (2004 and 2010). Years of education and working hours available
for all rounds. Partner is also available for all rounds and indicates whether respondent has a
partner for whom employment and educational attainment are also available.
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workers without a degree, but in lower deciles than workers with a degree. The share
of respondents with a partner is reported at the bottom of the table, as this might be
driving differences in household income. The differences across education groups are not
significant, although there might still be differences in partners’ educational attainment
or propensity to work. Hours worked are roughly similar across education groups, albeit
slightly lower for less and slightly higher for more educated workers.
In terms of years of education completed, the intermediate category also falls neatly
between graduates and non-graduates, with 14.9 years on average. In 2004 and 2010,
respondents were asked whether someone applying for their job would require more than
compulsory education. Among those with an advanced vocational qualification, 79% re-
sponded yes, while this was only the case for 59% of workers with no degree, but 90% of
workers with a degree. Workers were also asked whether their job requires learning new
things. The question was answered on a scale of 1 to 4, where 1 is ”Not at all true” and
4 is ”Very true”. Again, the average answer for the intermediate education group is in
between those with and without a degree.
Figure 4.1 shows the average annual number of patent applications per 1000 employees
at NUTS2 level. The rate of successful applications is highest in the south of Germany.
This is in contrast to low levels of patenting in most regions in the east. In France, the rate
of patenting is highest in the Île-de-France and Rhône-Alpes regions. As discussed above,
patenting is overall lower in the UK, with the regions around Oxford and Cambridge
having the highest rates of patenting. While London is performing well in absolute terms,
the rate of patenting is small relative to total employment.
The next figures explore basic correlations between patenting and employment growth
for different education groups. Figure 4.2 plots average annual growth in non-graduate em-
ployment against total patenting over the observation period. The relationship is positive,
if loose. The high-performing German regions of Oberbayern, Stuttgart and Düsseldorf,
but also London, are close to the regression line. It should be stressed that these regions
have highly successful, knowledge intensive economies overall, so that the correlation with
patenting cannot be considered evidence of a causal relationship. On the other hand, the
Île de France has seen among the highest rates of losses in non-graduate jobs. Overall,
growth in non-graduate jobs is relatively low in France, both in highly innovative regions,
such as Rhône-Alpes, as well as less innovative and more remote regions like Limousin.
In the UK, some traditional manufacturing regions like the West Midlands experienced
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Figure 4.1: Patent applications per 1000 employees
Note: Average for 2000-2017, NUTS2 regions.
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strong employment growth, despite being average in terms of innovativeness.
Figure 4.2: Patenting and non-graduate employment growth
Note: Total patent application for 2000-2018 and average annual employment growth
for non-graduates for 2000-2019. Each observation is a NUTS2 region.
In contrast, figure 4.3 shows only a weak, negative unconditional correlation between
patenting and graduate employment growth. While employment growth is on average
higher for graduates than non-graduates, at around 3% against 0.1%, more innovative
regions do not necessarily create more jobs. The following sections test for these relations
formally.
4.4.2 Patenting and graduate employment
The first set of results looks at the interdependence of graduate employment and patenting.
To visualise the results, figure 4.4 plots the βh coefficients from equation 4.2. These are the
coefficients of lagged patenting in a regression of changes in graduate employment over the
time period indicated on the x-axis. Full regression results can be found in appendix table
4.A.1. As the estimation runs over changing time horizons, the y-axis can be interpreted
as the difference in employment over the baseline in year t-1.
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Figure 4.3: Patenting and graduate employment growth
Note: Total patent application for 2000-2018 and average annual employment growth
for graduates for 2000-2019. Each observation is a NUTS2 region.
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Figure 4.4 shows a statistically significant increase in graduate employment in response
to an increase in patenting. A 10% increase in patenting leads to an increase in graduate
employment by 0.005%. Graduate employment then remains stable at that level for several
years. Note that the there are several possible adjustment channels: the increase in
employment could both indicate transitions from unemployment or outside the labour
force, as well as in-migration of graduates, either from other regions or from abroad. The
employment response remains statistically significant for three years but then peters out,
implying that employment reverts slowly back to the baseline. This result makes intuitive
sense as inventions are likely to have a shelf-live, giving businesses a boost over several
years, but continuous innovation is required to retain this advantage. Before year t-1,
there is no statistically significant effect. This is the placebo test: changes in graduate
employment in the past are not influenced by future patenting. This could be the case if
reverse causality was an issue. Reassuringly, this test suggests this is not the case.
Figure 4.4: Graduate employment response to patenting shock
Note: Plot of βhs from equation 4.2 against time horizon h. Baseline in t-1. 95% confi-
dence intervals shaded in grey around point estimates. Full regression results can be
found in table 4.A.1.
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Figure 4.5 confirms that there is no evidence of a reverse effect of changes in graduate
employment on patenting. Here, the dependent variable, the number of patents, is in log-
levels and the y-axis can be interpreted as the number of additional patents filed between
-1 and the time horizon on the x-axis. Full regression results can be found in table 4.A.2
in the appendix. The point estimate hovers around zero and is statistically insignificant
throughout. This is not to say that graduates are not important for patenting, and more
innovative regions are likely to have a higher share of graduate employment. However,
growing graduate employment is not associated with a subsequent increase in patenting.
This is in contrast to Faggian and McCann (2009) who find an effect of in-migration of
graduates on patenting at the NUTS2 level in the UK. However, they consider recent
graduates who migrate upon graduation only, which might constitute a more select group
than the general population with a university degree.
In this case, the significant and positive placebo effect is expected: patenting before
a graduate employment shock is higher because patenting causes an increase in gradu-
ate employment as shown in figure 4.4. The causality runs clearly from innovation to
graduate employment, not the other direction. The significant effect from innovation on
graduate employment but not in the other direction can be rationalised when considering
that most graduates are unlikely to work in the innovative sector directly. Rather, the
innovation creates a multiplier effect that creates further jobs in professional services that
benefit indirectly from the innovation, such as legal and financial services or marketing
and distribution (Moretti, 2012).
4.4.3 Effects on workers without degree and workers with intermediate
qualifications
Next, I turn to the employment effects for those without a university degree. I estimate
equation 4.3 by regressing the change in non-graduate employment on lagged graduate
employment and patenting. The first set of results considers all non-graduates and the
regressions are run at the NUTS2 regional level, while further results below consider
workers with advanced vocational qualifications. As before, the effects shown in figure 4.8
and 4.9 can be understood as the change in non-graduate employment above the baseline
in year t-1 in response to a 1% change in graduate employment or patenting, respectively.
Full regression results can be found in table 4.A.3.
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Figure 4.5: Patenting response to graduate employment shock
Note: Results from regression of patenting on lagged graduate employment. The plot
shows the coefficients of graduate employment against time horizon h. Baseline in t-
1. 95% confidence intervals shaded in grey around point estimates. Full regression
results can be found in table 4.A.2.
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Figure 4.6 shows a significant positive effect of graduate employment on non-graduate
employment. Non-graduate employment remains around 0.1% above the baseline for two
to three years after an initial 1% increase in graduate employment. The effect is temporary,
however, and after four years non-graduate employment reverts back to the baseline.
Reassuringly, there is no significant effect before year -1, confirming that there is no
evidence of reverse causality.
Figure 4.6: Non-graduate employment response to graduate employment shock
Note: Plot of βghs from equation 4.3 against time horizon h. Baseline in t-1. 95% confi-
dence intervals shaded in grey around point estimates. Full regression results can be
found in table 4.A.3.
There is a small but short-lived effect of patenting on non-graduate employment, as
figure 4.7 shows. Non-graduate employment is significantly above the baseline for two
years after the patenting shock, but reverts back to the baseline by year 2, with point
estimates turning negative, albeit statistically insignificant. This is expected. The non-
graduate category encompasses all workers with less than a bachelor’s degree, most of
whom are unlikely to be employed in the innovation or associated sectors.
The next set of results zooms in on workers with intermediate, advanced vocational
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Figure 4.7: Non-graduate employment response to patenting shock
Note: Plot of βphs from equation 4.3 against time horizon h. Baseline in t-1. 95% confi-
dence intervals shaded in grey around point estimates. Full regression results can be
found in table 4.A.3.
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qualifications that are below degree level. As explained above, mid-skilled employment is
only available at two-year intervals and at the NUTS1 regional level, so that the effects
shown in figures 4.8 and 4.9 have to be understood in terms of two-year compound growth
rates. Full regression results can be found in table 4.A.4. Due to the limited number of
survey waves available for the ESS, the sample size varies by time horizon. While this
reduces comparability between estimates for different horizons, it makes the best use of
the available dataset.
Figure 4.8 shows the effect of graduate employment on mid-skilled employment. After
two years, a 1% increase in graduate employment is estimated to lead to a 2% increase over
the baseline in year -2 in mid-skilled employment. This effect levels off slightly towards
year 6. The effects are larger in magnitude than the effect of graduate employment on all
non-graduates shown in figure 4.6. A 1% increase in graduate employment is associated
with a 2% increase in mid-skilled employment, compared to 0.1% for all non-graduates.
This suggests that the effect for mid-skilled workers may be driven by complementarities
with graduates. In contrast, the effect of graduates on non-graduates is usually explained
by the consumption of local services by high-paid workers (Lee & Clarke, 2019; Moretti,
2012). While the estimated effects are large, the error bands are also relatively wide.
This is to be expected, as employment is estimated from a survey, containing additional
sampling variation.
Figure 4.9 shows the effect of patenting on mid-skilled employment. There is a statis-
tically significant immediate positive effect, but employment reverts back to the baseline
by year 4. However, the effect is much larger than that for all non-graduates, presented
in figure 4.7. This confirms that workers with advanced qualifications below degree level
can benefit directly from innovation, not just through the consumption channel from high-
skilled workers.
4.4.4 Cross-country heterogeneity
While among Europe’s top innovators, the countries considered are quite different in terms
of their labour market institutions and local and regional systems of innovation. Therefore,
the following presents estimation results by country. The effects follow broadly the same
trends across countries, but with variation in the magnitude of effects. As the sample
sizes are smaller when estimating by country, it is to be expected that confidence intervals
become larger and some effects are statistically insignificant as a result.
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Figure 4.8: Advanced vocational employment response to graduate employment shock
Note: Plot of βphs from equation 4.4 against time horizon h. Baseline in t-2. 95% confi-
dence intervals shaded in grey around point estimates. Full regression results can be
found in table 4.A.4.
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Figure 4.9: Advanced vocational employment response to patenting shock
Note: Plot of βphs from equation 4.4 against time horizon h. Baseline in t-2. 95% confi-
dence intervals shaded in grey around point estimates. Full regression results can be
found in table 4.A.4.
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Figure 4.10: Estimations for France
Note: Plot of β coefficients from equations 4.2-4.4 including French regions only. Base-
line in t-1 for figure a)-c) and in t-2 for d) and e). 95% confidence intervals shaded
in grey around point estimates. Full regression results can be found in tables 4.A.5 -
4.A.7.
The estimates for France in figure 4.10 are broadly similar to the pooled estimates.
However, the effect of patenting on graduate employment is statistically insignificant de-
spite point estimates that show a similar pattern and are larger in magnitude than in the
whole sample. While there is a small, marginally significant effect of graduate employment
on non-graduate employment, the effect of patenting on non-graduate employment hovers
around zero.
Figure 4.11 shows results for Germany. The effect of patenting on graduate employment
is statistically significant and larger in magnitude than in the overall sample. There is
a large positive effect from graduate employment on non-graduate employment. Like in
the full sample, this disappears again by year 3. However, there is also a significant
positive effect before year -2, suggesting that the effect may be driven by an unobserved
variable that affects both graduate and non-graduate employment. The effect of graduate
employment on mid-skilled workers is larger in magnitude than that for all non-graduates,
Technological invention and local labour markets 112
Figure 4.11: Estimations for Germany
Note: Plot of β coefficients from equations 4.2-4.4 including German regions only. Base-
line in t-1 for figure a)-c) and in t-2 for d) and e). 95% confidence intervals shaded
in grey around point estimates. Full regression results can be found in tables 4.A.5 -
4.A.7.
but only statistically significant in year 2. In contrast, there is no significant effect of
patenting on mid-skilled employment.
Figure 4.12 shows the estimates for the UK. Given the relatively low levels of patenting
in most regions in the UK, it is unsurprising to find no significant effect from patenting
in panels a), c), and e). However, the effects from graduate employment on non-graduate
and mid-skilled employment are also small and short-lived. In the case of mid-skilled
employment, this is somewhat to be expected, as the UK system of vocational training is
relatively weak compared to France and Germany. The small response from non-graduate
employment is surprising given the UKs flexible labour market regime.
The results are suggestive of differences in the effects across the three countries. Some
of these differences can be rationalised given what we know about the countries innovation
and education systems, as well as industry specialisations. For example, it may be expected
that the response of non-graduate employment to a patenting shock is larger in Germany, if
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Figure 4.12: Estimations for the UK
Note: Plot of β coefficients from equations 4.2-4.4 including UK regions only. Baseline
in t-1 for figure a)-c) and in t-2 for d) and e). 95% confidence intervals shaded in grey
around point estimates. Full regression results can be found in tables 4.A.5 - 4.A.7.
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a successful invention can be commercialised, leading to increased production in the large
domestic manufacturing sector. However, it is surprising that this effect is not mirrored in
the response of mid-skilled employment, suggesting further research into the adjustment
channels is required.
4.4.5 Job-year multiplier calculation
In keeping with the literature, I calculate jobs multipliers from the coefficients estimated
above (Moretti & Thulin, 2013; Lee & Clarke, 2019). To calculate impacts in terms of jobs
created, the βh coefficients, which can be interpreted as elasticities, are multiplied by the
ratio of dependent to explanatory variable (Van Dijk, 2018). The multiplier for the effect
of graduate employment on non-graduate employment is provided by equation 4.5, where
empng is average non-graduate employment and empg is average graduate employment per
region and year in the estimation sample. Note that this is not the number of new jobs,
but additional job-years over the estimation horizon between t and t+6. This calculation
is more appropriate than a calculation of the number of jobs created, as some of the
effects take time to materialise while others are only temporary and decline over time. A








For the patenting coefficients, the calculation is slightly different, because patenting is
measured as patents filed per year in logs. The coefficient is approximately equal to the











Multiplier estimates for the whole sample as well as by country are provided in table 4.3.
Because they are derived from different regressions for each estimation horizon, it is not
possible to derive standard errors for the combined effects. Note that some of these effects
are derived from statistically insignificant results.
Across the three countries, a patent is estimated to create 2.2 graduate job-years, e.g.
2.2 jobs for one year, or 1.1 jobs that remain for two years. Across NUTS2 regions, an
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average of 472 patents are filed per year. By a back-of-the-envelope calculation, patenting
can account for 208 additional jobs, or 0.07% of total graduate employment1. While this
overall effect is small, there is substantial variation across countries. The effect of graduate
jobs per patent is largest in Germany, at 1.78 job-years per patent. This translates into
259 additional graduate jobs on average per year and NUTS2 region, representing 0.1% of
total graduate employment. The effect in France is slightly smaller, at 1.6 job-years (150
job-years or 0.04% total graduate employment). The estimate for the UK is negative, at
1.47. However, all underlying point estimates are statistically insignificant, implying that
the effect is overall close to zero.
Table 4.3: Job-year multipliers
All France Germany UK
Graduate job-years per patent 2.20 1.60 1.78 -1.47
Non-graduate job-years per graduate job 0.35 0.034 1.09 -0.046
Non-graduate job-years per patent 0.90 -0.35 2.49 1.21
Higher vocational job-years per graduate job 2.42 3.84 -0.19 3.13
Higher vocational job-years per patent 5.62 14.2 3.54 18.2
Note: Multipliers derived from beta coefficients depicted in figures 4.4 to 4.12. Mul-
tipliers can be interpreted as additional job-years created due to an additional job/
patent over a five year horizon.
Looking at the effects for non-graduate jobs, the overall multiplier is 0.35 job-years
per graduate job for the whole sample. This is an economically meaningful number,
corresponding to 22,000 jobs on average per year and NUTS2 region, or 5% of total non-
graduate employment. By country, the effect is largest in Germany at 1.09 job-years per
graduate job (60,386 jobs per NUTS2 region, or a share of 8%). The effects for France
and the UK are close to zero, corresponding to insignificant point estimates throughout.
These estimates are comparable to those found in the literature. Lee and Clarke (2019)
estimate the effect for a single point in time over a 6-year period. However, the employment
groups considered are different, as they consider the effect of high-tech on non-tradable
employment. Their preferred specification yields a multiplier of 0.6. For comparison, the
1This is calculated as job-year multiplier divided by 5 to annualise the effect, and multiply by the
average number of patents per year and region.
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estimates in 4.3 should be divided by 5 to arrive at an annualised effect. They are therefore
considerably smaller than Lee and Clarke (2019)’s effects, ranging from 0.0028 for Germany
to 0.122 for the combined sample. The latter effect is similar to OLS estimates by Lee and
Clarke (2019). Moretti and Thulin (2013) consider 10-year intervals for the United States
and 6-year intervals for Sweden for the effect of tradable on non-tradable employment.
Their preferred estimates for the effects of tradable employment on non-tradable unskilled
are 0.3 for the United States and between -0.27 and 0.51 for Sweden. This last estimate
is most similar to estimates arrived at here. It should be noted though that the tradable
jobs are a smaller subset of overall employment than graduate employment. It is therefore
not surprising that the magnitudes of effects are somewhat different.
The patent multiplier for non-graduates is smaller than that for graduates, at 0.9 job-
years per patent, corresponding to the small and partly insignificant point estimates seen
in figure 4.7. This corresponds to 85 jobs on average per NUTS2 region, or 0.01% of non-
graduate employment. The effects from patenting on non-graduates is largest in Germany,
at 2.49 job years per patent (363 jobs per NUTS2 region, or 0.05% of total non-graduate
employment), derived from point estimates that are statistically significant from year 0
to 3. The estimated multiplier for France is negative but small, at -0.35, and based on
overall insignificant point estimates. While the multiplier for the UK is relatively large,
at 1.21, this is also based on insignificant point estimates.
The multiplier effects for mid-skilled, or vocational employment are larger in magni-
tude, in particular the patent multiplier. The overall multiplier predicts 2.42 mid-skilled
jobs to be created for every graduate job, corresponding to 376,068 jobs on average per
year at the NUTS1 level, or 91% of mid-skilled employment. The patent multiplier is
estimated at 5.62 mid-skilled jobs per patent, corresponding to 1226 jobs and 0.05% of
total mid-skilled employment.
At the country level, the estimated multipliers are more difficult to interpret, as many
of the underlying point estimates are statistically insignificant. This is also driven by
small sample sizes, as these estimates rely on a smaller number of regions at a higher
level of aggregation, and a shorter time series. For France, both multipliers are based on
point estimates that are statistically significant at the beginning of the estimation period
but then turn insignificant. The estimates predict 3.84 additional mid-skilled jobs per
graduate job (166,800 jobs, 44% of total mid-skilled employment) and 14.2 additional mid-
skilled jobs per patent (2,590 jobs, 0.6% of total mid-skilled employment). The estimated
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multipliers are similar for the UK, at 3.13 mid-skilled jobs per graduate job, and 18.2 mid-
skilled jobs per patent. However, the patent multiplier is based on statistically insignificant
point estimates throughout. The large magnitude of the multiplier may be explained
by overall very low levels of patenting in many regions. The multipliers for mid-skilled
employment for Germany are difficult to interpret due to the volatility of the underlying
point estimates. The graduate employment multiplier is small and negative, but this
masks significant positive point estimates in the middle of the estimation period, while
those at the beginning and end are negative but statistically insignificant. Similarly, the
point estimates for the patent multiplier hover around zero.
4.5.Discussion and conclusion
The empirical results provide evidence for the model outlined in section 4.2.3. While
much of the literature has focused on the effect of invention and innovation on graduate
or high-skilled employment, as well as the effect of graduates on non-graduates, there is
also a limited effect on those with vocational qualifications and those without university
degrees. Furthermore, the results are suggestive of the intermediating role played by the
wider institutional environment, including national and regional systems of innovation and
education.
The results confirm a significant multiplier effect from graduate on non-graduate em-
ployment. While the effect is only temporary, there is also a significant positive effect of
patenting on non-graduate employment. The local projections method shows that consid-
ering these effects over several years, instead of a single point in time is important. The
effects of patenting on graduate employment, and the effect of graduate on non-graduate
employment and mid-skilled employment rise over two to three years and then decline
again. In contrast, the effects of patenting on non-graduate and mid-skilled employment
are relatively short lived, and employment reverts back to the baseline after a short, pos-
itive impact.
The positive effect of patenting on non-graduate employment, even if short-lived, shows
that not all innovation may be labour-displacing at the regional level. As expected, the
magnitude of the effect is larger for workers with advanced vocational qualifications that
may themselves contribute to the innovation process (Filippetti & Guy, 2016). This
suggests that innovative firms and industries may to some extend halt or slow down the
decline in employment of some mid-skilled occupations. However, these jobs are likely to
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be different from jobs consisting predominantly of routine tasks that are declining fastest,
instead requiring creativity and soft skills (Aghion et al., 2019; Filippetti & Guy, 2020).
This warrants further research into the adjustment channels. First, who are the people
taking the additional jobs? Additional jobs may be filled by transition from unemployed
or inactivity, or by internal or international migrants. Research by Bartik (1993) on the
effects of local economic policy suggests that the latter effect is important as an adjustment
mechanism. This may be particularly the case in countries like the UK, where unemploy-
ment is generally low. However, it is possible that the creation of new jobs allows locals to
climb the job ladder. With the available data, it is only possible to see absolute changes
in employment, without an indication of churn within local labour markets. This leads
to the second question, regarding where jobs are being created, as well as their quality.
Both graduate and non-graduate jobs may be created at the innovating businesses or in
the wider economy. A successfully innovating firm may hire more scientists and engineers
to invest in further innovation. They might also require additional skills in marketing and
distribution, if the invention processes through to commercialisation. They might also re-
quiring additional workers in manufacturing or installation. On the other hand, jobs may
be created in local services, both high- and low-skilled, which may or may not be related to
the initial shock. Third, it would be expected that these adjustment mechanisms vary sig-
nificantly by industry, occupation and technology class. Some industries exhibit stronger
complementarities between skilled and unskilled labour than others. Additionally, while
some technologies are complementary to labour, others are labour substituting. An incre-
mental innovation may increase a firm’s competitive advantage, making its workers more
productive and ultimately lead to more employment as the firm expands. Disruptive new
technologies may displace older firms and industries, also making skills required previously
obsolete.
Answering these questions requires situating technological invention in the wider in-
novation process. Invention is just the first stage in a longer innovation process that leads
to commercialisation, and may also involve process and product innovation. Differentiat-
ing useful inventions from those that do not lead to any further innovation would make
the estimates presented more precise. Furthermore, information about the following steps
yields insights into the effects expected. Commercialisation often takes places at a dif-
ferent location from the initial invention (Feldman, 1994). Many inventions, particularly
by specialised research labs or universities are also licensed rather than commercialised
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in-house. The time frames of this process also depend on the technology and industry in
question. While some jobs will be created throughout the innovation process, others will
follow from commercialisation.
There is significant heterogeneity across the three countries studied. For France, there
are no significant effects on non-graduates of either graduate employment or patenting.
This suggests that rigid labour protection legislation may may prevent labour markets from
adjusting (Griffith & Macartney, 2014). However, there are significant effects for those
with vocational qualifications. These qualifications may make it easier to demonstrate their
skills to hiring firms, in turn lowering their risk in the face of strict employment protection.
Interestingly, the opposite is observed in Germany. While non-graduate employment shows
a strong, significant reaction to shocks in graduate employment and patenting, the effect
of graduate employment on mid-skilled employment is statistically significant only for one
year, and the effect of patenting is insignificant throughout. A possible explanation is
that, while employment protection and unemployment insurance for relatively low-skilled
and low-paid jobs have been reduced, those with vocational education, especially in the
highly innovative manufacturing industries, still enjoy relatively high levels of protection,
also due to the stronger role of unions and works councils.
Further research can unpack these differences, in particular by comparing a wider set
of countries, or by studying the effects of institutional arrangements over time. More
liberal labour market regimes, such as in the UK, may be more conducive to radical inno-
vation, while at the same time allowing for swifter labour market adjustment (Akkermans,
Castaldi, & Los, 2009; Griffith & Macartney, 2014). This should also consider any dif-
ferences in the quality of jobs that are created by different innovations, as Kemeny and
Osman (2018) and Lee and Clarke (2019) find that jobs created through the multiplier ef-
fect from high-tech employment may have an overall negative effect on average earnings in
liberal labour market regimes such as in the US and the UK. In relatively inflexible labour
markets such as the French, incentives may be higher to invest in labour-substituting in-
novation. While labour displacing technology is often feared (Caselli & Manning, 2017),
the countries studied also suffer from skills shortages in the face of changing technology.
Further research into the adjustment channels can reveal whether some labour market
institutions are more conducive to making use of technological opportunities, not only by
providing a flexible labour force, but also incentivising investments in the skills required.
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Appendix
4.A.Additional tables
Table 4.A.1: Graduate employment response to patenting shock
t-4 t-3 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5
L.Log patents 0.0049 0.015 0.039** 0.069*** 0.077*** 0.079*** 0.054** 0.048**
(0.023) (0.019) (0.016) (0.020) (0.019) (0.023) (0.023) (0.019)
L.Log grad. emp. -0.69*** -0.87*** -0.34*** -0.56*** -0.65*** -0.67*** -0.68*** -0.73***
(0.037) (0.041) (0.035) (0.039) (0.028) (0.032) (0.051) (0.046)
L2.Log grad. emp. 0.34*** 0.64*** 0.14*** 0.28*** 0.27*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.23***
(0.039) (0.034) (0.036) (0.037) (0.046) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035)
Log pop density 1.49*** 0.89*** 0.33* 0.54** 1.11*** 1.43*** 1.59*** 1.64***
(0.22) (0.14) (0.18) (0.25) (0.25) (0.24) (0.24) (0.23)
Recession (2009-2010) 0.0048 -0.0021 0.016*** 0.017** 0.027*** 0.035*** 0.013** -0.0043
(0.0057) (0.0054) (0.0047) (0.0068) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0052) (0.0054)
Constant -6.26*** -3.69*** -0.86 -1.74 -4.29*** -5.59*** -6.17*** -6.27***
(1.12) (0.71) (0.88) (1.26) (1.22) (1.16) (1.16) (1.11)
Observations 892 892 892 892 892 892 892 892
within R2 0.33 0.44 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.42 0.44 0.51
between R2 0.0063 0.0069 0.0014 0.0037 0.0024 0.0041 0.013 0.018
overall R2 0.0028 0.0043 0.0027 0.0044 0.0032 0.0043 0.0094 0.015
F-statistic 80.1 115.4 27.6 42.3 127.3 98.2 38.5 56.4
P of model test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Note: The top row shows the estimation horizon. The dependent variable is graduate employment growth over
the estimation horizon, e.g. between t-4 and t-1 in the first column and between t+5 and t-1 in the last column.
t-1 and t-2 not estimated due to multicollinearity. Estimation at the NUTS2 region level. Region fixed effects
included in all specifications.
Table 4.A.2: Patenting response to graduate employment shock
t-4 t-3 t-2 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5
L.Log patents 0.21*** 0.35*** 0.39*** 0.34*** 0.28*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.12** 0.051
(0.073) (0.044) (0.058) (0.057) (0.049) (0.051) (0.051) (0.048) (0.043)
L.Log grad. emp. 0.44*** 0.27*** 0.23*** 0.058 0.0073 0.017 -0.064 0.019 0.063
(0.067) (0.047) (0.046) (0.047) (0.066) (0.060) (0.059) (0.069) (0.066)
Log pop density -0.92* -0.92** -0.68* -0.031 0.33 0.76* 1.17*** 0.91** 0.58
(0.55) (0.44) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.41) (0.42) (0.41) (0.41)
Recession (2009-2010) 0.054***0.083***0.044***-0.0060 0.0098 -0.0077 0.0014 0.020 0.017
(0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.0088) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012)
Constant 6.95** 7.12*** 5.84*** 3.60* 2.27 0.56 -1.23 0.0091 1.89
(2.91) (2.43) (2.04) (2.01) (2.01) (2.24) (2.27) (2.21) (2.17)
Observations 892 892 892 892 892 892 892 892 892
within R2 0.20 0.25 0.23 0.14 0.095 0.045 0.048 0.042 0.025
between R2 0.012 0.034 0.16 0.99 0.61 0.25 0.17 0.18 0.18
overall R2 0.0099 0.031 0.16 0.97 0.61 0.26 0.18 0.19 0.19
F-statistic 20.3 38.8 25.0 11.0 10.1 3.5 4.2 3.5 1.8
P of model test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.14
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Note: The top row shows the estimation horizon. The dependent variable is patenting growth over the estima-
tion horizon, e.g. between t-4 and t-1 in the first column and between t+5 and t-1 in the last column. t-1 not
estimated due to multicollinearity. Estimation at the NUTS2 region level. Region fixed effects included in all
specifications.
Table 4.A.3: Non-graduate employment response to employment and patenting shocks
t-4 t-3 t-2 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
L.Log patents 0.024 0.016 0.028*** 0.050***-0.0027 -0.017 -0.020 -0.011
(0.018) (0.012) (0.0098) (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
L. ∆ log grad. emp. -0.033 -0.0055 0.049** 0.083*** 0.073*** 0.066*** -0.014 -0.068**
(0.022) (0.019) (0.021) (0.025) (0.019) (0.020) (0.023) (0.034)
L.Log non-grad emp. -1.18*** -1.14*** -0.44*** -0.78*** -0.97*** -0.95*** -1.12*** -1.11***
(0.032) (0.034) (0.044) (0.049) (0.060) (0.033) (0.050) (0.052)
L2.Log non-grad emp. 0.27*** 0.58*** -0.11*** -0.19*** -0.10** -0.12*** 0.014 0.073
(0.044) (0.039) (0.035) (0.038) (0.044) (0.037) (0.041) (0.057)
Log pop density 0.68*** 0.31** -0.58*** -1.14*** -1.27*** -1.22*** -1.21*** -1.09***
(0.18) (0.13) (0.073) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Recession (2009-2010) 0.029*** 0.020*** -0.011***-0.0061 -0.012*** -0.019*** -0.014***-0.0045
(0.0043) (0.0023) (0.0028) (0.0044) (0.0039) (0.0037) (0.0040) (0.0042)
Constant 1.95* 1.78** 6.44*** 12.0*** 13.7*** 13.5*** 13.7*** 12.6***
(1.01) (0.70) (0.50) (0.76) (0.80) (0.79) (0.81) (0.73)
Observations 892 892 892 892 892 892 892 892
within R2 0.55 0.57 0.34 0.60 0.70 0.71 0.70 0.66
between R2 0.0075 0.0069 0.0070 0.062 0.050 0.046 0.047 0.053
overall R2 0.0041 0.011 0.00010 0.0024 0.0056 0.0094 0.013 0.020
F-statistic 340.4 284.9 96.6 116.9 209.5 349.1 143.1 169.4
P of model test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Note: The top row shows the estimation horizon. The dependent variable is non-graduate employment growth
over the estimation horizon, e.g. between t-4 and t-1 in the first column and between t+5 and t-1 in the last
column. t-1 not estimated due to multicollinearity. Estimation at the NUTS2 region level. Region fixed effects
included in all specifications.
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Table 4.A.4: Advanced vocational employment response to employment and patenting
shocks
t-6 t t+2 t+4 t+6
L.Log patents 2y. -0.16 0.88** 0.30 -0.12 0.50
(0.41) (0.37) (0.36) (0.49) (0.57)
L2. ∆ log grad. emp. -1.23 0.90 2.53*** 1.37** 1.02
(1.09) (1.15) (0.72) (0.64) (0.93)
L2. ∆ log mid-skilled emp -0.47*** -0.48*** -0.48*** -0.52*** -0.43***
(0.078) (0.056) (0.059) (0.049) (0.066)
Log pop density 1.62 1.18 2.22 4.52* 4.09
(1.92) (0.94) (1.58) (2.68) (2.92)
Recession (2009-2010) 0.093 0.20* 0.057 0.0036 0.014
(0.15) (0.11) (0.11) (0.088) (0.086)
Constant -8.01 -12.8** -14.3* -24.2 -26.3
(11.3) (4.74) (8.47) (14.6) (16.4)
Observations 209 249 209 169 131
within R2 0.21 0.29 0.40 0.48 0.37
between R2 0.019 0.027 0.036 0.024 0.0057
overall R2 0.0094 0.010 0.0098 0.00081 0.000092
F-statistic 11.7 21.0 36.8 31.3 11.8
P of model test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Note: The top row shows the estimation horizon. Consistent with data availability, the estimation
horizon increases in steps of two years. The dependent variable is advanced vocational employment
growth over the estimation horizon, e.g. between t-6 and t-2 in the first column and between t+6 and
t-2 in the last column. t-2 and t-4 not estimated due to multicollinearity. Vocational employment is
normalised by total employment. Log patent applications include all applications in last two years.
Estimation at the NUTS1 region level. Region fixed effects included in all specifications.
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Table 4.A.5: Graduate employment response to patenting shocks by country
t-4 t-3 t-2 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
France
L.Log patents -0.060 -0.019 0.038 0.064 0.019 0.046 0.054 0.075
(0.079) (0.064) (0.040) (0.044) (0.051) (0.067) (0.054) (0.051)
L.Log grad. emp. -0.80*** -0.98*** -0.42*** -0.74*** -0.80*** -0.83*** -0.82*** -0.88***
(0.074) (0.074) (0.083) (0.069) (0.062) (0.080) (0.11) (0.087)
L2.Log grad. emp. 0.37*** 0.68*** 0.021 0.16** 0.14* 0.15** 0.11 0.098
(0.098) (0.071) (0.065) (0.068) (0.071) (0.065) (0.070) (0.064)
Log pop density 3.29*** 2.12*** 1.82*** 2.71*** 3.37*** 3.27*** 3.21*** 3.21***
(0.84) (0.48) (0.64) (0.75) (0.73) (0.70) (0.58) (0.54)
Constant -12.6*** -8.10*** -6.40** -9.65*** -11.9*** -11.5*** -11.1*** -10.7***
(3.14) (1.78) (2.67) (3.11) (2.88) (2.74) (2.35) (2.24)
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
within R2 0.32 0.46 0.22 0.37 0.48 0.52 0.54 0.60
between R2 0.078 0.055 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.097 0.086
overall R2 0.0091 0.0065 0.0015 0.0024 0.0050 0.0075 0.0087 0.0087
F-statistic 43.4 50.6 19.3 38.9 59.3 31.0 17.1 31.7
P of model test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Germany
L.Log patents -0.021 -0.031 0.023 0.061** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.098***
(0.030) (0.023) (0.023) (0.027) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.032)
L.Log grad. emp. -0.68*** -0.81*** -0.29*** -0.40*** -0.63*** -0.50*** -0.59*** -0.74***
(0.063) (0.068) (0.045) (0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.039) (0.053)
L2.Log grad. emp. 0.26*** 0.56*** 0.15*** 0.21*** 0.32*** 0.086 0.091 0.24***
(0.069) (0.069) (0.056) (0.053) (0.068) (0.073) (0.067) (0.056)
Log pop density 0.31 -0.039 -0.69*** -0.72*** -0.075 0.49 0.48 0.61*
(0.28) (0.19) (0.16) (0.26) (0.29) (0.36) (0.36) (0.32)
Constant 0.57 1.72 4.47*** 4.72*** 1.41 -1.31 -0.68 -1.17
(1.63) (1.14) (1.00) (1.57) (1.79) (2.19) (2.17) (1.89)
Observations 354 354 354 354 354 354 354 354
within R2 0.47 0.48 0.14 0.19 0.31 0.36 0.44 0.56
between R2 0.12 0.00015 0.037 0.010 0.17 0.20 0.25 0.22
overall R2 0.0029 0.023 0.0034 0.0015 0.093 0.12 0.18 0.19
F-statistic 41.9 62.7 18.4 20.8 67.8 57.1 70.7 54.3
P of model test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
UK
L.Log patents -0.017 0.00013 -0.012 -0.0095 0.0026 -0.016 -0.040* -0.026
(0.042) (0.033) (0.020) (0.025) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.020)
L.Log grad. emp. -0.80*** -1.03*** -0.61*** -0.94*** -0.89*** -0.96*** -0.96*** -0.92***
(0.10) (0.088) (0.063) (0.069) (0.064) (0.073) (0.12) (0.099)
L2.Log grad. emp. 0.19** 0.51*** 0.011 0.14* 0.11 0.14* 0.13** 0.16***
(0.071) (0.052) (0.061) (0.074) (0.089) (0.075) (0.060) (0.051)
Log pop density 2.86*** 2.48*** 2.93*** 3.90*** 4.00*** 4.10*** 4.04*** 3.50***
(0.70) (0.48) (0.31) (0.53) (0.61) (0.66) (0.62) (0.35)
Constant -13.2*** -11.5*** -13.5*** -18.0*** -18.7*** -18.9*** -18.4*** -15.7***
(3.35) (2.32) (1.49) (2.66) (2.97) (3.08) (2.81) (1.66)
Observations 328 328 328 328 328 328 328 328
within R2 0.32 0.49 0.35 0.52 0.55 0.61 0.61 0.57
between R2 0.0018 0.027 0.0066 0.0061 0.020 0.065 0.15 0.17
overall R2 0.00065 0.0021 0.00035 0.0028 0.0048 0.0088 0.020 0.031
F-statistic 30.5 45.0 35.4 46.4 50.1 84.7 19.8 35.1
P of model test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Note: The top row shows the estimation horizon. The dependent variable is graduate employment growth over
the estimation horizon, e.g. between t-4 and t-1 in the first column and between t+5 and t-1 in the last column.
t-1 and t-2 not estimated due to multicollinearity. Estimation at the NUTS2 region level. Region fixed effects
included in all specifications.
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Table 4.A.6: Effects on non-graduate employment by country
t-4 t-3 t-2 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
France
L.Log patents 0.013 -0.0064 -0.0065 -0.023 0.013 0.0088 0.000038 -0.020
(0.034) (0.029) (0.023) (0.026) (0.028) (0.036) (0.032) (0.031)
L. ∆ log grad. emp. -0.027 -0.066* -0.019 0.024 0.070* 0.046 -0.0090 -0.0029
(0.042) (0.035) (0.033) (0.043) (0.034) (0.047) (0.045) (0.044)
L.Log non-grad emp. -1.18*** -1.22*** -0.52*** -0.70*** -0.78*** -0.61*** -0.59*** -0.72***
(0.070) (0.078) (0.087) (0.099) (0.088) (0.084) (0.083) (0.100)
L2.Log non-grad emp. 0.14 0.56*** -0.079 0.029 0.20** 0.15* 0.0037 -0.029
(0.098) (0.071) (0.082) (0.088) (0.075) (0.076) (0.095) (0.094)
Log pop density 1.10** 0.51** -0.52* -0.85*** -1.55*** -1.85*** -1.99*** -1.83***
(0.40) (0.23) (0.25) (0.28) (0.31) (0.32) (0.38) (0.40)
Constant 1.65 2.02* 6.38*** 8.45*** 10.9*** 11.6*** 13.0*** 13.4***
(1.85) (1.08) (1.44) (1.33) (1.34) (1.43) (1.97) (2.17)
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
within R2 0.58 0.60 0.33 0.38 0.45 0.46 0.49 0.51
between R2 0.21 0.12 0.012 0.049 0.034 0.030 0.018 0.011
overall R2 0.042 0.044 0.00000021 0.0014 0.0017 0.0025 0.0017 0.00086
F-statistic 85.1 66.5 16.0 19.3 39.9 43.1 20.8 16.6
P of model test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Germany
L.Log patents -0.041* -0.0047 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.037** 0.026** 0.0054 0.0052
(0.023) (0.024) (0.017) (0.027) (0.015) (0.011) (0.016) (0.018)
L. ∆ log grad. emp. 0.073* 0.088** 0.046 0.19*** 0.097*** -0.015 -0.047** -0.028*
(0.036) (0.034) (0.029) (0.035) (0.021) (0.024) (0.020) (0.017)
L.Log non-grad emp. -1.10*** -1.22*** -0.30*** -0.71*** -1.00*** -1.25*** -1.22*** -1.03***
(0.063) (0.052) (0.049) (0.043) (0.034) (0.044) (0.045) (0.042)
L2.Log non-grad emp. 0.21*** 0.68*** -0.27*** -0.32*** -0.22*** 0.066* 0.24*** 0.27***
(0.054) (0.051) (0.049) (0.038) (0.034) (0.034) (0.030) (0.029)
Log pop density -1.35*** -0.82*** -0.097 -0.047 -0.30** -0.31* -0.35 -0.42*
(0.19) (0.11) (0.095) (0.11) (0.12) (0.18) (0.22) (0.25)
Constant 13.6*** 8.08*** 3.58*** 6.13*** 9.38*** 9.25*** 8.29*** 7.28***
(1.19) (0.74) (0.66) (0.79) (0.77) (1.06) (1.25) (1.40)
Observations 354 354 354 354 354 354 354 354
within R2 0.54 0.63 0.36 0.63 0.84 0.86 0.78 0.69
between R2 0.028 0.020 0.0031 0.050 0.0000012 0.0075 0.016 0.0098
overall R2 0.00021 0.000056 0.0034 0.0026 0.0023 0.0033 0.0043 0.0021
F-statistic 110.3 215.0 53.3 104.9 262.1 232.0 178.2 171.7
P of model test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
UK
L.Log patents 0.0016 0.0011 0.0038 0.042* 0.0016 -0.00057 -0.0030 0.0035
(0.027) (0.016) (0.015) (0.025) (0.016) (0.019) (0.022) (0.014)
L. ∆ log grad. emp. -0.064** -0.0074 0.082** 0.055* 0.049** 0.082*** -0.043 -0.18***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.040) (0.028) (0.024) (0.019) (0.041) (0.062)
L.Log non-grad emp. -1.12*** -1.02*** -0.52*** -0.87*** -1.04*** -0.96*** -1.29*** -1.33***
(0.041) (0.035) (0.059) (0.058) (0.092) (0.040) (0.061) (0.053)
L2.Log non-grad emp. 0.19** 0.43*** -0.024 -0.099* -0.048 -0.28*** -0.11 -0.034
(0.074) (0.048) (0.049) (0.056) (0.060) (0.042) (0.066) (0.097)
Log pop density 1.90*** 1.20*** -0.91*** -1.80*** -1.92*** -1.52*** -1.26*** -0.85***
(0.18) (0.12) (0.090) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.19) (0.21)
Constant -5.23*** -3.31*** 8.57*** 16.0*** 17.6*** 16.3*** 15.7*** 13.1***
(0.98) (0.68) (0.53) (0.86) (1.04) (0.98) (1.16) (0.94)
Observations 328 328 328 328 328 328 328 328
within R2 0.70 0.62 0.41 0.76 0.79 0.81 0.82 0.80
between R2 0.0013 0.0094 0.0016 0.037 0.029 0.031 0.045 0.072
overall R2 0.0017 0.0042 0.00067 0.00031 0.00021 0.00031 0.00051 0.0017
F-statistic 325.2 278.9 83.1 114.3 103.9 249.8 397.4 426.9
P of model test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Note: The top row shows the estimation horizon. The dependent variable is non-graduate employment growth
over the estimation horizon, e.g. between t-4 and t-1 in the first column and between t+5 and t-1 in the last
column. t-1 not estimated due to multicollinearity. Estimation at the NUTS2 region level. Region fixed effects
included in all specifications.
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Table 4.A.7: Effects on advanced vocational employment by country
t-6 t t+2 t+4 t+6
France
L.Log patents 2y. 0.22 1.87** 1.31 1.00 -0.83
(0.81) (0.61) (0.97) (1.51) (0.65)
L2. ∆ log grad. emp. -0.70 4.50** 2.84** -0.12 2.91
(4.49) (1.89) (1.21) (1.78) (2.33)
L2. ∆ log mid-skilled emp -0.67*** -0.62*** -0.66*** -0.70*** -0.62***
(0.21) (0.087) (0.095) (0.15) (0.066)
Log pop density -3.76 4.74 -0.78 3.14 15.0*
(7.40) (2.75) (3.19) (7.71) (5.54)
Recession (2009-2010) 0.93* 0.84*** 0.56 0.47* 0.43**
(0.45) (0.18) (0.34) (0.24) (0.096)
Constant 16.9 -37.3** -5.92 -23.1 -70.3**
(37.7) (12.3) (10.8) (30.5) (23.6)
Observations 44 56 44 32 20
within R2 0.45 0.60 0.59 0.74 0.84
between R2 0.18 0.0014 0.18 0.0032 0.10
overall R2 0.00015 0.0057 0.21 0.0032 0.00048
F-statistic 5.8 21.8 22.9 . .
P of model test 0.01 0.00 0.00 . .
Germany
L.Log patents 2y. 0.59 0.58 0.45 -0.83 0.31
(0.79) (0.91) (0.73) (0.58) (1.40)
L2. ∆ log grad. emp. -2.36** -1.10 3.07** 0.96 -0.84
(0.89) (1.42) (1.10) (0.60) (1.51)
L2. ∆ log mid-skilled emp -0.54*** -0.38*** -0.43*** -0.50*** -0.29**
(0.10) (0.078) (0.11) (0.051) (0.13)
Log pop density 4.13* 2.91* 7.38*** 12.6*** 9.52**
(2.15) (1.51) (1.78) (2.42) (4.21)
Recession (2009-2010) 0.070 0.22 -0.074 -0.15 -0.027
(0.18) (0.15) (0.18) (0.12) (0.16)
Constant -28.1* -20.8*** -45.3*** -65.5*** -56.2*
(14.6) (6.56) (10.9) (14.7) (28.9)
Observations 93 109 93 77 63
within R2 0.34 0.21 0.46 0.62 0.27
between R2 0.030 0.016 0.024 0.017 0.0079
overall R2 0.013 0.0037 0.00030 0.0071 0.0023
F-statistic 15.2 13.3 90.2 73.3 2.1
P of model test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12
UK
L.Log patents 2y. -0.28 0.49* 0.36 0.94 0.99
(0.42) (0.25) (0.50) (0.56) (0.86)
L2. ∆ log grad. emp. 1.95 0.58 0.58 2.47** 2.10
(1.68) (1.77) (0.99) (0.86) (2.10)
L2. ∆ log mid-skilled emp -0.25** -0.57*** -0.43*** -0.49*** -0.50***
(0.11) (0.088) (0.041) (0.095) (0.11)
Log pop density -1.60 -1.02 -3.55*** -2.75 -2.75
(2.16) (1.40) (1.13) (1.71) (2.17)
Recession (2009-2010) -0.17 -0.014 -0.097 0.12 0.12
(0.18) (0.21) (0.12) (0.15) (0.15)
Constant 11.0 2.63 18.3*** 9.60 9.38
(10.5) (8.34) (5.12) (11.1) (16.3)
Observations 72 84 72 60 48
within R2 0.16 0.41 0.43 0.52 0.60
between R2 0.16 0.00000032 0.0069 0.020 0.018
overall R2 0.0021 0.049 0.0014 0.0020 0.023
F-statistic 4.0 26.1 36.6 24.3 12.5
P of model test 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Note: The top row shows the estimation horizon. Consistent with data availability, the estimation horizon in-
creases in steps of two years. The dependent variable is advanced vocational employment growth over the esti-
mation horizon, e.g. between t-6 and t-2 in the first column and between t+6 and t-2 in the last column. t-2
and t-4 not estimated due to multicollinearity. Vocational employment is normalised by total employment. Log
patent applications include all applications in last two years. Estimation at the NUTS1 region level. Region
fixed effects included in all specifications.
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